Nor certainly could its worst enemy have predicted that the infallibility of the Pope would be invented and thrust upon the faithful, as a doctrine20 whose acceptance was essential to their spiritual welfare, in a period when it was being proved every day and in all departments of human knowledge that what was universally believed to be a certainty yesterday is discounted as a fallacy to-morrow. Nothing in all the long controversy21 about the Separation of Church and State in France produced a greater or more permanent effect upon intelligent Frenchmen than this preposterous22 claim of Papal infallibility. Explain it away, whittle23 down its significance by any amount of Jesuitical sophistry24, and still this declaration that a mere25 man could never be mistaken, because he was the Vicegerent of God, shook the whole framework of Catholic domination, so far as any participation26 of the State in the matter was concerned. And the career and character of many of the Pope’s predecessors27 rendered the dogma more utterly28 preposterous to all who had even a smattering of the history of the Vatican than might otherwise have been the case. That John XXIII should have been infallible threw a strange light upon Catholic morality in its highest grades. Yet if Pius infallible, why not John?
What, however, had more practical effect in turning the scale of public opinion against the Papacy, its nominees29 and believers as servants and paid employees of the State, was the fact that in all the practical affairs of French life the Catholic Church, as represented by its ecclesiastical hierarchy30, had taken the wrong side. Theoretical or theological difficulties would never[222] have upset the regard of the French people for the National Church. But, time after time, the Clerical party ranged itself with the reactionists, throwing over all its wisest counsellors, whose devotion to the Church had never been questioned, when they advised standing31 by the cause of the people, and relied solely32 upon the judgment33 of bigoted34 Jesuits. Zola, whom these creatures hated, showed in his “Germinal,” thorough-going materialist35 as he was, what a noble part a priest of the Church could play, when the young ecclesiastic12 stands between the strikers who form part of his flock and the soldiers who are about to fire upon them. Individuals might thus rise up to and above the level of their creed, but the Church in France, as a whole, was represented by men of God who were a good deal worse than men of Belial. Nor was this all. They pursued a policy of relentless36 obscurantism. Their object was not to develop education but to stunt37 its growth: not to teach the truth but to foster lies. So manifest was the determination to take no high view of their duties that such a man as the venerable Dr. Leplay, a Catholic of Catholics whose religious convictions did not prevent him from becoming a master of the theories of Marx, lamented38 that his Church was proving itself wholly incompetent39 to cope with or to stem what, as a Christian, he recognised was the rising tide of infidelity.
Of this infidelity, the free-thinker and champion of secularism40, Clemenceau, was a type and a prominent example. He saw the Church as a pernicious influence. His feeling towards it was even more vehement41 than that of Voltaire or Gambetta. “écrasez l’infame!” “Le cléricalisme voilà l’ennemi!” If thought was to be free, if Frenchmen were to be emancipated42 from superstition43 and intolerance, the power of the Catholic Church must be weakened and, if possible, destroyed. For him, in this matter, compromise was impossible. His begettings, his surroundings, his education, his profession, his political life all made him relentless on this point. Behind the Duc de Broglie, behind the persecutor44 of Dreyfus, behind the pretender Boulanger, behind reaction in all its forms hid the sinister45 figure[223] of the unscrupulous power, working perinde ac cadaver47 against all that was noblest in France, against all that was highest in the ideals of the Republic. And if Clemenceau knew well that under all circumstances and at every turn of events the Catholic Church was the enemy of France and of himself, the Church had no doubt at all that Clemenceau was its most formidable foe48 in French political life.
Long before and after his defeat in the Var, in 1893, the Catholics never hesitated to join with their enemies, if only this combination would help them to overthrow49 Clemenceau. Whatever differences the French Premier50 might have with the Socialists51 on strikes and social affairs generally, on the matter of the separation of Church and State they were heartily53 at one. In fact, Clemenceau was even more uncompromising than they. The whole texture54 of his thought revolted against showing any consideration for a Church which, from his point of view, had been for centuries the chief and most formidable enemy of progress in France and the most capable organiser of attacks upon all democratic and Republican ideals.
