I mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a fearless examination of progress made or missed.
My first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question just yet. The League was founded only three years ago—much too short a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but very delicate and sensitive human machine. There has been hardly time enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads5 of nerves that[Pg 69] thread its system. You cannot move a finger at the councils of Geneva without touching6 some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering protest. The League has, however, been long enough in existence to reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities and its perils7.
It has already achieved triumphs of which its founders8 may well be proud. The restoration of Austria to life when it seemed to have been hopelessly submerged in the deluge9 of economic, financial and political disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat10 of artificial respiration11. The successful effort organised by the League to stamp out typhus in Eastern Europe and prevent its spread to the West is also a success worthy12 of record. But for this intelligently conducted campaign that terrible disease would have ravaged13 Russia and Central Europe and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and privation as to become easy victims to its devastating14 assaults.
The Labour branch of the League has also been specially15 active and energetic, and its persistent16 endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the standards[Pg 70] of toil17 in all countries are producing marked and important results. In addition great credit is due to the League for the splendid work it has accomplished18 in alleviating19 the distress20 which prevailed amongst the famine-stricken areas of Eastern Europe and amongst the refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious21 Bolshevism in Russia, and the still greater horrors of Turkish savagery22 in Asia Minor23.
But these humanitarian24 tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the primary objects of the foundation of the League. Its main purpose was the averting25 of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which nations would be bound by their own covenant26 and the pressure of other nations to resort in order to settle their differences. Its failure or success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. How does it stand in this respect?
It succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between Sweden and Finland over the possession of the Aaland Islands. That success was on the line of its main purpose. Here the methods of the League gave confidence in its complete impartiality27.
[Pg 71]
So much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it was called in and gave its decision. Its Silesian award has been acted upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. That is due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment28. Instead of following the Aaland precedent29 in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course which engendered30 suspicion of its motives31. It created a regrettable impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over the decision. There was a suspicion of intrigue32 in the choice of the tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings33. In the Aaland case no great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions arrived at either way. But here two powers of great authority in the League—France and Poland—were passionately34 engaged in securing a result adverse35 to Germany. The other party to the dispute had no friends, and was moreover not a member of the League.
Britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist36 of the claims of Germany. Poland had a powerful advocate on the League—a country with a vital interest in securing a pro-Polish decision. In these circumstances the League ought to have[Pg 72] exercised the most scrupulous37 care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from all bias38. Had it chosen distinguished39 jurists outside its own body to undertake at least a preliminary investigation40 as it did in the Aaland case, all would have been well. It preferred, however, to retain the matter in its own hands. Hence the doubts and misgivings41 with which the judgment of the League has been received not only by the whole of Germany, but by many outside Germany.
This decision, and the way Poland has flouted42 the League over Vilna served to confirm the idea which prevails in Russia and Germany that France and Poland dominate the League. The Silesian award may be just, but the fact remains43 that it will take a long series of decisions beyond cavil44 to restore or rather to establish German and Russian confidence in the League.
It is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half Europe should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely45 on the confidence reposed46 in its impartiality by all the nations which may be called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse to their views or supposed interests. The Vilna fiasco, the Armenian[Pg 73] failure, the suspicions that surround the Silesian award, the timidity which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question disturbing the peace of Europe to-day, the futile47 conversations and committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in scrapping48 one flight of a?roplanes or one company of infantry49. All these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. What is it?
Undoubtedly50 the great weakness of the League comes from the fact that it only represents one half the great powers of the world. Until the others join you might as well call the Holy Alliance a League of Nations.
The ostensible51 purpose of that combination was also to prevent a recurrence52 of the wars that had for years scorched53 Europe, and to establish European peace on the firm basis of a joint54 guarantee of delimited frontiers. But certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated55 its policy. They terrorised Europe into submission56 and called that peace.
No historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material in the occurrences of to-day to justify57 the reference. The League to be a reality must represent the whole civilised world. That is[Pg 74] necessary to give it balance as well as authority. That was the original conception. To ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren controversy58.
I do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the man?uvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in America. Whether the Senate should have honoured the signature of an American President given in the name of his country at an international conference, or whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance59 with American ideas to justify sanction—whether the amendments60 demanded as the condition of approval would have crippled the League and ought to have been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been accepted—these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for me to discuss.
