For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 5, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude1 to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest2 the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere3 domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements4 to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation5, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged6 in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision7 of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction8. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition9 in the federal councils to usurp10 the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory11; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor12 of the national government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and lust13 of domination would be sufficient to beget14 that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent15 body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant16 an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence17, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly from the diffusive18 construction of the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias19 towards their local governments than towards the government of the union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.
This strong propensity20 of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries21 in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so many rivulets22 of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate23 for the instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,—I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience24 and attachment25. It is that which, being the immediate26 and visible guardian27 of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem28, and reverence29 towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse30 itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided31 an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived32 from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative33 men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual34 sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal35 systems were not, strictly36 speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals37, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted39 to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure40 of fealty41 or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal38 was a kind of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition42 to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons43 or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy44.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion45 was entirely46 thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected47 into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch48 finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded49 and detested50 by both; till mutual51 danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency52 and justice, preserved the fidelity53 and devotion of their retainers and followers54, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment55 or subversion56 of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation57 or conjecture58. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent59 example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants60 by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation61 with England subdued62 its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously63 established in the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract64 its legitimate65 and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise66 review of the events that have attended confederate governments will further illustrate67 this important doctrine68; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy69 a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS
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1
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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2
divest
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| v.脱去，剥除 | |
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3
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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4
allurements
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| n.诱惑( allurement的名词复数 )；吸引；诱惑物；有诱惑力的事物 | |
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5
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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6
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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7
supervision
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| n.监督，管理 | |
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8
jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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9
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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10
usurp
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| vt.篡夺，霸占；vi.篡位 | |
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11
nugatory
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| adj.琐碎的，无价值的 | |
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12
splendor
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| n.光彩；壮丽，华丽；显赫，辉煌 | |
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13
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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14
beget
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| v.引起；产生 | |
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15
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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16
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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17
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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18
diffusive
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| adj.散布性的，扩及的，普及的 | |
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19
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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20
propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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21
auxiliaries
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| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
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rivulets
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| n.小河，小溪( rivulet的名词复数 ) | |
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23
compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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24
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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28
esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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29
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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30
diffuse
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| v.扩散；传播；adj.冗长的；四散的，弥漫的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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32
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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33
speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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34
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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35
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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36
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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37
vassals
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| n.奴仆( vassal的名词复数 )；（封建时代）诸侯；从属者；下属 | |
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38
vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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39
allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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40
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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41
fealty
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| n.忠贞，忠节 | |
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42
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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43
barons
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| 男爵( baron的名词复数 )； 巨头； 大王； 大亨 | |
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44
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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45
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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46
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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47
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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48
monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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49
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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50
detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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51
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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52
clemency
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| n.温和，仁慈，宽厚 | |
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53
fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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54
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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55
abridgment
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| n.删节，节本 | |
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56
subversion
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| n.颠覆，破坏 | |
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57
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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58
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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59
cogent
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| adj.强有力的，有说服力的 | |
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60
dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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61
incorporation
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| n.设立，合并，法人组织 | |
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62
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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63
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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64
counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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65
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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66
concise
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| adj.简洁的，简明的 | |
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67
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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68
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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69
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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