Referring again to my individual development, I should find it difficult to express how much Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft at one time meant to me.
The one ethical fact of which I was so to speak perfectly6 assured, the “inviolability” so often mentioned in previous chapters, is extremely hard to justify7 to the thinking mind. The empirical school of philosophers scoff8 at the very notion of it. The practice of the world is a perpetual, painful evidence of the small attention74 paid to it, and even idealistic philosophers from Plato down have found it quite possible to construct quasi-ethical systems based on the idea, not of human equality, but of the inferiority of the greater number. In Kant, however, one encounters an epoch-making philosopher who not only accepts as a fact the idea of inviolability, and of the kind of equality that goes with it, but who undertakes to set it forth in such a manner as to command the assent9 of the reason. For a long time I believed that he had succeeded in his great enterprise; and it was only after years of discipleship10, not indeed without suppressed misgivings11, that I began to see that I had been mistaken.
My eyes were opened when I realized certain extremely questionable12 moral consequences to which his doctrine13 led him: for instance, his unspeakable theory of marriage, his defense14 of capital punishment, the stiff individualism of his system, and his failure to establish an instrumental connection between the empirical goods, of wealth, culture, and the like, and the supreme15 good or supreme end as defined by him. I was forced by these unsound conclusions to ask myself whether the foundations of the system are sound. Surely if it is true of any system of thought, it is true of an ethical system that it must be judged by its fruits. The Kantian system is indeed vastly impressive, and even sublime16 in some of its aspects. We travel on the road along which Kant leads with a certain sense of exaltation, but when at the end of our journey we find that we have reached a goal at which we cannot consent to abide17, it is imperative18 to inquire whether the point of departure was well taken.
75
The point of departure in Kant’s exposition is the existence in all men of a sense of duty. Moral relations subsist19 only between moral beings. All men possess a sense of duty,—therefore all men are moral beings, therefore all are morally equal,—therefore no one may be used as a mere tool for the benefit of others, but is to be treated as worth while on his own account. Thus runs the argument.
The sense of duty is the consciousness of being bound to render implicit20 obedience21 to a categorical imperative. Our rational nature tells us categorically what is right to do. Our rational nature issues absolute commands. The sense of duty is man’s response to them. Kant does not for a moment imply that either he or anyone else has ever adequately obeyed. The moral dignity, the moral equality of men, does not depend on the obedience but on the consciousness of the obligation to obey—on acknowledged subjection to the command. The actual moral performances of some men are certainly better than those of others; but of no one, not even of the best of men, can it be shown that the moral principle in its purity, that is, unadulterated by baser incentives22, was ever the actuating motive23 of his conduct. The different members of the human species differ morally in degree, but are of the same moral kind, being distinguished24 from the lower animals not because they obey the moral law, but because they recognize the obligation to obey it. This sort of consciousness may be dim in some, but it exists in all. The most brutal25 murderer is dimly aware of the holy law which he has transgressed27.
The great dictum of the universal moral equality of76 mankind is thus made to depend on an assumed fact. If this fact can be successfully disputed, the dictum itself is imperilled. It has been disputed, not flippantly, but most seriously, and it is in my opinion obnoxious28 to fatal objections. I do not indeed believe it possible to establish the negative, to wit, that the sense of duty does not lurk29 somewhere, is not latent somewhere in the consciousness of persons morally the most obtuse30; but I hold it to be impossible to prove the affirmative, to wit, that a sense of duty does exist in all human beings, even in the most degraded. Kant’s dictum of equality depends on making good the affirmative proposition, but this he has failed to do.
One circumstance especially which at first sight seems favorable to Kant’s contention31 turns against him. He has been assailed32 on the ground that his categorical imperative is a fiction, that no such an imperative plays a r?le in the actual experience of men. On the contrary, the actual experience of men is replete33 with categorical imperatives34. Nothing in the life of man plays a greater r?le than these imperatives. The danger that threatens Kant’s demonstration35 is due to the number of rival categoricals that compete with his, and from which the one he sets up is not with certainty distinguishable. To put the matter simply, what is called in technical language a categorical imperative is nothing else than a way of acting36 somehow felt by the individual to be obligatory37 upon him, whether he likes it or dislikes it. It is a constraint39 in which he is bound to acquiesce40, a public rule of some sort which overrides41 his private propensities42.
Constraints43 of this sort are numerous. Many of them77 no one would think of designating as moral. Some are distinctly antimoral. I will mention a few:—for instance, the rules of behavior derived44 from the tabu notion. Certain kinds of food may not be eaten; certain objects like the Ark of the Covenant45 in David’s time may not be touched.19 Strict tabus obtain in regard to marriage such as the rules of endogamy and exogamy. Certain persons may not even be looked at. A feeling of horror is felt toward those who transgress26 these rules; and the transgression46 of them is often considered far more reprehensible47 than a moral sin. It would evidently be absurd to characterize a Hottentot or a Fiji Islander as the moral equal of a civilized48 man on the ground that, like the latter, he possesses the sense of duty, consisting in his case of an unquestioning acknowledgment of the categorical imperative of tabus.
Gang loyalty49 is another instance in point. In one of our prisons a certain convict is at present paying the penalty of a crime which was really committed by one of his pals50. He could have got off scot free if he had “squealed.” But “squealing” is contrary to the honor code of the gang and he preferred to sacrifice his liberty rather than prove recreant51 to the claims of gang loyalty. There are some writers who hold that this is an instance of morality, genuine as far as it goes, but restricted within too narrow a circle. The fact that it is restricted within too narrow a circle, that fidelity52 to a few is compatible with violent hostility53 against the community at large, seems to me to prove that the moral quality is absent. Morality is either universal or nothing. Gang78 loyalty is a social phenomenon, but not an ethical phenomenon. The distinction between the two terms will be enforced later on. In any event the sense of constraint is manifest. The moral character of the constraint I deny.
