For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 1, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds2 the people of America together be severed3 or dissolved by ambition or by avarice4, by jealousy5 or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry6 through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation7 from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect8 that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous9 which can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious10, and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes11 with which sophistry12 has beset13 the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious14 a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch15.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the "insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation16 of the union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate17 a position which is not either controverted18 or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent19, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending20 anarchy21. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation22. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length extorted23 from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating24 the extremity25 at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession26 of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed27 out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the union.
We may indeed with propriety28 be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation29. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation30. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent31 peril32 for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel33 the aggression34? We have neither troops, nor treasury35, nor government.(1) Are we even in a condition to remonstrate36 with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation37 in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere38 pageants39 of mimic40 sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural41 decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress42? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully43 explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate44 property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity45 of money. To shorten an enumeration46 of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder47, poverty, and insignificance48 that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
This is the melancholy49 situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims50 and councils which would now deter51 us from adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink52 of a precipice53, seem resolved to plunge54 us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled55 by every motive56 that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity57, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced58 us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness of the concession59, on the part of the old adversaries60 of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous61 opposition62 to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute63 of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite64 to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable65; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution66 of State authority; at sovereignty in the union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended68 otherwise than by an alteration69 in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric70.
The great and radical71 vice72 in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE73 or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the union, yet it pervades74 and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States has an indefinite discretion75 to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding76 on the members of the union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating77 from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible78 with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely79 stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized80 nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes81 of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate82. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium83 of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation84 were exhausted85, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting86 lesson to mankind, how little dependence67 is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate87 interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail88 upon us all the mischiefs89 which have been enumerated90 under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive91; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual92 jealousies93 and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues94 of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling95 to be placed in this perilous96 situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens,—the only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed98 to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted99 in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION100 of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic1, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations101 of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach102 of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience97. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent103 man choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches104, by the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members, and would beget105 a full compliance106 with all the constitutional requisitions of the union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle107 of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied108 the original inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates109 of reason and justice, without constraint110. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness111 than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy112 of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction113, which is apt to mingle114 its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience115 of control, that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser116 sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs117, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged118 is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without the intervention119 of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect120 of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity121 of the thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary122 conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption123. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny124, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right judgment125, and with that strong predilection126 in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been conversant127 in the proceedings128 of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior129 pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious130 resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence131 of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified132 produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext133 of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least delinquent134 States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked135 with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative136 men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not, without hesitation137, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive138 voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn139 its support, till the frail140 and tottering141 edifice142 seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
PUBLIUS
1. "I mean for the union."
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1
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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binds
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| v.约束( bind的第三人称单数 )；装订；捆绑；（用长布条）缠绕 | |
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severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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momentous
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| adj.重要的，重大的 | |
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spacious
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| adj.广阔的，宽敞的 | |
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mazes
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| 迷宫( maze的名词复数 )； 纷繁复杂的规则； 复杂难懂的细节； 迷宫图 | |
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sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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compendious
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| adj.简要的，精简的 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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controverted
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| v.争论，反驳，否定( controvert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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extorted
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| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
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precipitating
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| adj.急落的，猛冲的v.（突如其来地）使发生( precipitate的现在分词 )；促成；猛然摔下；使沉淀 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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imminent
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| adj.即将发生的，临近的，逼近的 | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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remonstrate
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| v.抗议，规劝 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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pageants
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| n.盛装的游行( pageant的名词复数 )；穿古代服装的游行；再现历史场景的娱乐活动；盛会 | |
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mimic
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| v.模仿，戏弄；n.模仿他人言行的人 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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distress
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| n.苦恼，痛苦，不舒适；不幸；vt.使悲痛 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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depreciate
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| v.降价，贬值，折旧 | |
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scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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insignificance
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| n.不重要；无价值；无意义 | |
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melancholy
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| n.忧郁，愁思；adj.令人感伤（沮丧）的，忧郁的 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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deter
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| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
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brink
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| n.(悬崖、河流等的)边缘，边沿 | |
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precipice
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| n.悬崖，危急的处境 | |
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54
plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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seduced
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| 诱奸( seduce的过去式和过去分词 )； 勾引； 诱使堕落； 使入迷 | |
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concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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Amended
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| adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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fabric
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| n.织物，织品，布；构造，结构，组织 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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72
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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73
corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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74
pervades
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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76
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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77
deviating
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| v.偏离，越轨( deviate的现在分词 ) | |
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78
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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81
vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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82
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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83
equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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84
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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85
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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86
afflicting
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| 痛苦的 | |
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87
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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88
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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89
mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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90
enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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95
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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97
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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98
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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101
violations
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| 违反( violation的名词复数 )； 冒犯； 违反（行为、事例）； 强奸 | |
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102
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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103
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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104
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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105
beget
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| v.引起；产生 | |
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106
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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107
oracle
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| n.神谕，神谕处，预言 | |
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108
belied
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| v.掩饰( belie的过去式和过去分词 )；证明（或显示）…为虚假；辜负；就…扯谎 | |
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109
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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110
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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111
disinterestedness
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112
infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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113
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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114
mingle
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| vt.使混合，使相混；vi.混合起来；相交往 | |
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115
impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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116
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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117
orbs
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| abbr.off-reservation boarding school 在校寄宿学校n.球，天体，圆形物( orb的名词复数 ) | |
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118
abridged
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| 削减的，删节的 | |
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119
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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120
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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121
conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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122
momentary
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| adj.片刻的，瞬息的；短暂的 | |
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123
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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124
scrutiny
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| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
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125
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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126
predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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127
conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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128
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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129
exterior
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| adj.外部的，外在的；表面的 | |
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130
harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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131
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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132
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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133
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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134
delinquent
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| adj.犯法的，有过失的；n.违法者 | |
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135
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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136
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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137
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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138
persuasive
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| adj.有说服力的，能说得使人相信的 | |
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139
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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140
frail
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| adj.身体虚弱的；易损坏的 | |
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141
tottering
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| adj.蹒跚的，动摇的v.走得或动得不稳( totter的现在分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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142
edifice
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| n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿，教室) | |
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