The moral equality of men is a corollary of the attribution of worth to all men. Did we not ascribe worth to them, there is no reason why we should not make servile use of them. But there are admittedly formidable difficulties in the way of attributing worth to human nature.
The first and most obvious of these is the existence of repulsive2 traits in human beings, such as sly cunning, deceit, falsehood, grossness, cruelty: homo homini lupus! Secondly3, there is the prevalent error of employing ethical4 terms, like good and bad, to denote the merely attractive and repellent traits.23 Attractive traits, such as gentleness, sweetness, kindness, a sympathetic disposition6, are, in those fortunate enough to possess them, pleasing accidents of nature. We delight in them, but have no reason to ascribe the superlative quality of worth to those who possess them. If the evil that men do revolts us, the so-called good in them does not give us the right to surround their heads with the nimbus of worth. Thirdly, and perhaps even more deterrent7 than92 the ever-present spectacle of evil and the inadequacy8 of so-called goodness, is the commonplaceness, the cheapness of men.
It must be admitted that, with rare exceptions, our estimates of others are apt to be low rather than lofty. Can we ascribe worth to those whom we hold cheap? The reason of our habitual9 under-estimation of fellowmen I think is that we regard them from the standpoint of the use to which we can put them, and do not see them from the inside, as it were, in the light of the marvelous energies of which human nature is the scene. The grossest matter, the most ordinary physical happenings, reveal to the instructed eye of the scientist the play of forces which it taxes the most powerful intellects in some measure to apprehend10 and describe. Yet these miracles escape the dull senses of those of us who deal with the forces of nature from the point of view of their immediate11 use. We turn on the electric light, but have little more than a crude surmise12 of the things that the word electricity meant to Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, or Hertz. And as we turn on the electric light, so we turn on our fellowmen, as it were, to use them. The thought of the poet—“What a piece of work is man, how infinite in faculty13!” occurs to us only at scattered14 moments. And yet things transpire15 in the inner life of human beings far more marvelous than the chemical processes or the flux16 of electric waves, did we but attend to them. There is in particular one kind of energy to which the quality of worth may well attach itself. It is unlike the physical forces; it is not a transformed mode of mechanical energy. It is sui generis, underivative,93 unique; it is synonymous with highest freedom; it is power raised to the Nth degree. It is ethical energy. To release it in oneself is to achieve unbounded expansion. Morality, as commonly understood, is a system of rules, chiefly repressive. Ethical energy, on the contrary, is determined17 by the very opposite tendency; a tendency, it is true, never more than tentatively effectuated under finite conditions. And because the energy is unique, it points toward a unique, irreducible, hence substantive18 entity19 in man, from which it springs. This entity is itself incognizable, yet the effect it produces requires that it be postulated20. The category of substance, which is almost disappearing from science, is to be reinstalled in ethics. Ethics cannot dispense21 with it. This, as a prelude22, may suffice to indicate the path along which we shall proceed.
The Reason Why the Method of Ethics Must Be the Opposite of the Method Employed by the Physical Sciences
Physical science begins from the bottom and builds upwards23. It analyzes24 phenomena25 into their elements, and thereupon seeks to combine these elements into structures that shall correspond to experience. In this business it never comes to a finish. Its analysis of the elements is provisional. Every element is hypothetical. Indeed it is plain in the nature of the case that no element can be ultimate. An element is a unit, and every empirical unit necessarily conceals26 in its bosom27 a plexus of which it is the unification. The very idea of94 unit requires for its complement28 a manifold of some kind. In hypothetical units, or ideal constructs that have for their purpose to lead to the discovery and arrangement of real phenomena, science abounds29. Atoms, electrons, energy conceived as a substance by Ostwald, Spencer’s physiological30 units, are examples.
The results achieved by science are never more than approximations in the sense that the units, the bricks with which the house is built, are liable to be rejected, and the constructions achieved are subject to revision.
