Nor did we expect remission of our debts. Whenever we were tempted9 to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that reminded us of the attitude of the "Middle West." America was discovered by Europe centuries ago, but the "Middle West," as a political entity10, is to[Pg 253] untutored Europeans a discovery of the war. We were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the American conscience—inexorable, intractable, but irresistible11 when engaged in any enterprise. How potent12 this conscience was, as a world force, the war demonstrated. From the heights it hurled13 an avalanche14 of force against Germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. Unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard side of the Middle West conscience.
Our hope was therefore not in remission. There were, however, many other possibilities. We were not the only debtors of the American government. Other Allies had borrowed not merely indirectly15 through us, but directly from America. We had every confidence that the United States government would not mete16 out to Britain severer treatment than it was prepared to accord to our Allies. We had to contend, it is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. Apart from our great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, the resources and the inherited skill of our people. We have nothing like the rich[Pg 254] plains and the fertilising and ripening17 sunshine of France, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. Our sources of wealth—apart from coal—are precarious18, for they depend more largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. We are international providers, merchants and carriers. A sixty-year contract to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. The demoralised condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion of our industrial population unemployed19 than any other European country. I hear tales of unemployment in the United States of America, but the reports that reach us here on American unemployment are so contradictory20 that I can build no argument upon them. But, as to the gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. We have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment pay in one form or another. The annual cost to the nation of feeding its workless population runs to over £100,000,000—almost the figure of the annuity21 demanded from Germany as a war indemnity22.
[Pg 255]
Although there are signs of improvement the omens23 point to a prolonged period of subnormal trade. Continuous depression for years will mean that Britain will suffer more from the devastation24 to her trade caused by the war than France from the devastation of her provinces. Our country, anxious about its means of livelihood25, with a million and a half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has to bear the heaviest burden of taxation26 in the world. Why? Because it has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on £3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the Allies or incurred on their behalf. That is why we felt hopeful that the United States would not discriminate27 against a nation so situated28.
When I talk of debts the Allies owe to us, I want to emphasise29 the fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. They are onerous30 facts representing a real burden borne at this hour by the bent31 and panting taxpayer4 of Britain. If these loans had never been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter32 by over two shillings in the pound. He is every year paying to the actual lenders—some British, some American—that proportion of his income.[Pg 256] It is a weight he undertook to carry for his Allies during the war on the sacred pledge of those Allies that they would take it over after the war. The American government borrowed from their public to make advances to Great Britain, and have called upon the British taxpayer to redeem33 his pledge. We make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation of the strict letter of the bond. But that amount is in substance part of the debt owing by the Allies to Britain. And the British taxpayer naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own legitimate34 burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental35 countries. He naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation36 which would have terminated in an all-round settlement.
That was the real purport37 of the Balfour note. The true significance of that great document has been entirely38 misunderstood—sometimes carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently39. I guarantee that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred.[Pg 257] It has suffered the same fate as the treaty of Versailles. Opinion is sharply divided as to both between those who rend40 without reading and those who read without rending41. Most men have received their impressions of the Balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave instructions to condemn42 it without ever reading it. The men who really understood both the Versailles treaty and the Balfour note have been too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain.
But the time has come when the public attention should be once more drawn43 to the remarkable44 and far-reaching proposals of the Balfour note. They constitute an offer on the part of Britain to measure the amount of her claims against her Allies by the extent of her obligations to the United States of America. The British government even offered to include the claim of their country against Germany in this generous concession45. What does that mean in reference to present conditions? That if the Allies and Germany between them found the £30,000,000 a year which Britain has undertaken to pay America, she would forgo46 her claim to the £3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. It[Pg 258] was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results beneficent beyond computation. Britain, which would have been the heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world recovery that would have ensued.
How was it received? Some criticised it because it asked too little—some because it demanded too much. Many criticised because they were determined47 to approve nothing that emanated48 from such a government, but most of its censors49 condemned50 it because they never took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street cries happened to denounce it. The government that propounded51 it soon after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. So this great project which would have settled for ever the question which above all others is vexing52 peace and unsettling minds in Europe was pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed.
But surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement of the question of inter-Allied53 debts. We cannot rest satisfied with an arrangement which effectively binds54 us to pay without prospect55 of the slightest contribution from our debtors.[Pg 259] What America cannot indulge in we cannot afford. The gold of Europe now lies in its coffers. Who are we—plunged in the mire56 of debt up to our nostrils—to give ourselves airs of generosity57 superior to the only golden land left in this war-stripped earth?