Another example of an imperative which is categorical enough but at the same time non-ethical is furnished by Darwin’s well-known explanation of the original of conscience. He assumes that certain ways of behaving which our ancestors found to be socially useful, have become registered as it were in our organisms, and constitute a kind of race-consciousness which persists in each individual. This latent consciousness is potent54 as a tendency, though often not masterful enough to repress the recalcitrant55 egoistic impulses. A conflict ensues. The deep ingrained tendency makes itself felt. And as social beings we are aware that we ought to side with it. But the egoistic impulses break out on the surface of consciousness and vehemently56 urge us in the opposite direction. The feeling of obligation, and thereafter of remorse57, are the record of the inner struggle. I do not here undertake to discuss at length the truth of Darwin’s theory. There are a number of weak spots in it, to which I shall merely allude58 in passing. First, he speaks of acts found to be socially useful in primitive59 communities. Is it possible to show that the same or similar acts retain their utility in a developed industrial society like that of the present day? Is not the term “socially useful” extremely vague, and can the notion implied in it be expanded without the assistance of a truly ethical princi79ple?20 Then again, why should the thing called social utility overawe the individual mind and thwart60 individual purpose? Why should not the daring egotist affirm his right to be and flourish in the present hour, in the teeth of social utility? It will be said that the claims are insistent61, that the tendency is ingrained, that it has become instinctive62 in him, and that he cannot release himself from the control it exercises over him. But instincts can be weakened and in time extinguished, like the fear of the dark, when the absence of an objective cause is recognized. Why should not the altruistic63 impulse likewise, by the method of Freudian analysis, if you please, be exposed to the light, and the egotist thereby64 be enabled to disembarrass himself of the interference of dead ancestors in his life purposes, and to proceed on his way undisturbed by any inward qualms65?
These examples serve to illustrate66 the point with which we are here concerned, namely, that the presence 80 and operation of undoubted constraints does not establish the existence in all men of the sense of duty on which Kant founds universal moral equality. Kant would indeed object that all these so-called constraints or imperatives are hypothetical, and not really categorical. By an hypothetical imperative he understands one in which the command depends upon an “if”—if there be invisible spirits such as primitive men imagined, then the rules of tabu follow. If the safety of the gang is an object of commanding interest, then gang loyalty is obligatory. If the preservation67 and prosperity of human society in general (a society superior to that of ants and of bees indeed but like them a product of nature and not radically68 distinct from them) be regarded as the supreme end of desire and endeavor, then the rules of social behavior are to be obeyed. But, he would say, none of these objects are fit to rank so high. They all are optional ends. An hypothetical imperative is one in which the end pursued is optional, the imperative extending only to the means. If the end be desired, then it is reasonable, and in so far imperative, that we adopt the means that lead to its attainment69. An imperative truly categorical, however, is one in which the obligation extends to the end proposed as well as to the means. It is not left to our inclination70 to embrace or to refuse the end, it being of such a kind as absolutely to constrain38 us to accept it.
But if this be so, then in this first part of our criticism we turn upon Kant and declare that he has nowhere given us reason to believe that the acceptance of an absolute end is implied in the kind of constraints to81 which the generality of men submit. And again if such acceptance cannot be proved, then the universal moral equality of men based by him on the presence in all of the sense of duty disappears, and his lofty ethical structure breaks down at this point.
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1
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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scoff
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| n.嘲笑，笑柄，愚弄；v.嘲笑，嘲弄，愚弄，狼吞虎咽 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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discipleship
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| n.做弟子的身份（期间） | |
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misgivings
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| n.疑虑，担忧，害怕；疑虑，担心，恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 )；疑惧 | |
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questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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incentives
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| 激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 )； 刺激； 诱因； 动机 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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brutal
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| adj.残忍的，野蛮的，不讲理的 | |
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transgress
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| vt.违反，逾越 | |
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transgressed
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| v.超越( transgress的过去式和过去分词 )；越过；违反；违背 | |
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obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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lurk
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| n.潜伏，潜行；v.潜藏，潜伏，埋伏 | |
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obtuse
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| adj.钝的；愚钝的 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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replete
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| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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imperatives
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| n.必要的事( imperative的名词复数 )；祈使语气；必须履行的责任 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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constrain
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| vt.限制，约束；克制，抑制 | |
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constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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acquiesce
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| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
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overrides
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| 越控( override的第三人称单数 )； （以权力）否决； 优先于； 比…更重要 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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constraints
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| 强制( constraint的名词复数 )； 限制； 约束 | |
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44
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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45
covenant
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| n.盟约，契约；v.订盟约 | |
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46
transgression
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| n.违背；犯规；罪过 | |
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reprehensible
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| adj.该受责备的 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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pals
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| n.朋友( pal的名词复数 )；老兄；小子；（对男子的不友好的称呼）家伙 | |
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51
recreant
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| n.懦夫；adj.胆怯的 | |
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52
fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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53
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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potent
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| adj.强有力的，有权势的；有效力的 | |
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recalcitrant
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| adj.倔强的 | |
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vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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remorse
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| n.痛恨，悔恨，自责 | |
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allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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thwart
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| v.阻挠，妨碍，反对；adj.横(断的) | |
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insistent
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| adj.迫切的，坚持的 | |
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instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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altruistic
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| adj.无私的，为他人着想的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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qualms
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| n.不安；内疚 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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radically
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| ad.根本地，本质地 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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