The greatest names in French history are the names of those whom the Catholic Church has persecuted55 or martyred. Its leaders would resort to the same tactics now, and have only failed to do so because the power has slipped from their hands as the truths of science and the wider conceptions of human destiny have permeated56 the minds of the masses. There was no likelihood that, as Prime Minister, Clemenceau, the free-thinker and materialist, would be inclined to modify his opinions in favour of what might be regarded as statesmanlike concessions57 to the Right on ecclesiastical matters. The danger lay in the other direction. It was one of the remarkable58 incidents, in connection with his first tenure59 of the Presidency60 of the Council, that the final settlement of this important question of the relations of Church and State should come when he himself was at the head of the French Government.
When M. Briand’s measure for the complete laicisation of the Church so far as the State was concerned was introduced into[224] the Chamber61, he pointed62 out in his report that the proposal for complete separation was not dictated63 by hatred or political prejudice, nor did it involve anything at all approaching to the change in the relations of property when, at the time of the French Revolution, the Church owned one-third of the total wealth of France. This Act was the assertion of definite principles which were necessary in order to secure for the State full mastery in its own country. Freedom of worship for all. No State payment to ministers of any creed. Equitable64 management of Church property taken over by the towns and Communes.
The Bill, after considerable debate in the National Assembly, was passed by a large majority. In the Senate M. Clemenceau denounced the settlement as too favourable65 to the clergy66. His criticism was as mordant67 as usual. But he neither proposed an amendment68 nor voted against the Bill, which passed the Senate without even the alteration69 of a word, by a greater proportional majority than it did in the Lower House.
This, it might have been thought, would have been the end of the matter for Clemenceau. He had done his full share towards putting the Catholic Church out of action, and might have been contented70, as Premier, with any further settlement that M. Briand, the member of his own Cabinet responsible for this important measure, and M. Jaurès, the powerful leader of the Socialist52 Party, might come to in regard to the properties of the Church, about which there had been much bitter feeling. But Clemenceau has the defects of his qualities. The Pope had refused to permit his clergy to avail themselves of the excellent terms French Republicans, Radicals71 and Socialists had been ready to accord to them. He had issued two Encyclicals which could certainly be read as intended to stir up trouble in the Republic—which, in fact, had brought about some disorder73. When, therefore, everything seemed arranged on this prickly question of valuations and appropriations74, Clemenceau could not resist the temptation to show the unsatisfactory nature of the entire business to him. It was[225] one of those moments of impulse when “the Tiger” could not refrain from giving free play to his propensities75, at the expense of his own kith and kin46, failing the presence of his enemies to maul. It was thought that the Ministry76 must come down; for both M. Briand and M. Jaurès took this outburst amiss. But a conversation in the lobby brought the great irreconcilable77 very sensibly to a compromise, and Clemenceau failed to give the Catholics the malicious78 enjoyment79 they anticipated. It was a strange ebullition which exhibited the perennial80 youth of this statesman of the unexpected.
In other directions than social affairs and Morocco, where he unfortunately relied upon the Right more than upon the Left in the Assembly for the support of his Administration, Clemenceau proved that his claim to act as the advocate of reform as well as the upholder of order was no pretence81.
Whatever may have been its alleged82 deficiencies in some respects, Clemenceau’s first Ministry was by far the most Radical72 Government that had held office under the Republic. And the boldness and decision which he and his Cabinet displayed in dealing83 with what they regarded as Anarchist84 action—it is fair, perhaps, to recall that Briand himself had first achieved fame as an Anarchist—on the part of the workers, they also put in force, when high-placed officers, with a powerful political backing, tried to impose their will upon the State. Thus the navy, as has too often happened in French annals, had been allowed to drift into a condition which was actually dangerous, in view of what was going on in the German dockyards, and the probable combination of the Austrian and Italian fleets, with German help, in the Mediterranean85. At the same time, admirals were in the habit of acting86 pretty much as they saw fit in regard to the fleets and vessels87 under their control. Consequently, important men-of-war had been wrecked88 time after time, and more than one serious accident had occurred. In almost every case also, so powerful was the esprit de corps89, in the wrong sense, that the officers in command at the time were exonerated90 from blame.[226] There was, therefore, a strong public opinion in favour of something being done to improve both the fleet itself and the spirit which animated its commanders. Admiral Germinat, a popular officer with, as appears, a genuine loyalty91 to his profession and a desire to remedy its defects, thought proper to write a very strong letter to a local service newspaper, making a fierce attack upon the general management of the navy, without having given any notice of his views either to the Minister of Marine92 or the Prime Minister.
