From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested1 by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations2 of this fact will be worthy3 of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity4, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges5 of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters6 of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages7 of political writers.
This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy8: It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate9 effect of the use of it, civil war.
It remains10 to inquire how far so odious11 an engine of government, in its application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed12 would be confined to a single member, and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defense13. Independent of this motive14 of sympathy, if a large and influential15 State should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious16 arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived17; plausible18 excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions19, inflame20 the passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation21 or omission22 of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement23; the better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper24 beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn25, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment26, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge27 the affront28 or to avoid the disgrace of submission29. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the union.
This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated30 in a more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the union by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent31 members by an imitation of their example. And the guilt32 of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining33 when force could with propriety34 be employed. In the article of pecuniary35 contribution, which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretense36 of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify37 the harsh expedient38 of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious39 views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail in the national council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate40 into a military despotism; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the populousness41 and strength of several of these States singly at the present juncture42, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion43 applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous44 heroes and demi-gods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce45 the refractory46 and disobedient have been the signals of bloody47 wars, in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half.
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity48, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate49 to execute its own resolutions. The majesty50 of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed51 and exercised by the government of the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be disaffected52 to the authority of the union, it could at any time obstruct54 the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.
The plausibility55 of this objection will vanish the moment we advert56 to the essential difference between a mere57 NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the union, they have only NOT TO ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected53 but unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience, exemption58, or advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the intervention59 of the State legislatures, if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion60 of an unconstitutional power. No omissions61 nor evasions62 would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous63 in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation64 of authority. The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence65 of the courts of justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked66 in a conspiracy67 with the legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme68 law of the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted69 with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians70 of the Constitution, would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a decided71 preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity72 or rashness, because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority.
If opposition73 to the national government should arise from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source it might emanate74, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness75. As to those partial commotions76 and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet77 society, from the intrigues78 of an inconsiderable faction79, or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of the community the general government could command more extensive resources for the suppression of disturbances80 of that kind than would be in the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds81 which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration82 through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding83 either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the contagion84 of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty85 for human foresight86 or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities.
PUBLIUS
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1
attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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2
confirmations
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| 证实( confirmation的名词复数 )； 证据； 确认； （基督教中的）坚信礼 | |
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3
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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4
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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vestiges
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| 残余部分( vestige的名词复数 )； 遗迹； 痕迹； 毫不 | |
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6
fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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7
suffrages
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| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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8
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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9
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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10
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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11
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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12
redressed
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| v.改正( redress的过去式和过去分词 )；重加权衡；恢复平衡 | |
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13
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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14
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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15
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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16
specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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17
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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18
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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19
apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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20
inflame
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| v.使燃烧；使极度激动；使发炎 | |
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21
violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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22
omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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23
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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24
tamper
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| v.干预，玩弄，贿赂，窜改，削弱，损害 | |
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25
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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26
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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27
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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28
affront
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| n./v.侮辱，触怒 | |
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29
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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30
renovated
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| 翻新，修复，整修( renovate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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31
delinquent
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| adj.犯法的，有过失的；n.违法者 | |
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32
guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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33
ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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34
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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35
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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36
pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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37
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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38
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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39
factious
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| adj.好搞宗派活动的，派系的，好争论的 | |
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40
degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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41
populousness
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| 人口稠密 | |
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42
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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43
coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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44
fabulous
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| adj.极好的；极为巨大的；寓言中的，传说中的 | |
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45
coerce
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| v.强迫，压制 | |
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46
refractory
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| adj.倔强的，难驾驭的 | |
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47
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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48
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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49
magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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50
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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51
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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52
disaffected
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| adj.（政治上）不满的，叛离的 | |
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53
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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54
obstruct
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| v.阻隔，阻塞(道路、通道等)；n.阻碍物，障碍物 | |
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55
plausibility
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| n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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56
advert
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| vi.注意，留意，言及；n.广告 | |
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57
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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58
exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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59
intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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60
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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61
omissions
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| n.省略( omission的名词复数 )；删节；遗漏；略去或漏掉的事（或人） | |
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62
evasions
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| 逃避( evasion的名词复数 )； 回避； 遁辞； 借口 | |
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63
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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64
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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65
concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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66
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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67
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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68
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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69
tainted
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| adj.腐坏的；污染的；沾污的；感染的v.使变质( taint的过去式和过去分词 )；使污染；败坏；被污染，腐坏，败坏 | |
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70
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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71
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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72
levity
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| n.轻率，轻浮，不稳定，多变 | |
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73
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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74
emanate
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| v.发自，来自，出自 | |
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75
licentiousness
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| n.放肆，无法无天 | |
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76
commotions
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| n.混乱，喧闹，骚动( commotion的名词复数 ) | |
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77
disquiet
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| n.担心，焦虑 | |
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78
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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79
faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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80
disturbances
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| n.骚乱( disturbance的名词复数 )；打扰；困扰；障碍 | |
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81
feuds
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| n.长期不和，世仇( feud的名词复数 ) | |
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82
conflagration
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| n.建筑物或森林大火 | |
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83
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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84
contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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85
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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86
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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