That Kant has formulated20 a truth of the utmost importance for mankind (that no man is to be treated as a mere tool), seems to me incontestable. That he has not made good his own proposition is my contention21, and that the whole problem must therefore be taken up de novo. It will assist us in doing so to expose the84 flaw in his categorical imperative22, or the formal principle of universality and necessity applied23 to human actions, which in his view imprints24 upon them the character of absolute rightness.
Note that Kant approaches the problems of ethics from the side of physical science, and with the bias25 of the physical scientist. The ethical principle he sets up, the bare idea of universal necessity or of law in general, is derived27 by way of abstraction from the particular laws of nature. It is a physical principle in disguise. To understand Kant’s system, it is simply indispensable to keep this point in mind. He was pre-occupied during the major portion of his life with profound speculations28 on scientific subjects. The title of the Critique of Pure Reason might not be inappropriately changed into “A treatise29 on the fundamental assumptions of science, as handled by Newton and his successors.” He was undeniably interested in ethics. His ultimate aim was to clear the way for the confident holding of ethical principles. (See the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason.) But he could not divest30 himself of the prejudice of his temperament31 and of his lifelong pursuit. He is not singular in this respect. To borrow the first principle of ethics from some other field is a common and apparently32 ineradicable error. Mechanics, ?sthetics, and recently biology, have been laid under contribution for this purpose. A consistent attempt to study ethical phenomena33 on their own ground, to mark off what is really distinctive34 in the data of ethical experience, and then to search for some principle which shall serve to give a coherent account of them, has to my85 knowledge never yet been undertaken. Always ethics has been treated as an annex35 to some other discipline. Always we behold the attempt to assimilate before the distinctive traits and characteristics have been carefully investigated. Never yet has the independence of this wonderful aspect of human nature been truly acknowledged. Kant indeed freed ethics from its long tutelage to theology; but he left it still in subjection, subject to his own favorite study, physical science.
But though the notion of necessity, together with that of universality, which he derived from physics was employed by him as a fundamental principle of rightness in conduct, the principle itself insensibly, and as it would seem unbeknown to himself, underwent a remarkable36 change in the course of his undertaking37 to give it a new application. The following brief comments will serve to elucidate38 this point.
In physics, whenever an antecedent phenomenon has been exactly described, and a sequent phenomenon is defined in the same fashion, the connection is pronounced to be necessary—as for instance the transformation39 of mechanical energy into heat, and conversely. A single carefully guarded experiment may suffice to establish the necessary nexus40 between two phenomena. And after having established the necessity, we are confident of the universality. If exceptions should occur and contravene41 the supposed law, the calculations or the observations are to be corrected. But never in physical science do we start from universality and predict necessity therefrom. Kant in his ethics invariably couples together the two terms Universal and Neces86sary. But he reverses the procedure of science, he begins with the universality and thereupon affirms the necessity.
Universality is for him the test of moral necessity. If an act can be universalized, the performance of it, according to him, is morally necessary. For instance, the question is asked, Is it right to kill? Look at the act of killing42, says Kant, and see whether it can be universalized, that is to say, whether if everybody felt at liberty to kill, the act of the murderer would or would not be self-defeating? He kills in order to affirm his life at the expense of another’s. If his action were to be generally imitated, his own life would be forfeit43, or at least in danger, and he would be annulling44 what he intends to affirm. Hence murder is morally wrong: to sacredly respect the life of others is right.
But not only is the order reversed, so that necessity follows on the heels of universality, but the very meaning of the term necessity is altered. A logical necessity is substituted for a physical necessity. The idea of necessity as handled by physical science denotes the connection between one thing and something else. It is not the thing itself but its relation to some other thing that is necessary. It is not the phenomenon A nor the phenomenon B, in the case of a cause and its effect, that is declared to be necessary, but the sequence of B on A, the circumstance that B is tied up to A, must follow in its wake. But the term Necessity as used by Kant in his Ethics, denotes a relation of a thing to itself. It is in fact equivalent to self-consistency, which is a logical notion derived from the principle of self-identity. A87 is A, and it is not thinkable that it should be non-A. Similarly Kant says: If a man desires to affirm his life, that is, to be self-preserving, it is not thinkable, it would not be rational or logical on his part, to perform an act which would be self-defeating. Kant does not say that a man might not irrationally46 take another man’s life, regardless of the consequences to himself; he says that as a rational intelligence acting47 on purely48 logical motives49 he could not do so.21 To repeat, then, physical necessity is a relation of one thing to another thing: the logical necessity involved in self-consistency is a relation of a thing to itself.
My next contention, and this touches the root of the matter, is that the notion of end is incompatible50 with self-consistency as the paramount51 principle in ethics. For a self-consistent rational being is a being in harmony with himself, one who if this harmony should in some unaccountable way ever be broken would by his own endeavor seek to return to himself. (Kant declares that the morality of any one man cannot be affected52 by his fellows, by any influence from the outside; it must be his own act.) But an end presupposes some outside object as a means: means and ends are inseparable correlatives. On the other hand, an entity45 which merely affirms itself, or if somehow alienated53 from self endeavors without assistance from beyond its sphere 88 to return to itself, is no true end at all, and cannot be designated as such. It is no end because it employs no means.