Thereupon, M. Clemenceau at once put him on the retired93 list. Immediately a great hubbub95 arose. The very same people who had approved of Clemenceau’s policy, in regard to those whom they called anarchist workmen, were now in full cry after the President of Council, for daring to deal thus drastically with a man who, however his good intentions may have been and however distinguished96 his career, was beyond all question an anarchist admiral. The matter became a question of the day. It was brought up in the Senate amid all sorts of threats to the stability of the Government. M. Clemenceau, as usual, took up the challenge boldly himself. His speech was so crushing that the whole indictment97 against the Ministry collapsed98. The evidence of indiscipline on the Admiral’s part, not only on this occasion but on several others, and the declaration that Admiral Germinat would not be excluded from the navy, when he had purged99 his offence and when his services would be advantageous100 to the country, settled the matter and strengthened the Ministry.
By acquiring the Chemin de Fer de l’Ouest and combining it with other Government railways, the Ministry made the first important step towards nationalisation of railways. Clemenceau defended this measure on grounds that would be, and were, accepted by Socialists; but events have shown in this particular case that a good deal more is needed than the establishment of another department of State bureaucracy to render the railways a national property really beneficial to the community. As carried out in practice, the acquisition[227] of the Chemin de Fer de l’Ouest has rather set back than advanced the general policy of railway nationalisation in France.
A more important measure was that introduced by M. Caillaux and, amazing to say, passed through the Assembly, for a graduated income-tax. How this majority was obtained has always been one of the puzzles of that period. There is no country in the world where a tax upon incomes is more unpopular than in France, and from that day to this, in spite of the desperate need for funds which has arisen, this tax has never yet become law. But it was a genuine financial reform and creditable to the Government. The Socialists supported it, though in itself it is only a palliative measure of justice in purely101 bourgeois102 finance. From this period dates the close alliance between the Socialists as revolutionaries and M. Caillaux as the adventurous103 financier and director of the Société Générale, which later produced such strange results in French politics, and intensified104 Socialist hatred for M. Clemenceau. But at this time M. Caillaux, with the full concurrence105 and support of the Prime Minister, was attacking all the bourgeois interests in their tenderest place. The wonder is that such a policy did not involve the immediate94 fall of the Ministry. Quite possibly, had Clemenceau remained in office, it might have become a permanent feature in French finance. Boldness and boldness and boldness again is sometimes as successful in politics as it is in oratory106. Although, therefore, to attack pecuniary107 “interests” of a large section of the nation is a far more hazardous108 enterprise than to denounce eminent109 persons or to overthrow Ministries110, this move might then have been successful if well followed up.
On March 8th, in this year 1909, Clemenceau unveiled a statue to the Radical Minister Floquet, with whom he had worked for many years. The revolutionary Socialists announced their intention of demonstrating against him on this occasion. They objected to him and his administration on account of the expedition to Morocco—in which Clemenceau had certainly run counter to all his previous policy on colonial affairs—on[228] account of cosmopolitan111 finance, Russian loans and the shooting down of workmen on strike. It was the last that occasioned the bitterest feeling against him, and this was really not surprising.
