From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787.
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable1 texture2, yet confirming all the lessons derived3 from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain4 quotas5 and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity7 and the sanction of their constituents8 are requisite9. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial10 rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. A council of state, a chamber11 of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify12 the federal administration.
The executive magistrate13 of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an hereditary14 prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial15 estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates16 of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates17 under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives18.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for garrisons19, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts of fortified20 towns.
In his marine21 capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and directs every thing relative to naval22 forces and other naval affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy23; appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred thousand florins. The standing24 army which he commands consists of about forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated25 Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord26 among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities27; a precarious28 existence in peace, and peculiar29 calamities30 from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred31 of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices32 of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes33 an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but the jealousy34 in each province renders the practice very different from the theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy35 certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota6.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive36 the articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement37 from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate38 resistance; but utterly39 impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering40 defense41.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign minister, elude42 matters taken ad referendum, by tampering43 with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly45 and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation47 of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies48 of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies49, by a defective50 constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy51 manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the union could never have subsisted52, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness53, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence44, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues54 the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots55 have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened56 for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal46 found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy57 and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse58 opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude59 mingle60 an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious61 concord62 which has distinguished63 the consultations64 for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries65 and failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed66 on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity67, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum68 under which, we trust, the enjoyment69 of these blessings70 will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe71 of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents72. Experience is the oracle73 of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive74 and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive75 of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION76 of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.
PUBLIUS
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1 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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2 texture | |
n.(织物)质地;(材料)构造;结构;肌理 | |
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3 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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4 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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5 quotas | |
(正式限定的)定量( quota的名词复数 ); 定额; 指标; 摊派 | |
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6 quota | |
n.(生产、进出口等的)配额,(移民的)限额 | |
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7 unanimity | |
n.全体一致,一致同意 | |
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8 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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9 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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10 provincial | |
adj.省的,地方的;n.外省人,乡下人 | |
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11 chamber | |
n.房间,寝室;会议厅;议院;会所 | |
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12 fortify | |
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化 | |
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13 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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14 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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15 patrimonial | |
adj.祖传的 | |
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16 potentates | |
n.君主,统治者( potentate的名词复数 );有权势的人 | |
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17 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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18 prerogatives | |
n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 );特权;大主教法庭;总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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19 garrisons | |
守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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20 fortified | |
adj. 加强的 | |
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21 marine | |
adj.海的;海生的;航海的;海事的;n.水兵 | |
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22 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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23 proxy | |
n.代理权,代表权;(对代理人的)委托书;代理人 | |
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24 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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25 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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26 discord | |
n.不和,意见不合,争论,(音乐)不和谐 | |
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27 indignities | |
n.侮辱,轻蔑( indignity的名词复数 ) | |
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28 precarious | |
adj.不安定的,靠不住的;根据不足的 | |
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29 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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30 calamities | |
n.灾祸,灾难( calamity的名词复数 );不幸之事 | |
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31 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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32 vices | |
缺陷( vice的名词复数 ); 恶习; 不道德行为; 台钳 | |
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33 reposes | |
v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的第三人称单数 ) | |
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34 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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35 levy | |
n.征收税或其他款项,征收额 | |
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36 waive | |
vt.放弃,不坚持(规定、要求、权力等) | |
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37 reimbursement | |
n.偿还,退还 | |
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38 meditate | |
v.想,考虑,(尤指宗教上的)沉思,冥想 | |
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39 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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40 persevering | |
a.坚忍不拔的 | |
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41 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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42 elude | |
v.躲避,困惑 | |
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43 tampering | |
v.窜改( tamper的现在分词 );篡改;(用不正当手段)影响;瞎摆弄 | |
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44 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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45 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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46 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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47 usurpation | |
n.篡位;霸占 | |
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48 contingencies | |
n.偶然发生的事故,意外事故( contingency的名词复数 );以备万一 | |
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49 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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50 defective | |
adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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51 anarchy | |
n.无政府状态;社会秩序混乱,无秩序 | |
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52 subsisted | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53 tardiness | |
n.缓慢;迟延;拖拉 | |
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54 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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55 patriots | |
爱国者,爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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56 convened | |
召开( convene的过去式 ); 召集; (为正式会议而)聚集; 集合 | |
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57 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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58 adverse | |
adj.不利的;有害的;敌对的,不友好的 | |
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59 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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60 mingle | |
vt.使混合,使相混;vi.混合起来;相交往 | |
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61 propitious | |
adj.吉利的;顺利的 | |
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62 concord | |
n.和谐;协调 | |
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63 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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64 consultations | |
n.磋商(会议)( consultation的名词复数 );商讨会;协商会;查找 | |
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65 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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66 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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67 tranquillity | |
n. 平静, 安静 | |
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68 asylum | |
n.避难所,庇护所,避难 | |
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69 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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70 blessings | |
n.(上帝的)祝福( blessing的名词复数 );好事;福分;因祸得福 | |
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71 catastrophe | |
n.大灾难,大祸 | |
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72 precedents | |
引用单元; 范例( precedent的名词复数 ); 先前出现的事例; 前例; 先例 | |
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73 oracle | |
n.神谕,神谕处,预言 | |
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74 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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75 subversive | |
adj.颠覆性的,破坏性的;n.破坏份子,危险份子 | |
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76 coercion | |
n.强制,高压统治 | |
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