What warrant then has Kant for introducing the foreign notion of end into a world of pure self-consistency? When we use the term Necessity in relation to physical phenomena, as of cause and effect, we assert unalterable sequence, unity54 of temporal and spatial55 differenti?. When we use the same term as Kant uses it, we assert the unity of a thing with itself. But this in the nature of the case does not admit the intrusion of the alien concept of the outside. The spiritual society or pattern to which human society ought to be conformed, is according to Kant a society of ends, of ends per se. This is his great pronouncement. But the very idea on which he lays so much stress, the idea of end, on closer scrutiny56 of his premises57 disappears. The entities58 composing that society are self-sufficing, and moreover intrinsically unrelated to each other. Rational self-preservation is the only character that can be predicated of any of them.
I have laid stress on the fact that Kant derived his ethical principle from his physics. The passage in which he speaks of the ethical order as a universal and necessary order like that of nature is to my mind conclusive59. I now urge in addition that this sort of second nature superimposed upon existing nature would not have to our contemplating60 minds a dignity superior to that of physical nature. The moral order as thus exhibited would not possess the worth we attribute to it as exalted61 above what is called the natural order. The89 falling stone is a perfect illustration of physical necessity. Necessity passed through human consciousness, or bathed in human consciousness, is not on that account a more eligible62 principle. Nay63, since human consciousness interferes64 and causes contingent65 actions, due to passion, appetite, etc., the moral order constructed by men should be even less worth while than the physical order of nature, if indeed necessity be the touchstone of worth.22
To summarize: according to Kant man as an object is unfit to warrant the claim of unconditional66 obligation on the part of others toward himself. An abstract principle must be sought. This principle is universality, and necessity based on universality. Respect for this purely abstract notion is that which alone imparts a moral quality to so-called moral acts. We start, according to Kant, with the declaration that man is an end per se. But we reject him as an object, and take refuge in a formal principle. We then assume that every human being is conscious of the working within himself of this formal principle and acknowledges his subjection to it, whether he is able to analyze67 it out or not. And thus indirectly68 we derive26 out of emptiness a ray of glory which we allow to fall upon each and every man.90
The question now is, since this approach to the ethical problem manifestly fails, must we not begin at the opposite end, and take the attribution of worth to men, however unworthy they may actually be, as our starting-point?
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1 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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2 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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3 tinged | |
v.(使)发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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4 somber | |
adj.昏暗的,阴天的,阴森的,忧郁的 | |
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5 pessimism | |
n.悲观者,悲观主义者,厌世者 | |
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6 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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7 paradox | |
n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法;自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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8 supremely | |
adv.无上地,崇高地 | |
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9 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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10 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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11 ethical | |
adj.伦理的,道德的,合乎道德的 | |
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12 cardinal | |
n.(天主教的)红衣主教;adj.首要的,基本的 | |
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13 iniquitous | |
adj.不公正的;邪恶的;高得出奇的 | |
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14 labor | |
n.劳动,努力,工作,劳工;分娩;vi.劳动,努力,苦干;vt.详细分析;麻烦 | |
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15 degradation | |
n.降级;低落;退化;陵削;降解;衰变 | |
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16 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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17 scrutinize | |
n.详细检查,细读 | |
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18 tenuous | |
adj.细薄的,稀薄的,空洞的 | |
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19 circuitous | |
adj.迂回的路的,迂曲的,绕行的 | |
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20 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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21 contention | |
n.争论,争辩,论战;论点,主张 | |
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22 imperative | |
n.命令,需要;规则;祈使语气;adj.强制的;紧急的 | |
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23 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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24 imprints | |
n.压印( imprint的名词复数 );痕迹;持久影响 | |
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25 bias | |
n.偏见,偏心,偏袒;vt.使有偏见 | |
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26 derive | |
v.取得;导出;引申;来自;源自;出自 | |
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27 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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28 speculations | |
n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 );思考;投机活动;推断 | |
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29 treatise | |
n.专著;(专题)论文 | |
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30 divest | |
v.脱去,剥除 | |
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31 temperament | |
n.气质,性格,性情 | |
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32 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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33 phenomena | |
n.现象 | |
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34 distinctive | |
adj.特别的,有特色的,与众不同的 | |
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35 annex | |
vt.兼并,吞并;n.附属建筑物 | |
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36 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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37 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
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38 elucidate | |
v.阐明,说明 | |
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39 transformation | |
n.变化;改造;转变 | |
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40 nexus | |
n.联系;关系 | |
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41 contravene | |
v.违反,违背,反驳,反对 | |
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42 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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43 forfeit | |
vt.丧失;n.罚金,罚款,没收物 | |
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44 annulling | |
v.宣告无效( annul的现在分词 );取消;使消失;抹去 | |
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45 entity | |
n.实体,独立存在体,实际存在物 | |
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46 irrationally | |
ad.不理性地 | |
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47 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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48 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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49 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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50 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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51 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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52 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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53 alienated | |
adj.感到孤独的,不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 );使不友好;转让;让渡(财产等) | |
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54 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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55 spatial | |
adj.空间的,占据空间的 | |
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56 scrutiny | |
n.详细检查,仔细观察 | |
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57 premises | |
n.建筑物,房屋 | |
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58 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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59 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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60 contemplating | |
深思,细想,仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 ); 注视,凝视; 考虑接受(发生某事的可能性); 深思熟虑,沉思,苦思冥想 | |
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61 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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62 eligible | |
adj.有条件被选中的;(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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63 nay | |
adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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64 interferes | |
vi. 妨碍,冲突,干涉 | |
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65 contingent | |
adj.视条件而定的;n.一组,代表团,分遣队 | |
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66 unconditional | |
adj.无条件的,无限制的,绝对的 | |
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67 analyze | |
vt.分析,解析 (=analyse) | |
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68 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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