Clemenceau had made the workers’ liberty to strike in combination secure, but he did not use the power of the State against the employers, who, in the mines especially, could on his own showing be considered only as profiteering trustees under the State. Also, he refused to all Government servants the right to combine or to strike. This disinclination to take the capitalists by the throat, while using the official power to restrain the workers, had a great deal more to do with the menacing attitude of the Socialists than Morocco or finance. However, there was no disturbance113. Clemenceau took advantage of the occasion to deliver a speech which was in effect a powerful defence of the idealist Republicanism of the eighteenth century against the revolutionary Socialism of the twentieth.
The French Revolution is deified by nearly all advanced Frenchmen. Its glorification114 is as much the theme of Jaurès and Vaillant as of Gambetta and Clemenceau. Bourgeois revolution as it turned out to be, owing to economic causes which neither individualists nor collectivists could control, orators115 of the Revolution overlook facts and cleave to ideals. Thus Clemenceau told his audience that the French Revolution was a prodigious116 tragedy, which seemed to have been the work of demi-gods, of huge Titans who had risen up from far below to wreak117 Promethean vengeance118 on the Olympians of every grade. The French Revolution was the inevitable119 culmination120 of the deadly struggle between the growing forces of liberty and the worn-out forces of autocracy121 without an autocrat122. Yet, said he, the Revolution itself was made by men and women inspired with the noblest ideals, but educated, in their own despite, by the Church to methods of domination, condemned123 also by the desperate resistance of immeasurable powers to prompt and pitiless action followed by corresponding deeds of brutal124 reaction. The people who had just shed torrents125 of[229] blood for the freedom of the world passed, without audible protest, from Robespierre to Napoleon. Yet the Revolution is all of a piece. The Republic moves steadily126 on as one indissoluble, vivifying force. Compare the France of the panic of 1875 with the France of to-day. Her position is the result of understandings and alliances and friendships based on the authority of her armed force. France has resumed her position in Europe, in spite of a few weak and mean-spirited Frenchmen, whose opposition127 only strengthened the patriotic128 enthusiasm of the nation at large. The history of the Republican Party had been one long consecration129 of the watchwords of the French Revolution. Liberty of the Press. Liberty of public meeting. Liberty of association. Liberty of trade unions. Liberty of minds by public schools. Liberty of thought and religion. Liberty of secular instruction. Liberty of State and worship. Laws had been passed for relief of the sick. A day of rest had been prescribed for all. Workmen’s compensation for injury had been made imperative130. The Income Tax had been passed by the Assembly. “The Revolution is in effect one and indivisible, and, with unbroken persistence131, the work of the Republic goes on.” A fine record! So argued Clemenceau.
Notwithstanding all the mistakes which Socialists so bitterly resented, this was a great victory for the Republicans and for the Administration of which Clemenceau was the head. Not the least important claim to national recognition of good service done was the establishment of the Ministry of Labour, over which Viviani, the well-known Socialist, presided. The pressure of events, as well as the pressure of the Socialists themselves, might well have pushed the Radical-Socialist Premier farther along the Socialist path.
Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, and, from more than one point of view, for the nation, M. Clemenceau had another of those strange fits of impatience132 and irascibility which he had exhibited more than once before. The political antagonism133 between M. Clemenceau and M. Delcassé was of long standing, and was intensified by personal bitterness. During his tenure[230] of the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, a position which he had held for seven years, in successive Administrations of widely different character, M. Delcassé had been subjected to vehement attacks by the leader of the Radical Left. His policy in relation to Morocco had been specially112 obnoxious134 to M. Clemenceau. That policy M. Clemenceau had most severely135 criticised at the time when M. Delcassé was stoutly136 resisting that extension of German influence in Morocco which led to the Foreign Minister’s downfall and the Conference of Algeciras, that M. Delcassé had refused to accept. The relations between the two statesmen could scarcely have been worse; but hitherto the Radical leader had carried all before him.