The point however which I wish to emphasize is that the scientist is satisfied of the truth, the reality of its partial results. Newton, for instance, in formulating31 the law of gravitation has, so to speak, marked off a strip of reality. The ground covered cannot be lost; when some natural law is enunciated32, the proper conditions for its discovery and verification having been observed, a sure footing in reality has been gained, science standing33 to this extent on terra firma, though beyond the domain34 within which the law applies the phenomena may be heaving and billowing like the sea.
Now the question I am intent upon is, Why is it possible for science to be content with partial acquisition? Why does it profess35 to know positively36 a part without knowing the whole? And why can ethics not take a step without an ideal of the whole?
Kant’s chief purpose in the Critique of Pure Reason was to vindicate37 the certainty of the physical knowledge of a part as being compatible with total ignorance of the whole. The older metaphysics was engaged in the attempt to supply the whole, to sketch38 it out in order95 to give certainty to the part that is within the reach of science. The older metaphysics said to science: You have in hand the conditioned, but remember the conditioned depends on the unconditioned. Unless, therefore, you round out what you possess, with the help of the unconditioned, the certainty you seem to have within the field of the conditioned disappears. Again, science traces causes, and the older metaphysicians insisted that the whole chain of causes hangs in air unless it be attached to a first cause. Now Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason really amounts in nuce to this: you do not require the whole in order to explain the part. Link the partial phenomena together in a certain way, a way dependent on the joint39 action of the space and time intuitions and the categories, and you will gain the desired certainty. The certainty is in the linkage40. We may add link to link of the chain of reality without troubling to consider by what piers41 it is supported or on what shore the piers rest—if indeed there be piers and shores at all. The bridge hangs over the River of Time and we can safely travel on it. How we get on to this bridge we do not know, and where we shall leave it we cannot know either.
It is a mistake to speak of Kant as a rationalist pure and simple. When he expelled the older metaphysics he antagonized pure rationalism. The older metaphysics held that the mere5 existence of the conditioned proves the existence of the unconditioned, requires the unconditioned. In Kant’s answer to this lies the gist42 of his enterprise in philosophy: You are quite right, he says, that the idea of the conditioned requires the idea of96 the unconditioned, logically, rationally. But observe well, nature is not just logical or rational. There is an irrational43 element in it, namely, extended manifold and temporal sequence. Juxtaposition44 and sequence are irrational, because, if I interpret him rightly, in the case of each the relation presented to the mind is that of parts outside each other—in the one case alongside, in the other before and after; while in the logical or rational relation the parts are implicit45 in the whole as in the case of the premises46 of a syllogism47 and the conclusion, the relation of a genus to the species, the universal to the particular.
We have in nature, according to Kant, a partnership48 between the irrational and the rational factors. And thereupon he proceeds to argue that we impose laws on nature, understanding thereby49 that we get hold of reality or objectivity in so far as we are able to imprint50 the rational element upon the irrational. The positing51 of the thing per se, which has proved a stumbling-block to many, is no more than a confession52 that we shall never succeed entirely53 in this business of subjecting the irrational to the rational factor. The thing per se is the X that remains54 over when the rational function has done its utmost. A thing, a real object, is that which is imprinted55 with, penetrated56 with, rationality. The manifolds of space and time, of juxtaposition and sequence are incapable57 of completely receiving this imprint, that is, of completely responding to our quest for reality, and this their incompetency58 is expressed in the notion of the thing per se.
To return to the main question as to the difference between the method by which science proceeds and the97 reverse method prescribed to ethics, I ask, Why is absolute knowledge of nature impossible? The answer is, Because absolute knowledge would mean the completely rational construction of nature, and this is prevented by the irrational element existing in it. But why has the relative knowledge we possess the character of certainty? Why are we sure of the law of gravitation? Why are we justified59 in saying that science within certain limits plants her foot on terra solida? Because at certain points the sense data do coincide with the rational requirements. There are recurrent phenomena of such a kind, coupled together in such a way, that each is capable of mathematical measurement, and that the sequence of the one after the other can therefore be predicted.
