This is the advice ponderously6 and pompously7 tendered them in inspired articles. So far, the French nation is jubilant that M. Poincaré has scored heavily on points. He is a defter8 penman, and, moreover, he does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a Committee of Ministers, all holding irreconcilable9 views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on one point—that no one quite knows what action to propose.
[Pg 235]
Up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion10 that the French could be shelled out of the Ruhr by reproaches which were both querulous and apologetic. That is not the way to shift continental11 statesmanship from its purpose. The French Foreign Office is better informed as to Cabinet divisions in this country than are the British public. It knows that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary dare not take measures which will hamper12 French action in the Ruhr.
When the Tory Diehards placed co-operation with France in the forefront of their programme they honestly meant it. For them it was not a mere13 man?uvre to unhorse the Coalition14. They cannot, therefore, support an attitude of resistance to French pressure on Germany. A refusal to join France in squeezing Germany is to them a continuation of the evil of the Coalition they overthrew15 with the help of Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Lord Curzon. They will not tolerate it.
That explains the impotence of British diplomacy16 in a situation which is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. The Cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to action. They have, therefore, dispersed17 far and[Pg 236] wide to search for fortuitous guidance hither and thither—some in the tranquillity18 of their English country houses; some in the healing springs of France; some in the mists of Scottish moorlands. Mayhap one of them will bring home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. It is all very humiliating to the Empire that raised ten millions of men and spent ￡10,000,000,000 of its treasure to win the War. The net result of the voluminous correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the Allies whom we saved from destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our friendly companionship. They are marching resolutely19 in one direction, whilst we are shambling along in another.
We have travelled long distances from each other since January last, and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in common when we met the Germans at Cannes early last year.[9] The Entente20 has never been more cordial than it was then—it has never shown more promise of hopeful partnership21 for the peace of the world. We were on the point of securing an amicable22 and [Pg 237]businesslike arrangement with Germany for the payment of reparations and of concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of France and Belgium against the possibility of future invasion.
From these starting-points it was proposed that Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium should advance together to a general settlement of European problems in East and West—political, financial, economic and transport. This we had agreed to do and, with the unity23 and goodwill24 which then prevailed, could have accomplished25.
But M. Poincaré had no use for the dove of peace. He wanted to fly his falcon26. He had trained and bred it in the French farmyard, and there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. When his chance came he flew it at the wounded German eagle. It is poor sport, and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to Frenchmen of a sort. The best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in the clamour of the unthinking. If the helpless bird is torn to pieces, there is nothing in that for French or Belgian larders27.
Quite unintentionally the hawk28 has brought down the Entente also. It may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. Henceforth international[Pg 238] arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. France is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the Ruhr by force. That is what "pay or stay" means. To that policy the majority in this country are definitely opposed. If the Diehards in the Cabinet were by any chance to win, and either Mr. Baldwin surrendered or resigned in favour of a Poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor any possible successors could carry the country along into the Ruhr venture.
Some of them around the Prime Minister who have so suddenly assumed pro-French sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well that, although they may use the Diehards for their own ends, if they succeeded in their somewhat sinister29 purpose they could not carry out the Diehard policy.
They are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies30 by negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with France. But British Premiers31 are not appointed at Rambouillet nor do they draw their authority from the Quai d'Orsay. Whatever may be thought of Mr. Bonar Law or of Mr. Stanley Baldwin by political partisans32, no one suggests[Pg 239] that they derived33 their promotion34 from other than purely35 British sources.
But for a fortnight nothing is to happen—except the spread of unemployment in Britain and of despair in Germany. At the end of the fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to M. Poincaré's rejoinder? Or will there be another conference?
Both M. Poincaré and the present Parliamentary régime in Britain came into power on the cry of "Enough of these eternal conferences; let us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before the War"—and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." Nevertheless, Mr. Bonar Law's administration during its short tenure36 of six months participated in four European conferences, and M. Poincaré, during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly37 in eight. The French Press are urging him on to add another to a record which already beats that of M. Briand in the matter of "joy-riding"—to quote the contemptuous Diehard name for international conferences during Coalition days.
