Kant’s ethical order is a duplicate of the physical order. The notion of law is taken from physics, and expanded into the concept of law in general. Ethical behavior is represented as behavior motivated by the notion of lawfulness8. Law is characterized by uni101versality and necessity. Chapter II, however, shows that in physics universality is predicated on the ground of an ascertained9 necessary connection. In physics, necessity has its true meaning as pertaining10 to a relation between one thing and another. If the linkage11 can be established, the universality follows. In Kant’s ethics12, on the contrary, necessity is taken as the consequence of the universality and the proper meaning of necessity is lost. Self-consistency takes the place of the relation to something else. The ideal society, as described, would therefore be a society of self-preserving rational intelligences, ethically13 solipsistic.
Next we began the investigation14 into the idea of worth. Why do men hold themselves and others cheap? They regard each other from the point of view of the use to be made of others and of their own life, and not from the point of view of the energies deployed15. The turning on of electric power was used as an illustration. Nevertheless, even exceptional men, men regarded as illustrating16 in the highest degree the mental energies implicit17 in human nature, would not possess the quality of worth, that is, of being ends per se, merely on the score of their scientific or their artistic18 activities. We cannot say that the world would be less perfect if there were no scientists to discover its laws. There is a supreme19, a unique energy and it is to this that the quality of worth belongs.26
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The ethical quality called worth is the supreme good, and must be accessible to all, even to those to whom the lesser20 goods are denied. Ethics is a system of thought which stands or falls with the contention21 that while the better may be within reach only of the exceptional few, the best is within reach of all.
In attempting to approach the task of building up a world-view based on ethical experience, it became unavoidable to consider the method by which the approach might be made, and for this purpose to contrast the methods of science and the methods of ethics. Science, as we have seen, collects its bricks and builds its house by composition. Science analyzes22 phenomena23 into units, which it then combines. The mystery is how science can achieve certainty in respect to certain phenomena of nature without previous knowledge of the whole of nature. Kant’s answer is that there is partial congruity24 between the mental functions and the data that come to us from the unknown. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason faces in two directions. It expels the older metaphysics which assumed that the empirical world is rational throughout, or rationalizable, and which thence argued the existence of the unconditioned as necessarily implied in the existence of the conditioned, and of a first cause as actually implied in the chain of causes and effects. Kant contends that there is an irrational25 element, namely, bare juxtaposition26 (part outside part), and bare sequence (part before and after part), while the logical or rational relation implies that103 the part is to be conceived as implicit in the whole. Juxtaposition and sequence, therefore, can never be completely rationalized. On the other hand, Kant undertakes to prove that whatever of reality we know is traceable to the projection28 of the rational factor upon the irrational. One might even say that, according to Kant, the mind itself produces the irrational factor, since the intuitions of space and time are according to him, functions of the mind itself—the mind setting up a manifold so constituted as to receive sense impressions. At any rate the capital point to which we were led up was that science puts her foot on terra firma in a restricted area, without reference to what lies beyond, while if we are to proceed in ethics at all, we must begin with some ideal plan of the whole, since in ethics we are not interpreting a foreign nature, but act upon natures similar to our own; and since, in the case of conduct, there is no such partial concurrence29 of the rational and irrational as in physics, no one of the so-called moral modes of behavior being moral when taken separately. Hence the conclusion that there is no possibility of establishing the conception of worth unless we have some ideal of the whole in which and in relation to which the incomparable worthwhileness of a human being can be made good.
We need hardly again remind ourselves that this conception of worth, or of man as end per se, is not a mere4 abstraction, and that our interest in it is not academic. Every outcry against the oppression of man by man, or against whatsoever30 is morally hideous31, is but the affirmation of the cardinal32 principle that a human104 being as such is not to be violated, is not to be handled like a tool, but is to be respected and revered33 as an end per se. But what do we mean by end per se, and how account for this notion? Does it come into our mind like a bolt from the blue, or is it revealed as prefigured in the human mind when we follow it into its intimate constitution?
Our knowledge of the world we live in is extremely limited—in its details it is confined to the planet we live on, extending to the myriads34 of celestial35 bodies beyond us only by means of scant36 generalizations37. If we have knowledge of only so small a portion, how can we frame an ideal of the whole? At the same time we must remember that the world we actually know, this earth and yonder starry38 myriads, is in very truth our world, the world as it exists for us, a world which with the help of data coming to us from the unknown, we ourselves have built up on certain constructive39 principles; and that these principles have been found, within certain limits, availing.27 I say availing within certain limits. The defeat they meet with beyond those limits is due to the intractable elements of juxtaposition and sequence, of the time and space manifolds, which in themselves are incapable40 of being completely rationalized.