Nature might have been arranged quite otherwise. The time spans might have been so long, as to prevent our observing the recurrences60. A day-fly cannot observe the periodicity of the earth’s revolution around its axis61. The fact however that there is this partial correspondence between human rationality and the unknown nature of things is a bare fact, incapable of explanation.24 The answer, then, I take it, is: our knowledge of nature is relative, which means incompletely rational, because of the foreign element in nature unamenable to the opera98tion of the rational, the synthetic62, function. This relative knowledge is none the less certain, that is, in some sense absolute, because of the partial coincidence of the phenomena of nature and the synthetic processes of the mind.
With this degree of certainty we must perforce content ourselves, in dealing63 with outside nature. In trying to understand and interpret that which is not ourselves, we hit upon barriers which cannot be transcended64, upon a foreign factor which opposes itself to our endeavors. But it is otherwise in the sphere of conduct. Here, if there is to be certainty at all, in regard to right as distinguished65 from wrong, if there is to be such a thing as right in the strict sense, we cannot content ourselves with the paradoxical, relative-absolute just described. For here we not merely interpret but act, and we must possess an ideal plan of the whole if we are to be certain of our rightness in any particular part of conduct. For in conduct there is no such partial coincidence between the rational and the irrational as in the case of physical law. There is not a single partial rule of conduct, neither “Thou shalt not kill” nor “Thou shalt not lie,” nor any other that, taken by itself, is of itself ethically66 right. It may be right, it may be wrong. It takes its ethical quality from the plan of conduct as a whole, and without reference to the whole it is devoid67 of rightness.25
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I have thus indicated the ground of the distinction between the method of science and the method of ethics, a distinction, it is true, to which Kant himself did not adhere. Partial coincidence of the rational with the irrational is expressed in physical law; absence of such concurrence68 destroys any attempt to build up an ethical theory on the empirical method. We cannot plant our feet on the part, gaining there the sense of certainty: we must creatively conceive the ideal of the whole and educe69 every partial mode of ethical conduct from that.
But how shall we proceed in the construction of such an ideal, for it is obvious that knowledge, in the scientific sense of the word, is entirely out of the question?
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1
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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repulsive
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| adj.排斥的，使人反感的 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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deterrent
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| n.阻碍物，制止物；adj.威慑的，遏制的 | |
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inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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transpire
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| v.(使)蒸发，(使)排出 ；泄露，公开 | |
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flux
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| n.流动；不断的改变 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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substantive
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| adj.表示实在的；本质的、实质性的；独立的；n.实词，实名词；独立存在的实体 | |
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entity
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| n.实体，独立存在体，实际存在物 | |
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postulated
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| v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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analyzes
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| v.分析( analyze的第三人称单数 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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conceals
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的第三人称单数 ) | |
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bosom
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| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
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complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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abounds
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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formulating
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| v.构想出( formulate的现在分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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enunciated
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| v.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 )；确切地说明 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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vindicate
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| v.为…辩护或辩解，辩明；证明…正确 | |
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sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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linkage
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| n.连接；环节 | |
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piers
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| n.水上平台( pier的名词复数 )；（常设有娱乐场所的）突堤；柱子；墙墩 | |
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gist
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| n.要旨；梗概 | |
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irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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juxtaposition
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| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
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implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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partnership
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| n.合作关系，伙伴关系 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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imprint
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| n.印痕，痕迹；深刻的印象；vt.压印，牢记 | |
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positing
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的现在分词 ) | |
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confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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imprinted
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| v.盖印（imprint的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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incompetency
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| n.无能力，不适当 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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recurrences
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| n.复发，反复，重现( recurrence的名词复数 ) | |
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axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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transcended
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| 超出或超越（经验、信念、描写能力等）的范围( transcend的过去式和过去分词 )； 优于或胜过… | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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ethically
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| adv.在伦理上，道德上 | |
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devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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educe
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| v.引出；演绎 | |
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