But as to the effect of the American refusal to adhere to the League, there can be no doubt. It robbed that body of all chance of dominating success in the immediate61 future. It is true that three great powers remained in the League, but Russia was excluded, Germany was not included, and when America decided62 not to go in, of the great powers, Britain, France and Italy alone remained.
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The effect has been paralysing. Where these three powers disagree on important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. The smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third.
Hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing63 menace to European peace are not dealt with by the League. Had America been in, even with an amended64 and expurgated constitution, the situation would have been transformed. America and Britain, acting65 in concert with an openly sympathetic Italy and a secretly assenting66 Belgium, would have brought such pressure to bear on France as to make it inevitable67 that the League should act.
The success of the League depends upon the readiness of nations great and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. But no great power has so far permitted any international question in which it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the League for decision.
It has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the Aaland Islands, over the fate of which[Pg 76] Sweden and Finland had a controversy. It has taken cognisance of disputes between Poland and Lithuania about Vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the parties. But the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out between France and Germany over the question of reparations the former resolutely68 declines to submit to consideration by the League.
The Treaty of Versailles is so wide in its application and so comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches international interests almost at every point. So that the French refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the effect of hobbling the League. As long as that attitude is maintained, the League is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and keeping peace.
The dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric69 disturbances70 for a whole generation. It is not an impossibility that it may end in the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. It is churning up deadly passions. If ever there was an occasion which called for the [Pg 77]intervention of an organisation71 set up for the express purpose of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds72, surely this is pre-eminently such a case. Not only do the French government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which constitutes the first and foremost part of the Treaty of Versailles into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. The constitution of the League stipulates73 that it will be the friendly duty of any power to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall be referred to the League. Nevertheless, one leading signatory rules out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own interests. This is the power which has invaded the territory of another because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the same treaty!
This emphatic74 repudiation75 of a solemn contract by one of its promoters has been acquiesced76 in by all the other signatories. Repudiation and acquiescence77 complete the electrocuting circuit. This limitation of the activities of the League is the gravest check which it has yet sustained in its career. I do not believe it would have occurred had[Pg 78] America, with or without Article 10, been an active member of this body. Its great authority, added to that of Britain and Italy, would have made the pressure irresistible78, and its presence on the council would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability and impartiality of the League that Germany would have accepted the conclusions arrived at without demur79 and acted upon them without chicane. A rational settlement of the reparations problem by the League would have established its authority throughout the world. Germany, Russia and Turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, and would soon be pleading for incorporation80 in its councils. The covenant would thus become a charter—respected, feared, honoured and obeyed by all. There would still be injustice81, but redress82 would be sought and fought for in the halls of the League. There would still be oppression, but freedom would be wrung83 from the clauses of the covenant. Argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised substitutes for shot, shell and sword. Wars would cease unto the ends of the earth, and the reign84 of law would be supreme85.
[Pg 79]
Wherein lies the real power of the League, or to be more accurate, its possibility of power? It brings together leading citizens of most of the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or likely to affect peace and concord86 amongst nations. The men assembled at Geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of peace. They are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. They are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. When in doubt they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the proceedings are reported direct to the governments. They meet often and regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well as courtesy.
It is in itself a good thing to accustom87 nations to discuss their difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. It is a practice to be cultivated. It is the practice that ended in eliminating the arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. It is only thus[Pg 80] that international disputes will gradually drift into the debating chamber88 instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. Wars are precipitated89 by motives which the statesmen responsible for them dare not publicly avow90. A public discussion would drag these emotives in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the withering91 contempt of humanity. The League by developing the habit amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. That is the greatest service it can render mankind. Will it be allowed to render that service? If not, then it will perish like many another laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself.
But if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried in the same tomb.
London, April 2nd, 1923.
