I have just read a book which has been widely recommended, which is introduced to the public by Dr. Saleeby, and which is, I understand, written by a Swiss scientist of great distinction. It is called Sexual Ethics12, by Professor Forel. I began to read the book, therefore, with respect. I finished reading it with stupefaction. The Swiss Professor is obviously an honest man, though too Puritanical13 to my taste, and I am told that he does really know an enormous lot about insects. But as for the conception of proving a case, as for any notion that a “new” opinion needs proof, and that it is not enough, when you knock down great institutions, to say that you don’t like them—it is clear that no such conceptions have ever crossed his mind. Science says that man has no conscience. Science says that man and woman must have the same political powers. Science says that sterile14 unions are morally free and without rule. Science says that it is wrong to drink fermented15 liquor. And all this with a splendid indifference16 to the two facts—first, that “Science” does not say these things at all, for numbers of great scientists say exactly the opposite; and second, that if Science did say these things, a person reading a book of rationalistic ethics might be permitted to ask why. Professor Forel may have mountains of evidence which he has no space to exhibit. We will give him the benefit of that doubt, and pass on to points where any thinking man is capable of judging him.
Where this sort of scientific writer is seen in all his glory is in his first abstract arguments about the nature of morality. He is immense; he is at once simple and monstrous17, like a whale. He always has one dim principle or prejudice: to prove that there is nothing separate or sacred about the moral sense. Professor Forel holds this prejudice with all possible decorum and propriety18. He always trots19 out three arguments to prove it; like three old broken-kneed elephants. Professor Forel duly trots them out. They are supposed to show that there is no such thing positively20 existing as the conscience; and they might just as easily be used to show that there are no such things as wings or whiskers, or toes or teeth, or boots or books, or Swiss Professors.
The first argument is that man has no conscience because some men are quite mad, and therefore not particularly conscientious21. The second argument is that man has no conscience because some men are more conscientious than others. And the third is that man has no conscience because conscientious men in different countries and quite different circumstances often do very different things. Professor Forel applies these arguments eloquently22 to the question of human consciences; and I really cannot see why I should not apply them to the question of human noses. Man has no nose because now and then a man has no nose—I believe that Sir William Davenant, the poet, had none. Man has no nose because some noses are longer than others or can smell better than others. Man has no nose because not only are noses of different shapes, but (oh, piercing sword of scepticism!) some men use their noses and find the smell of incense23 nice, while some use their noses and find it nasty. Science therefore declares that man is normally noseless; and will take this for granted for the next four or five hundred pages, and will treat all the alleged24 noses of history as the quaint25 legends of a credulous26 age.
I do not mention these views because they are original, but exactly because they are not. They are only dangerous in Professor Forel’s book because they can be found in a thousand books of our epoch27. This writer solemnly asserts that Kant’s idea of an ultimate conscience is a fable28 because Mohammedans think it wrong to drink wine, while English officers think it right. Really he might just as well say that the instinct of self-preservation is a fable because some people avoid brandy in order to live long, and some people drink brandy in order to save their lives. Does Professor Forel believe that Kant, or anybody else, thought that our consciences gave us direct commands about the details of diet or social etiquette29? Did Kant maintain that, when we had reached a certain stage of dinner, a supernatural voice whispered in our ear “Asparagus”; or that the marriage between almonds and raisins30 was a marriage that was made in heaven? Surely it is plain enough that all these social duties are deduced from primary moral duties—and may be deduced wrong. Conscience does not suggest “asparagus,” but it does suggest amiability31, and it is thought by some to be an amiable32 act to accept asparagus when it is offered to you. Conscience does not respect fish and sherry; but it does respect any innocent ritual that will make men feel alike. Conscience does not tell you not to drink your hock after your port. But it does tell you not to commit suicide; and your mere33 naturalistic reason tells you that the first act may easily approximate to the second.
Christians34 encourage wine as something which will benefit men. Teetotallers discourage wine as something that will destroy men. Their conscientious conclusions are different, but their consciences are just the same. Teetotallers say that wine is bad because they think it moral to say what they think. Christians will not say that wine is bad because they think it immoral35 to say what they don’t think. And a triangle is a three-sided figure. And a dog is a four-legged animal. And Queen Anne is dead. We have, indeed, come back to alphabetical36 truths. But Professor Forel has not yet even come to them. He goes on laboriously37 repeating that there cannot be a fixed38 moral sense, because some people drink wine and some people don’t. I cannot imagine how it was that he forgot to mention that France and England cannot have the same moral sense, because Frenchmen drive cabs on the right side of the road and Englishmen on the left.
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1 dynamite | |
n./vt.(用)炸药(爆破) | |
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2 satirist | |
n.讽刺诗作者,讽刺家,爱挖苦别人的人 | |
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3 hacked | |
生气 | |
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4 plodding | |
a.proceeding in a slow or dull way | |
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5 hatchet | |
n.短柄小斧;v.扼杀 | |
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6 quack | |
n.庸医;江湖医生;冒充内行的人;骗子 | |
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7 awed | |
adj.充满敬畏的,表示敬畏的v.使敬畏,使惊惧( awe的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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8 snobs | |
(谄上傲下的)势利小人( snob的名词复数 ); 自高自大者,自命不凡者 | |
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9 superstitious | |
adj.迷信的 | |
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10 triangular | |
adj.三角(形)的,三者间的 | |
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11 humane | |
adj.人道的,富有同情心的 | |
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12 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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13 puritanical | |
adj.极端拘谨的;道德严格的 | |
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14 sterile | |
adj.不毛的,不孕的,无菌的,枯燥的,贫瘠的 | |
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15 fermented | |
v.(使)发酵( ferment的过去式和过去分词 );(使)激动;骚动;骚扰 | |
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16 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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17 monstrous | |
adj.巨大的;恐怖的;可耻的,丢脸的 | |
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18 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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19 trots | |
小跑,急走( trot的名词复数 ); 匆匆忙忙地走 | |
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20 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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21 conscientious | |
adj.审慎正直的,认真的,本着良心的 | |
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22 eloquently | |
adv. 雄辩地(有口才地, 富于表情地) | |
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23 incense | |
v.激怒;n.香,焚香时的烟,香气 | |
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24 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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25 quaint | |
adj.古雅的,离奇有趣的,奇怪的 | |
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26 credulous | |
adj.轻信的,易信的 | |
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27 epoch | |
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
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28 fable | |
n.寓言;童话;神话 | |
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29 etiquette | |
n.礼仪,礼节;规矩 | |
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30 raisins | |
n.葡萄干( raisin的名词复数 ) | |
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31 amiability | |
n.和蔼可亲的,亲切的,友善的 | |
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32 amiable | |
adj.和蔼可亲的,友善的,亲切的 | |
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33 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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34 Christians | |
n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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35 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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36 alphabetical | |
adj.字母(表)的,依字母顺序的 | |
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37 laboriously | |
adv.艰苦地;费力地;辛勤地;(文体等)佶屈聱牙地 | |
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38 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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