If there is to be a general jubilee58 in which all alike participate in order to give the world a new start, then I feel sure Britain will play her part bravely and nobly. But a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees France, Italy and Belgium from all their debts whilst leaving Britain sweating to pay off debts incurred for her Allies on the strength of their bond—that we cannot bear.
I trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our Allies which, even if it is not a replica59 of our contract with the American government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will safeguard us against loss under that contract. It is I fear hopeless to expect that we should be recouped the 2s. in the pound which interest on Allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we might be guaranteed against the 6d. in the pound which the American instalments involve. I feel the effort is beset60 with difficulties and that the outlook is not[Pg 260] hopeful. There have of late been a few discouraging symptoms. One is the reception accorded at the recent Paris conference to the British prime minister's liberal offer regarding inter-Allied debts. It was a tactical error to open the conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate.
Had I been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent negotiations61 in Paris it would have been that they were so managed that for the first time since the war Britain has been completely isolated62 at a European conference. That is a misfortune, for it encouraged the French government to rash action. Up to the last conference Britain and Italy had remained in substantial accord even when France and Belgium took a different view, and Belgium had never before quitted any of the gatherings63 in complete disagreement with Great Britain. So France, always tempted as she was to occupy the Ruhr, hesitated to do so in the face of so formidable an Allied resistance. What is relevant, however, to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation64 on the occasion of the last conference. The British premier65 started the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of most of the [Pg 261]indebtedness of these countries to Britain, but which implied immediate66 arrangements for beginning repayment67 of the rest. This suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated68 opposition69 to the whole of the British plan. It became clear that existing governments on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay interest meanwhile. If we point to the fact as we did in the Balfour note, that we have undertaken to repay the United States of America the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the Allies, they simply shrug70 their shoulders and say in effect: "That is your affair. We repay neither Britain nor America, and there is an end of it."
The other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by M. Poincaré in the French Chamber71 in the course of which he dealt casually72 with the subject of inter-Allied indebtedness. The French prime minister then announced categorically that France had no intention of paying her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from Germany. What does that mean in effect? That the France represented by M. Poincaré has no [Pg 262]intention of ever paying her debts. When the colossal73 figure of German reparations is taken into account thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its liquidation74. Is the French debt to lie dormant75 carrying no interest meanwhile? If it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the present value of £500,000,000 debt payable76 thirty years hence is insignificant77. The present government of France have therefore declared they do not mean to pay what France owes. Surely the time to dictate78 the conditions of your repayment of a loan—when you propose to pay, how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all—is when you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money.
And yet in the same speech in which M. Poincaré serves up hot platitudes79 for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national obligations, he dismisses France's faithful ally with the cold comfort that France is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend to the debts she owes. I believe in my heart that there is a France of which he is not the spokesman—a great France which will not treat shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair and who is now staggering under[Pg 263] unparalleled burdens incurred in the discharge of the obligations of friendship.
All this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared up without undue80 delay. Having just completed negotiations for liquidating81 our own war indebtedness to America we are in a position to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that indebtedness. If nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. We shall be assumed to have accepted the Poincaré repudiation. I do not know what conditions the government have made with the United States government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in funding our debt. If they are to be placed on the market the chance of any future deal is destroyed. Ere that be done we must know where we are in reference to our own claims. I trust the government will act promptly82. Delay was justifiable83 so long as we were in the same position in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. The Baldwin settlement has altered all that. If we do not insist on an arrangement now the British taxpayer will have the fate of Issachar—that of the poor beast between two burdens—his own and that of the Allies.