Now the ideal of the whole is a plan or scheme in which the constructive principles of the mind are conceived as having untrammeled course and unhindered105 application, and the task of world-building, or rather universe-building, is in idea carried out to completion.
The attempt to present an ideal forecast, or outline of the whole of reality, as it would satisfy a mind constituted like ours, an ideal landscape of this sort, is not at all to be confounded with the arrogation41 of a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is supposed to be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of the whole is utterly42 and confessedly beyond our reach. The phrase a priori, too, is objectionable and unfortunate for two reasons. First, as just said, because it has been supposed to be a kind of knowledge. By some theologians men were supposed to possess a priori knowledge of God.28 Secondly43, because the word a priori suggests precedence in time, and our knowledge of the human mind and of its irreducible capacities comes out only in the course of experience. Much that has been called a priori, that is implicit in experience, did not become explicit44 until after prolonged experience. The Greek thinkers before Aristotle doubtless thought in terms of syllogism45, but it was not until Greek science had attained46 a certain ripeness that Aristotle was able to dissect47 out the logic27 which had previously48 been employed more or less unconsciously.
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Instead, therefore, of using the term a priori, which gives rise to the two-fold misapprehension of an a priori knowledge and of temporal precedence, and instead of throwing out the child with the bath, that is, of ignoring the independent part played by our mental constitution in building up experience, and in affording us the conviction of certainty, and of reality, it is highly desirable that a new term be found to take the place of a priori. The term “functional50 finality” suggests itself to me for this purpose.29
My field is ethics. I am entirely51 desirous of sticking to my own last, that is, dealing52 with such concepts as the data of my subject force upon me. I do not wish to trespass53, or to seem to trespass, on the domain54 of my neighbors. Hence in dealing with functional finalities I must deal with them primarily as they appear in the field of ethics, that is, in the domain of the actions and reactions of human beings upon one another. Irreducible principia of ethics are the functional finalities, which prescribe rules for such intercourse55, or better which create a scheme of ideal intercourse whereby the conduct of men shall be measured and determined5.
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I must, however, glance for a moment at fields outside my own, for the purpose not of controversy56 but of elucidation57; not to deal with the subject matter of my neighbors, but to mark off my own more definitely. What then, I ask, is the most general expression by which to designate the singularities of the human mind, the principles on which it acts, its immutable58 modes of behavior, the invariants that recur59 amid all the complex varieties of its processes? The principal invariants are the positing60 of a manifold of some kind, and the apprehending62 of that manifold as coherent. The manifold is not given, but is posited63 by the mind. The positing is a mental function, just as much as the apprehending of the plurality as coherent is a mental function. The particular manifolds of space and time experience are said to be given, but they would not be received by the mind were not the function of manifold-positing prepared to apprehend61 them.
In recent physical science the notion of the manifold plays a conspicuous64 r?le. Subtle speculations65 are employed to define the kinds of manifold which the physicist66 finds opportune67, and the kind of unity68 of which these manifolds are respectively capable. The two terms mentioned are themselves the most abstract conceivable, and naturally, that which is here taken to underlie69 all the constructive, world-building activity of the mind in every possible direction can only be expressed in the most sublimated70 language. But the notions themselves, or rather the acts of the mind, the functions designated, are rich and replete71 with concrete108 utility when applied72 to subject matter in the different fields.
Wherever we turn we find that the assurance of reality depends on the joint73 use of the two principles mentioned, the joint operation of the two kinds of mental action; that is to say—on the positing of a manifold and on the simultaneous apprehension49 of the subject matter to which it relates as coherent, as unified74.