Now came a dramatic climax137 to the long struggle. A debate arose in the French Assembly on the condition of the navy. It was admittedly not what it ought to have been. M. Picard, the Minister of Marine, made a conciliatory reply to interpellations on the subject of promised immediate reforms and even complete reconstitution. But this was not enough for M. Delcassé. The Assembly was not hostile to M. Clemenceau, and certainly had no desire to oust138 his Administration; yet M. Delcassé’s direct attack upon the Premier brought the whole debate down to the level of a personal question. Nevertheless, what he said was quite legitimate139 criticism. M. Clemenceau had been a member of the Commission of Inquiry140 on the Navy, and could not get rid of his responsibility for the present state of things. The great critic of everybody and everything was open to exposure himself. He who had enjoyed twenty-five years of running amuck141 at the whole political world was now being called to account in person as an administrator142. So far M. Delcassé. Clemenceau retorted that M. Delcassé had himself been on the Naval143 Commission of 1904. He was full of great policies here, there and everywhere. What had they resulted in? The humiliation144 of France and the Conference of Algeciras. Clemenceau was evidently much incensed145. The fact that he had been obliged, as he thought, by Germany’s action, to follow M. Delcassé’s Moroccan tactics rendered the[231] position exceptionally awkward. It raised the whole question of M. Delcassé’s foreign policy. This gave him a great advantage when it came to direct political warfare146. For M. Delcassé was considered, even by those who opposed him, as the victim of German hatred, since he had refused to surrender to German threats and was sacrificed simply because France dared not face a war. So when he recounted his agreement with Spain, his agreement with Italy, his agreement—“too long delayed”—with England, his mediation147 in the Spanish-American War and his Treaties of Arbitration148, the Assembly went with him. Then, too, his assaults upon Clemenceau raised the fighting spirit on Delcassé’s side. The feeling was: “This time Clemenceau is getting as good as he brings.” The Prime Minister has not done his duty either as President of the Inquiry or as President of Council. “I say to him as he said to Jules Ferry: ‘Get out. We won’t discuss with you the great interests of this nation.’”
Very good sword-play. But had Clemenceau kept cool, as he certainly would have done on the duel149 ground, there might have been no harm done. However, he burst out into furious denunciation, exasperated150 by the ringing cheers which greeted his opponent’s conclusion. It was M. Delcassé’s fault that France had to go to Algeciras. M. Delcassé would have carried things with a high hand. “But the army was not ready, the navy was not ready. I have not humiliated151 France: M. Delcassé has humiliated her.” A purely personal note, disclosing facts that were the more bitter to the Assembly inasmuch that they were true. It was indecent—that was the sensation that ran round the House—for a Premier thus to expose the weakness of his country on a personal issue, no matter what provocation he may have received. The hostile vote, therefore, was given against Clemenceau himself, not against his Government, and he promptly152 resigned.
Had he desired to bring about his own overthrow he would have acted precisely153 as he did; and some thought that this was his intention. It was an unworthy conclusion to a Premiership which, whatever its shortcomings, had done extremely[232] good work for the Republic, and to a Government which had lasted longer than any French Administration since the downfall of the Empire. The character and leadership of the Ministry under M. Briand, which succeeded Clemenceau’s Cabinet, proved that only by his own fault had he ensured his official downfall.
As usual, he turned round at once to other work, and accepted an engagement to speak throughout South America, publishing a pleasant record of his experiences in an agreeably written book. The Prime Minister of yesterday was the genial154 lecturer the day after.
Note.—It was said at the time that M. Briand’s intrigues155 in the lobbies were the real cause of Clemenceau’s defeat and resignation. Lately this has been confirmed to me on good authority. At any rate, M. Briand benefited. It was he who succeeded his chief.