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1 incurred | |
[医]招致的,遭受的; incur的过去式 | |
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2 debtors | |
n.债务人,借方( debtor的名词复数 ) | |
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3 taxpayers | |
纳税人,纳税的机构( taxpayer的名词复数 ) | |
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4 taxpayer | |
n.纳税人 | |
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5 repudiation | |
n.拒绝;否认;断绝关系;抛弃 | |
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6 texture | |
n.(织物)质地;(材料)构造;结构;肌理 | |
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7 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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8 wreck | |
n.失事,遇难;沉船;vt.(船等)失事,遇难 | |
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9 tempted | |
v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
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10 entity | |
n.实体,独立存在体,实际存在物 | |
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11 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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12 potent | |
adj.强有力的,有权势的;有效力的 | |
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13 hurled | |
v.猛投,用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 );大声叫骂 | |
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14 avalanche | |
n.雪崩,大量涌来 | |
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15 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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16 mete | |
v.分配;给予 | |
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17 ripening | |
v.成熟,使熟( ripen的现在分词 );熟化;熟成 | |
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18 precarious | |
adj.不安定的,靠不住的;根据不足的 | |
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19 unemployed | |
adj.失业的,没有工作的;未动用的,闲置的 | |
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20 contradictory | |
adj.反驳的,反对的,抗辩的;n.正反对,矛盾对立 | |
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21 annuity | |
n.年金;养老金 | |
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22 indemnity | |
n.赔偿,赔款,补偿金 | |
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23 omens | |
n.前兆,预兆( omen的名词复数 ) | |
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24 devastation | |
n.毁坏;荒废;极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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25 livelihood | |
n.生计,谋生之道 | |
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26 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
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27 discriminate | |
v.区别,辨别,区分;有区别地对待 | |
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28 situated | |
adj.坐落在...的,处于某种境地的 | |
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29 emphasise | |
vt.加强...的语气,强调,着重 | |
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30 onerous | |
adj.繁重的 | |
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31 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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32 lighter | |
n.打火机,点火器;驳船;v.用驳船运送;light的比较级 | |
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33 redeem | |
v.买回,赎回,挽回,恢复,履行(诺言等) | |
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34 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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35 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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36 consultation | |
n.咨询;商量;商议;会议 | |
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37 purport | |
n.意义,要旨,大要;v.意味著,做为...要旨,要领是... | |
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38 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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39 insolently | |
adv.自豪地,自傲地 | |
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40 rend | |
vt.把…撕开,割裂;把…揪下来,强行夺取 | |
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41 rending | |
v.撕碎( rend的现在分词 );分裂;(因愤怒、痛苦等而)揪扯(衣服或头发等);(声音等)刺破 | |
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42 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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43 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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44 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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45 concession | |
n.让步,妥协;特许(权) | |
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46 forgo | |
v.放弃,抛弃 | |
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47 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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48 emanated | |
v.从…处传出,传出( emanate的过去式和过去分词 );产生,表现,显示 | |
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49 censors | |
删剪(书籍、电影等中被认为犯忌、违反道德或政治上危险的内容)( censor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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50 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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51 propounded | |
v.提出(问题、计划等)供考虑[讨论],提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52 vexing | |
adj.使人烦恼的,使人恼火的v.使烦恼( vex的现在分词 );使苦恼;使生气;详细讨论 | |
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53 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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54 binds | |
v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 );装订;捆绑;(用长布条)缠绕 | |
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55 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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56 mire | |
n.泥沼,泥泞;v.使...陷于泥泞,使...陷入困境 | |
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57 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
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58 jubilee | |
n.周年纪念;欢乐 | |
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59 replica | |
n.复制品 | |
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60 beset | |
v.镶嵌;困扰,包围 | |
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61 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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62 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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63 gatherings | |
聚集( gathering的名词复数 ); 收集; 采集; 搜集 | |
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64 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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65 premier | |
adj.首要的;n.总理,首相 | |
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66 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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67 repayment | |
n.偿还,偿还款;报酬 | |
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68 consolidated | |
a.联合的 | |
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69 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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70 shrug | |
v.耸肩(表示怀疑、冷漠、不知等) | |
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71 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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72 casually | |
adv.漠不关心地,无动于衷地,不负责任地 | |
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73 colossal | |
adj.异常的,庞大的 | |
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74 liquidation | |
n.清算,停止营业 | |
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75 dormant | |
adj.暂停活动的;休眠的;潜伏的 | |
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76 payable | |
adj.可付的,应付的,有利益的 | |
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77 insignificant | |
adj.无关紧要的,可忽略的,无意义的 | |
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78 dictate | |
v.口授;(使)听写;指令,指示,命令 | |
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79 platitudes | |
n.平常的话,老生常谈,陈词滥调( platitude的名词复数 );滥套子 | |
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80 undue | |
adj.过分的;不适当的;未到期的 | |
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81 liquidating | |
v.清算( liquidate的现在分词 );清除(某人);清偿;变卖 | |
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82 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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83 justifiable | |
adj.有理由的,无可非议的 | |
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