For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 8, 1787
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted1 the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch2, carried his victorious3 arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions4. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected5 into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate6 descendants possessed7 the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals8, whose fiefs had become hereditary9, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke10 and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction11 and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient12 to restrain such powerful dependants13; or to preserve the unity14 and tranquillity15 of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity16, were carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy17, which agitated18 the long interval19 between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.
Out of this feudal20 system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component21 members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate22, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber23 and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme24 jurisdiction in controversies25 which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating26 for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas27 of troops and money; constructing fortresses28; regulating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited29. The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing30 tolls31 and duties on their mutual32 intercourse33, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice34 to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions35. The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.
The prerogatives36 of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates37; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable38 of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels39.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness40 of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues41; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially42 complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive43, or attended with slaughter44 and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, and misery45.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody46 pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated47 by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated48 by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies49, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions50 of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively51 kept up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury52.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing53 justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent54 and contumacious55 members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully56 the radical57 vice58 of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation59 and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief60 which they were instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment61 of this scheme of military coercion62 from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities63 which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public occasions, outrages64 were committed on him by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps65 of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated66 claim, on the pretext67 that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,(1) he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed68, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains69.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely71 to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling72 to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives73 from his separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe;—these causes support a feeble and precarious74 union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation75. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted76, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence77 to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating78 its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly79 be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities80 flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity81 of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy82; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly83 subject; by the few sources of contention84 among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint70 interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated85 and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance86 shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality87, pronounces definitive88 sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator89 in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled90 violent and bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed91 the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.
PUBLIUS
1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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vassals
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| n.奴仆( vassal的名词复数 )；（封建时代）诸侯；从属者；下属 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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dependants
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| 受赡养者，受扶养的家属( dependant的名词复数 ) | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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agitated
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| adj.被鼓动的，不安的 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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controversies
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| 争论 | |
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legislating
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| v.立法，制定法律( legislate的现在分词 ) | |
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quotas
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| （正式限定的）定量( quota的名词复数 )； 定额； 指标； 摊派 | |
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fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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forfeited
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| （因违反协议、犯规、受罚等）丧失，失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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tolls
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| （缓慢而有规律的）钟声( toll的名词复数 )； 通行费； 损耗； （战争、灾难等造成的）毁坏 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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electorates
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| 全体选民( electorate的名词复数 ) | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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bowels
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| n.肠，内脏，内部；肠( bowel的名词复数 )；内部，最深处 | |
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licentiousness
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| n.放肆，无法无天 | |
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intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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desolated
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| adj.荒凉的，荒废的 | |
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dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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defectively
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| adv.有缺陷地，缺乏地 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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dispensing
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| v.分配( dispense的现在分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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delinquent
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| adj.犯法的，有过失的；n.违法者 | |
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contumacious
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| adj.拒不服从的，违抗的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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devastation
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| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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immunities
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| 免除，豁免( immunity的名词复数 )； 免疫力 | |
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outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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disarmed
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| v.裁军( disarm的过去式和过去分词 )；使息怒 | |
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domains
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| n.范围( domain的名词复数 )；领域；版图；地产 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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consolidation
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| n.合并,巩固 | |
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surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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preeminence
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| n.卓越,杰出 | |
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perpetuating
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| perpetuate的现在进行式 | |
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improperly
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| 不正确地，不适当地 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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peculiarity
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| n.独特性，特色；特殊的东西；怪癖 | |
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insignificancy
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| 不重要的事物； 无关紧要的人； 低微 | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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86
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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87
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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88
definitive
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| adj.确切的，权威性的；最后的，决定性的 | |
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89
mediator
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| n.调解人，中介人 | |
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90
kindled
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| （使某物）燃烧，着火( kindle的过去式和过去分词 )； 激起（感情等）； 发亮，放光 | |
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91
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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