For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 19, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing2 armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietary3 of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected4 that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE5 authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture6, without having previously7 inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying9 troops, without subjecting his discretion10, in any shape, to the control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse11 the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged12 in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation13 of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise14, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures15 a little further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement16 and pathetic declamation17 can be without some colorable pretext18. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid19 precautions on this point, the omission20 of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension21 and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them(1) contained an interdiction22 of standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize23 their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible24 foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated25 either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal26 too intemperate27 to be ingenuous28. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive29 compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma30. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit31 provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment32 would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition33 he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection34, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent35 temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices36 of a sinister37 and unprincipled opposition38 to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid39 examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted40 to vent8 such loud censures41 upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty42 of human nature, and would lament43, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed44 and entangled45 by expedients46 so unfriendly to an impartial48 and right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced49, even by precedents50 among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper51 to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion52 of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage53 tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime54 powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity55 is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious56 links of political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish57 us not to be too sanguine58 in considering ourselves as entirely59 out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons60 on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages61 and depredations62 of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia63, or by permanent corps64 in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation65 of service, and the loss of labor66 and disconcertion of the industrious67 pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive68 objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence69 of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay70, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment71 their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient47 to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims72 of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals73; and for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes74 the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval75 establishments are in their infancy76, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS
1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed77 to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.
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1
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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2
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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3
proprietary
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| n.所有权，所有的；独占的；业主 | |
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4
recollected
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| adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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5
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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7
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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vent
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| n.通风口，排放口；开衩；vt.表达，发泄 | |
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9
levying
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| 征（兵）( levy的现在分词 )； 索取； 发动（战争）； 征税 | |
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10
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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11
peruse
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| v.细读，精读 | |
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12
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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13
appropriation
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| n.拨款，批准支出 | |
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14
surmise
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| v./n.猜想，推测 | |
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15
conjectures
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| 推测，猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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16
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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17
declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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18
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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19
rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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20
omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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21
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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22
interdiction
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| n.禁止；封锁 | |
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23
authorize
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| v.授权，委任；批准，认可 | |
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24
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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25
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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26
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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27
intemperate
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| adj.无节制的，放纵的 | |
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28
ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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29
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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30
enigma
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| n.谜，谜一样的人或事 | |
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31
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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32
astonishment
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| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
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33
prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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34
circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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35
ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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36
artifices
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| n.灵巧( artifice的名词复数 )；诡计；巧妙办法；虚伪行为 | |
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37
sinister
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| adj.不吉利的，凶恶的，左边的 | |
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38
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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39
candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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40
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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41
censures
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的第三人称单数 ) | |
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42
frailty
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| n.脆弱；意志薄弱 | |
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43
lament
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| n.悲叹，悔恨，恸哭；v.哀悼，悔恨，悲叹 | |
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44
perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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45
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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46
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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47
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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48
impartial
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| adj.(in,to)公正的，无偏见的 | |
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49
countenanced
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| v.支持，赞同，批准( countenance的过去式 ) | |
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50
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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51
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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52
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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53
savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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54
maritime
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| adj.海的，海事的，航海的，近海的，沿海的 | |
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55
consanguinity
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| n.血缘；亲族 | |
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56
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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57
admonish
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| v.训戒；警告；劝告 | |
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58
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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59
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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60
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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61
ravages
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| 劫掠后的残迹，破坏的结果，毁坏后的残迹 | |
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62
depredations
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| n.劫掠，毁坏( depredation的名词复数 ) | |
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63
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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64
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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65
rotation
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| n.旋转；循环，轮流 | |
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66
labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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67
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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68
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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69
prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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70
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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71
augment
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| vt.(使)增大，增加，增长，扩张 | |
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72
maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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73
arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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74
supersedes
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| 取代，接替( supersede的第三人称单数 ) | |
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75
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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76
infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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77
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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