H. M. H.
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1 provocation | |
n.激怒,刺激,挑拨,挑衅的事物,激怒的原因 | |
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2 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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3 immolate | |
v.牺牲 | |
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4 erring | |
做错事的,错误的 | |
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5 nominally | |
在名义上,表面地; 应名儿 | |
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6 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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7 creed | |
n.信条;信念,纲领 | |
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8 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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9 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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10 sanctuary | |
n.圣所,圣堂,寺庙;禁猎区,保护区 | |
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11 repression | |
n.镇压,抑制,抑压 | |
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12 ecclesiastic | |
n.教士,基督教会;adj.神职者的,牧师的,教会的 | |
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13 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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14 secular | |
n.牧师,凡人;adj.世俗的,现世的,不朽的 | |
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15 cardinals | |
红衣主教( cardinal的名词复数 ); 红衣凤头鸟(见于北美,雄鸟为鲜红色); 基数 | |
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16 salvation | |
n.(尤指基督)救世,超度,拯救,解困 | |
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17 votaries | |
n.信徒( votary的名词复数 );追随者;(天主教)修士;修女 | |
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18 cleave | |
v.(clave;cleaved)粘着,粘住;坚持;依恋 | |
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19 heresies | |
n.异端邪说,异教( heresy的名词复数 ) | |
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20 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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21 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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22 preposterous | |
adj.荒谬的,可笑的 | |
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23 whittle | |
v.削(木头),削减;n.屠刀 | |
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24 sophistry | |
n.诡辩 | |
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25 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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26 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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27 predecessors | |
n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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28 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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29 nominees | |
n.被提名者,被任命者( nominee的名词复数 ) | |
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30 hierarchy | |
n.等级制度;统治集团,领导层 | |
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31 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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32 solely | |
adv.仅仅,唯一地 | |
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33 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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34 bigoted | |
adj.固执己见的,心胸狭窄的 | |
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35 materialist | |
n. 唯物主义者 | |
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36 relentless | |
adj.残酷的,不留情的,无怜悯心的 | |
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37 stunt | |
n.惊人表演,绝技,特技;vt.阻碍...发育,妨碍...生长 | |
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38 lamented | |
adj.被哀悼的,令人遗憾的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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39 incompetent | |
adj.无能力的,不能胜任的 | |
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40 secularism | |
n.现世主义;世俗主义;宗教与教育分离论;政教分离论 | |
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41 vehement | |
adj.感情强烈的;热烈的;(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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42 emancipated | |
adj.被解放的,不受约束的v.解放某人(尤指摆脱政治、法律或社会的束缚)( emancipate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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43 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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44 persecutor | |
n. 迫害者 | |
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45 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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46 kin | |
n.家族,亲属,血缘关系;adj.亲属关系的,同类的 | |
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47 cadaver | |
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48 foe | |
n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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49 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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50 premier | |
adj.首要的;n.总理,首相 | |
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51 socialists | |
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52 socialist | |
n.社会主义者;adj.社会主义的 | |
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53 heartily | |
adv.衷心地,诚恳地,十分,很 | |
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54 texture | |
n.(织物)质地;(材料)构造;结构;肌理 | |
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55 persecuted | |
(尤指宗教或政治信仰的)迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 ); 烦扰,困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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56 permeated | |
弥漫( permeate的过去式和过去分词 ); 遍布; 渗入; 渗透 | |
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57 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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58 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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59 tenure | |
n.终身职位;任期;(土地)保有权,保有期 | |
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60 presidency | |
n.总统(校长,总经理)的职位(任期) | |
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61 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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62 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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63 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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64 equitable | |
adj.公平的;公正的 | |
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65 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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66 clergy | |
n.[总称]牧师,神职人员 | |
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67 mordant | |
adj.讽刺的;尖酸的 | |
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68 amendment | |
n.改正,修正,改善,修正案 | |
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69 alteration | |
n.变更,改变;蚀变 | |
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70 contented | |
adj.满意的,安心的,知足的 | |
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71 radicals | |
n.激进分子( radical的名词复数 );根基;基本原理;[数学]根数 | |
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72 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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73 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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74 appropriations | |
n.挪用(appropriation的复数形式) | |
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75 propensities | |
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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76 ministry | |
n.(政府的)部;牧师 | |