The simultaneity, the inseparableness of the two mental acts or functions in regard to the same subject-matter is the essential point on which hangs the web of the argument here submitted. Thus in geometry space must be regarded as a continuum, unbroken, uninterrupted at any point, and at the same time the same space must be treated as capable of puncture75, of linear and superficial delimitations; that is to say, of division. That which is one must yet be apprehended76 as divided; that which is divided, or delimitated, must yet be apprehended as one. The difficulties that arise spring from the vain endeavor to separate the two inseparable acts—the act of apprehending the manifold of space sub specie pluralitatis, and the act of apprehending it sub specie unitatis. Hence arises the puzzling question: How can that which is continuous be divided, how can chasms77 between the parts of space, however infinitesimal, be bridged? Witness the problem of Zeno, and the pragmatist solution of it by a demonstration78 that satisfies us indeed as to the fact (which no one doubts), but leaves the mental puzzle as before; and also Bergson’s Method of accounting79 for division by a comparison of the inner and the outer flux80, wherein he109 seems to overlook the difficulty that for the purpose of comparison two points must be fixed81, one in each flux, that is to say, the division in the flux must be regarded as already existing.
In the physical sciences we are compelled to assume on the one hand the atomic or granular constitution of matter, in other words, manifoldness. On the other hand, if “action at a distance” is to be escaped, we are bound to assume a continuum of some sort like the ether. Again, in the organic world there is the manifold of structures and functions, and the unity of organism. To whatever object of inquiry82 we give our attention, we find ourselves not only restricted fundamentally to the two functions described, but we discover that to their insunderable co-operation we owe whatever of truth we possess.
Now the business of ethics is to define its own subject-matter, that is to say the particular kind of manifold with which it deals, and the kind of unity of which that manifold is susceptible83. But as I approach this first goal of my enterprise, there is one obstacle which I must try to remove out of the way of the reader, before I can hope to win him to a hospitable84 consideration of my conclusions. The jointness or inseparableness of the two acts out of which certainty or reality issues has created all the difficulties. The fact that the manifold must be regarded as remaining a manifold, unaltered in its character as such, not derivative85 from the One (there is no such One), and that the unity does not contrariwise result from the manifold in the sense of springing from or being derived87 from it;—in other110 words that we must see the same landscape of things and events both sub specie pluralitatis and sub specie unitatis—has been the stumbling-block. The history of philosophy might be written under the two headings: 1, monistic systems that undertake, collapsing88 in their futile89 effort, to derive86 the world and its plurality from the One, as if there were such an One, out of whose bosom90 philosophy might evoke91 the many (creational systems, pantheistic systems, emanation systems, evolution systems); 2, pluralistic systems that essay, with equal lack of success, to explain the unity as somehow the offspring of the plurality.
Why then have these systems flourished? Why are these vain undertakings92 still renewed? The reason is that we cannot understand the joint action of the two functions, and the very point where enlightenment is needed is for us to recognize that no fundamental truths can be understood by us, that we can only look at them, contemplate93 and accept them. The point, I say, where enlightenment is needed is that the habit of trying to understand is due to a prejudice, to what may be called the superstition94 of causality.
I shall have to explain this hardy95 assertion with some care to prevent misconception. Causality, it will be objected, is the one thread that leads us through the labyrinth96 of nature. The search for causes enables us to become at home in our world by foreseeing events. In what sense then can it be permissible97 to speak of the prejudice of causality, nay98, of the superstition of it? With what warrant prescribe a limit to the aspirations99 of the human intellect to push its inquiries100 to the farthest111 limit, even so far as to understand the functional finalities themselves, if such there be?
The answer, succinctly101 put, is this: explaining or understanding things means tracing effects to their causes, and this is only one mode, a somewhat disguised mode, of the joint functional activity of which I have spoken. The manifold in this case is that of the temporal sequence of phenomena, of differences due to change of position in time; and the unity established between them (as for instance energy, of which the sequent phenomena represent the transformations) is an ideal, fictive unity, mentally superimposed (real despite its ideal or imaginary character, because of the necessity we are under to view the sequent phenomena sub specie unitatis). That there is nothing in the antecedent to compel the sequent to follow has been since the days of Hume a commonplace in philosophy. That nevertheless there is such a thing as the prediction of eclipses was made by Kant the basis of his doctrine102 of synthesis a priori. Be the terms used what they may, what counts is the fact that the joint action of two functions, which itself is inexplicable103, not to be understood, that is, not to be referred back to a preceding cause (as if there could be such a thing as a cause why we think in terms of causality) is the foundation of all so-called understanding.
Moreover causality is an incomplete example of the fundamental functional process. We never do thoroughly104 understand; we gain a certain relief, a certain increased ease of mind by pushing the problem back a112 step. And what I have called the prejudice of causality, is the unwillingness105 on our part to acknowledge the fact that we are face to face, in the case of causality, with the inexplicable; that that which helps us partially106 to understand (and serves for practical purposes well enough) is in its nature not to be understood, one of the modes in which the joint action of the functional finalities manifests itself.