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1 candidly | |
adv.坦率地,直率而诚恳地 | |
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2 partisans | |
游击队员( partisan的名词复数 ); 党人; 党羽; 帮伙 | |
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3 attachment | |
n.附属物,附件;依恋;依附 | |
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4 chimera | |
n.神话怪物;梦幻 | |
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5 myriads | |
n.无数,极大数量( myriad的名词复数 ) | |
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6 touching | |
adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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7 perils | |
极大危险( peril的名词复数 ); 危险的事(或环境) | |
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8 founders | |
n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
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9 deluge | |
n./vt.洪水,暴雨,使泛滥 | |
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10 feat | |
n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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11 respiration | |
n.呼吸作用;一次呼吸;植物光合作用 | |
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12 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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13 ravaged | |
毁坏( ravage的过去式和过去分词 ); 蹂躏; 劫掠; 抢劫 | |
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14 devastating | |
adj.毁灭性的,令人震惊的,强有力的 | |
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15 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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16 persistent | |
adj.坚持不懈的,执意的;持续的 | |
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17 toil | |
vi.辛劳工作,艰难地行动;n.苦工,难事 | |
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18 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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19 alleviating | |
减轻,缓解,缓和( alleviate的现在分词 ) | |
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20 distress | |
n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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21 victorious | |
adj.胜利的,得胜的 | |
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22 savagery | |
n.野性 | |
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23 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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24 humanitarian | |
n.人道主义者,博爱者,基督凡人论者 | |
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25 averting | |
防止,避免( avert的现在分词 ); 转移 | |
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26 covenant | |
n.盟约,契约;v.订盟约 | |
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27 impartiality | |
n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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28 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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29 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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30 engendered | |
v.产生(某形势或状况),造成,引起( engender的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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31 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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32 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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33 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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34 passionately | |
ad.热烈地,激烈地 | |
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35 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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36 protagonist | |
n.(思想观念的)倡导者;主角,主人公 | |
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37 scrupulous | |
adj.审慎的,小心翼翼的,完全的,纯粹的 | |
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38 bias | |
n.偏见,偏心,偏袒;vt.使有偏见 | |
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39 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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40 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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41 misgivings | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
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42 flouted | |
v.藐视,轻视( flout的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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43 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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44 cavil | |
v.挑毛病,吹毛求疵 | |
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45 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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46 reposed | |
v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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47 futile | |
adj.无效的,无用的,无希望的 | |
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48 scrapping | |
刮,切除坯体余泥 | |
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49 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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50 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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51 ostensible | |
adj.(指理由)表面的,假装的 | |
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52 recurrence | |
n.复发,反复,重现 | |
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53 scorched | |
烧焦,烤焦( scorch的过去式和过去分词 ); 使(植物)枯萎,把…晒枯; 高速行驶; 枯焦 | |
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54 joint | |
adj.联合的,共同的;n.关节,接合处;v.连接,贴合 | |
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55 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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56 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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57 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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58 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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59 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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60 amendments | |
(法律、文件的)改动( amendment的名词复数 ); 修正案; 修改; (美国宪法的)修正案 | |
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61 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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62 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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63 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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64 Amended | |
adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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65 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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66 assenting | |
同意,赞成( assent的现在分词 ) | |
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67 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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68 resolutely | |
adj.坚决地,果断地 | |
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69 atmospheric | |
adj.大气的,空气的;大气层的;大气所引起的 | |
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70 disturbances | |
n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 );打扰;困扰;障碍 | |
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71 organisation | |
n.组织,安排,团体,有机休 | |
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72 feuds | |
n.长期不和,世仇( feud的名词复数 ) | |
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73 stipulates | |
n.(尤指在协议或建议中)规定,约定,讲明(条件等)( stipulate的名词复数 );规定,明确要求v.(尤指在协议或建议中)规定,约定,讲明(条件等)( stipulate的第三人称单数 );规定,明确要求 | |
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74 emphatic | |
adj.强调的,着重的;无可置疑的,明显的 | |
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75 repudiation | |
n.拒绝;否认;断绝关系;抛弃 | |
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76 acquiesced | |
v.默认,默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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77 acquiescence | |
n.默许;顺从 | |
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78 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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79 demur | |
v.表示异议,反对 | |
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80 incorporation | |
n.设立,合并,法人组织 | |
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81 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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82 redress | |
n.赔偿,救济,矫正;v.纠正,匡正,革除 | |
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83 wrung | |
绞( wring的过去式和过去分词 ); 握紧(尤指别人的手); 把(湿衣服)拧干; 绞掉(水) | |
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84 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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85 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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86 concord | |
n.和谐;协调 | |
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87 accustom | |
vt.使适应,使习惯 | |
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88 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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89 precipitated | |
v.(突如其来地)使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 );促成;猛然摔下;使沉淀 | |
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90 avow | |
v.承认,公开宣称 | |
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91 withering | |
使人畏缩的,使人害羞的,使人难堪的 | |
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