It is a suspicious circumstance that those who[Pg 240] were once resentful and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here and in France. The reason is scarcely concealed38 by ardent39 advocates of the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." At the old conferences, so it is contended, France was invariably forced to give way. Now she can and will command the situation.
There is a new note of confidence ringing through French despatches and echoed in the French Press. France must get what she wants; Britain must take what she is given. The French share of reparations must first be assured—debts due to Britain can come out of what is left. It is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the British that they should expect to be paid what is owing to them! With their smug and hypocritical Puritan temperament40 and outlook they insist that contracts should be respected! France, for the sake of the Entente, will make a concession41 even to British cupidity42 and pharisaism. It will permit the British Empire to collect—not the whole of what is due to her, but a much-reduced claim out of Germany once the French demand for reparations is cashed or as good as cashed!
To me this is a new France. During my years[Pg 241] of discussion with French statesmen I never heard this voice. I had three or four talks with M. Poincaré, and I never heard him speak in these supercilious43 tones. Impunity44 has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency.
Belgium is to suggest a meeting of the Premiers. When it comes the French minimum terms are to be rigid45 and unequivocal. Here they are:—
1. France must be paid her irreducible minimum of ￡1,300,000,000 in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else.
2. Belgium is also to have her priority of ￡100,000,000.
3. As Germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, France and Belgium are to hold the Ruhr until they are paid. Hints have been thrown out by the more conciliatory French journals that the French Government might consider an early retirement46 from the Ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an international guarantee. That implies Britain and America becoming sureties for payment of the German indemnity47!
4. As to the rest, France and Belgium have no[Pg 242] objection, subject to the above conditions, to Great Britain collecting ￡700,000,000, i.e., about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and reparations) from Germany. But this munificent48 concession is to be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes49 entirely50 the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. The Allies and Germany between them owe Great Britain ￡3,000,000,000. The French and Belgian governments are willing that Great Britain should collect ￡700,000,000 of that amount from Germany, provided the remaining ￡2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled—and always provided that the ￡1,400,000,000 due to France and Belgium has been satisfactorily guaranteed.
5. These handsome terms can only be propounded51 if Germany first of all withdraws all passive resistance in the Ruhr. That is an essential preliminary.
The French government have stated these terms with such precision and such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence52, that any departure from them on the French side seems impossible. The hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a British surrender. There is[Pg 243] a dismal53 "joy-ride" in prospect54 for the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary. Is it conceivable they can contemplate55 such a capitulation? I do not see how the present Government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to French dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would lead to agreement.
What is the alternative? Herr Stresemann can alone answer that question. It is not yet clear what he means to do. Perhaps he is feeling his way to a decision.
London, August 27th, 1923.
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1
joust
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| v.马上长枪比武，竞争 | |
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upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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knights
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| 骑士； （中古时代的）武士( knight的名词复数 )； 骑士； 爵士； （国际象棋中）马 | |
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tilt
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| v.(使)倾侧；(使)倾斜；n.倾侧；倾斜 | |
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ponderously
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pompously
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| adv.傲慢地，盛大壮观地；大模大样 | |
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defter
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| adj.熟练的，灵巧的( deft的比较级 ) | |
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irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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hamper
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| vt.妨碍，束缚，限制；n.(有盖的)大篮子 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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overthrew
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| overthrow的过去式 | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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resolutely
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| adj.坚决地，果断地 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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partnership
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| n.合作关系，伙伴关系 | |
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amicable
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| adj.和平的，友好的；友善的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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falcon
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| n.隼，猎鹰 | |
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larders
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| n.（家中的）食物贮藏室，食物橱( larder的名词复数 ) | |
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hawk
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| n.鹰，骗子；鹰派成员 | |
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sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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premiers
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| n.总理，首相( premier的名词复数 )；首席官员， | |
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partisans
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| 游击队员( partisan的名词复数 )； 党人； 党羽； 帮伙 | |
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33
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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41
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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42
cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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supercilious
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| adj.目中无人的，高傲的；adv.高傲地；n.高傲 | |
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impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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indemnity
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| n.赔偿，赔款，补偿金 | |
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munificent
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| adj.慷慨的，大方的 | |
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forgoes
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| v.没有也行，放弃( forgo的第三人称单数 ) | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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51
propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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53
dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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55
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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