An ultimate principle has been defined as one which is presupposed in every attempt to account for it. The functional finalities of which I speak bear the test of this definition. The upshot of it all is that the constitutive principles of the human mind cannot be explained or understood, but can nevertheless be verified. And verification, in the last analysis, means exemplification. If we look at these ultimate truths, whether in geometry, in physics, or, as we shall later see, in ethics and ?sthetics, as enunciated107 abstractly, baldly, we confront them blankly, we are as it were dumbfounded in their presence. They seem arbitrarily imposed upon us. And why? Because we are endeavoring to understand them. We have acquired the habit of trying to get hold of truth by referring back to some antecedent. And therefore we are uneasy and disconcerted. But the moment we see them exemplified, as in the constructions of the geometer, in the laws or uniformities established by the physicist, etc., we are convinced. The subject-matter of ethics is different. The kind of exemplification is likewise different. But verification is exemplification in ethics as elsewhere; and this will be113 found to mean that the life, the ethical experience, must lead to the certainty.
And now we have reached the point where a brief discussion of the ethical manifold and its mode of unification comes up in proper order.
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1
recapitulate
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| v.节述要旨，择要说明 | |
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philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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puerile
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| adj.幼稚的，儿童的 | |
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lawfulness
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| 法制，合法 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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pertaining
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| 与…有关系的，附属…的，为…固有的(to) | |
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linkage
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| n.连接；环节 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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ethically
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| adv.在伦理上，道德上 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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illustrating
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| 给…加插图( illustrate的现在分词 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
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implicit
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| a.暗示的，含蓄的，不明晰的，绝对的 | |
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artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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analyzes
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| v.分析( analyze的第三人称单数 )；分解；解释；对…进行心理分析 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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congruity
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| n.全等，一致 | |
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irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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juxtaposition
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| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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projection
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| n.发射，计划，突出部分 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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hideous
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| adj.丑陋的，可憎的，可怕的，恐怖的 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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revered
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| v.崇敬，尊崇，敬畏( revere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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myriads
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| n.无数，极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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scant
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| adj.不充分的，不足的；v.减缩，限制，忽略 | |
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generalizations
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| 一般化( generalization的名词复数 )； 普通化； 归纳； 概论 | |
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starry
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| adj.星光照耀的, 闪亮的 | |
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constructive
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| adj.建设的，建设性的 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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arrogation
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| n.诈称，霸占，篡夺 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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syllogism
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| n.演绎法，三段论法 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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dissect
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| v.分割；解剖 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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functional
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| adj.为实用而设计的，具备功能的，起作用的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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trespass
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| n./v.侵犯，闯入私人领地 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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elucidation
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| n.说明，阐明 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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positing
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的现在分词 ) | |
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apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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apprehending
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的现在分词 )； 理解 | |
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posited
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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underlie
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| v.位于...之下，成为...的基础 | |
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sublimated
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| v.（使某物质）升华( sublimate的过去式和过去分词 )；使净化；纯化 | |
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replete
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| adj.饱满的，塞满的；n.贮蜜蚁 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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unified
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| (unify 的过去式和过去分词)； 统一的； 统一标准的； 一元化的 | |
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puncture
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| n.刺孔，穿孔；v.刺穿，刺破 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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chasms
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| 裂缝( chasm的名词复数 )； 裂口； 分歧； 差别 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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accounting
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| n.会计，会计学，借贷对照表 | |
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flux
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| n.流动；不断的改变 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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82
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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hospitable
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| adj.好客的；宽容的；有利的，适宜的 | |
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85
derivative
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| n.派(衍)生物；adj.非独创性的，模仿他人的 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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87
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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88
collapsing
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| 压扁[平]，毁坏，断裂 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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90
bosom
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| n.胸，胸部；胸怀；内心；adj.亲密的 | |
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evoke
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| vt.唤起，引起，使人想起 | |
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undertakings
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| 企业( undertaking的名词复数 )； 保证； 殡仪业； 任务 | |
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93
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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labyrinth
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| n.迷宫；难解的事物；迷路 | |
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permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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100
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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101
succinctly
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| adv.简洁地；简洁地，简便地 | |
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102
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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103
inexplicable
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| adj.无法解释的，难理解的 | |
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104
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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105
unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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106
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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107
enunciated
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| v.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 )；确切地说明 | |
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