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77 irreconcilable | |
adj.(指人)难和解的,势不两立的 | |
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78 malicious | |
adj.有恶意的,心怀恶意的 | |
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79 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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80 perennial | |
adj.终年的;长久的 | |
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81 pretence | |
n.假装,作假;借口,口实;虚伪;虚饰 | |
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82 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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83 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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84 anarchist | |
n.无政府主义者 | |
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85 Mediterranean | |
adj.地中海的;地中海沿岸的 | |
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86 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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87 vessels | |
n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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88 wrecked | |
adj.失事的,遇难的 | |
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89 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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90 exonerated | |
v.使免罪,免除( exonerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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91 loyalty | |
n.忠诚,忠心 | |
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92 marine | |
adj.海的;海生的;航海的;海事的;n.水兵 | |
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93 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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94 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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95 hubbub | |
n.嘈杂;骚乱 | |
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96 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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97 indictment | |
n.起诉;诉状 | |
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98 collapsed | |
adj.倒塌的 | |
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99 purged | |
清除(政敌等)( purge的过去式和过去分词 ); 涤除(罪恶等); 净化(心灵、风气等); 消除(错事等)的不良影响 | |
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100 advantageous | |
adj.有利的;有帮助的 | |
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101 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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102 bourgeois | |
adj./n.追求物质享受的(人);中产阶级分子 | |
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103 adventurous | |
adj.爱冒险的;惊心动魄的,惊险的,刺激的 | |
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104 intensified | |
v.(使)增强, (使)加剧( intensify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105 concurrence | |
n.同意;并发 | |
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106 oratory | |
n.演讲术;词藻华丽的言辞 | |
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107 pecuniary | |
adj.金钱的;金钱上的 | |
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108 hazardous | |
adj.(有)危险的,冒险的;碰运气的 | |
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109 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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110 ministries | |
(政府的)部( ministry的名词复数 ); 神职; 牧师职位; 神职任期 | |
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111 cosmopolitan | |
adj.世界性的,全世界的,四海为家的,全球的 | |
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112 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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113 disturbance | |
n.动乱,骚动;打扰,干扰;(身心)失调 | |
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114 glorification | |
n.赞颂 | |
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115 orators | |
n.演说者,演讲家( orator的名词复数 ) | |
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116 prodigious | |
adj.惊人的,奇妙的;异常的;巨大的;庞大的 | |
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117 wreak | |
v.发泄;报复 | |
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118 vengeance | |
n.报复,报仇,复仇 | |
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119 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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120 culmination | |
n.顶点;最高潮 | |
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121 autocracy | |
n.独裁政治,独裁政府 | |
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122 autocrat | |
n.独裁者;专横的人 | |
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123 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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124 brutal | |
adj.残忍的,野蛮的,不讲理的 | |
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125 torrents | |
n.倾注;奔流( torrent的名词复数 );急流;爆发;连续不断 | |
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126 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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127 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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128 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
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129 consecration | |
n.供献,奉献,献祭仪式 | |
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130 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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131 persistence | |
n.坚持,持续,存留 | |
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132 impatience | |
n.不耐烦,急躁 | |
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133 antagonism | |
n.对抗,敌对,对立 | |
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134 obnoxious | |
adj.极恼人的,讨人厌的,可憎的 | |
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135 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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136 stoutly | |
adv.牢固地,粗壮的 | |
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137 climax | |
n.顶点;高潮;v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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138 oust | |
vt.剥夺,取代,驱逐 | |
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139 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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140 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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141 amuck | |
ad.狂乱地 | |
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142 administrator | |
n.经营管理者,行政官员 | |
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143 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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144 humiliation | |
n.羞辱 | |
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145 incensed | |
盛怒的 | |
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146 warfare | |
n.战争(状态);斗争;冲突 | |
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147 mediation | |
n.调解 | |
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148 arbitration | |
n.调停,仲裁 | |
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149 duel | |
n./v.决斗;(双方的)斗争 | |
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150 exasperated | |
adj.恼怒的 | |
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151 humiliated | |
感到羞愧的 | |
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152 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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153 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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154 genial | |
adj.亲切的,和蔼的,愉快的,脾气好的 | |
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155 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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