From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated2 in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion3 of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful4 to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury5. It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite6 to her immediate7 safety, and to the mediate8 or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable9 as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony10, improvidence11, or inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses12 could easily be contrived13. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual14 jealousy15, would be apt to swell16 beyond their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment17 or demolition18 of the national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too naturally be prone19 to a rivalship with that of the union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated20 by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert21, the constitutional authority of the union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested22, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully23 aware of the danger to the union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not less at variance24 with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas25 and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion26 of the national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude27 standing28 armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition29 should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity30 or not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain31 the violation32? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or impending33 danger, which would be at once to deviate34 from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude35 of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly36 be submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide against apprehended37 danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy38. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding39 the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and the legislative40, in some scheme of usurpation41. Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities42, instigated43 by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations44 to produce the desired appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased45 again by timely concessions46. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect47 of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever pretext48, may be applied49 to the execution of the project.
If, to obviate50 this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies51 of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering52 storm, must be abstained53 from, as contrary to the genuine maxims55 of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders56, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey57, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation58.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia59 of the country is its natural bulwark60, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine61, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor62, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor63 on numerous occasions, erected64 eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance65, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders66 in one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell67 a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps68 in pay to prevent a revival69 of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper70 in this respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents71. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim54 of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth72, that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance73 of an adherence74 to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge75 of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal76 title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated77 by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering78 the government with restrictions79 that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach80 of the fundamental laws, though dictated81 by necessity, impairs82 that sacred reverence83 which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent84 for other breaches85 where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS
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1 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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2 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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3 inversion | |
n.反向,倒转,倒置 | |
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4 baneful | |
adj.有害的 | |
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5 treasury | |
n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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6 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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7 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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8 mediate | |
vi.调解,斡旋;vt.经调解解决;经斡旋促成 | |
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9 equitable | |
adj.公平的;公正的 | |
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10 parsimony | |
n.过度节俭,吝啬 | |
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11 improvidence | |
n.目光短浅 | |
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12 pretenses | |
n.借口(pretense的复数形式) | |
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13 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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14 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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15 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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16 swell | |
vi.膨胀,肿胀;增长,增强 | |
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17 abridgment | |
n.删节,节本 | |
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18 demolition | |
n.破坏,毁坏,毁坏之遗迹 | |
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19 prone | |
adj.(to)易于…的,很可能…的;俯卧的 | |
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20 stimulated | |
a.刺激的 | |
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21 subvert | |
v.推翻;暗中破坏;搅乱 | |
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22 attested | |
adj.经检验证明无病的,经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 );证实;声称…属实;使宣誓 | |
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23 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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24 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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25 quotas | |
(正式限定的)定量( quota的名词复数 ); 定额; 指标; 摊派 | |
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26 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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27 preclude | |
vt.阻止,排除,防止;妨碍 | |
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28 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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29 prohibition | |
n.禁止;禁令,禁律 | |
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30 tranquillity | |
n. 平静, 安静 | |
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31 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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32 violation | |
n.违反(行为),违背(行为),侵犯 | |
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33 impending | |
a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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34 deviate | |
v.(from)背离,偏离 | |
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35 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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36 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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37 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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38 jeopardy | |
n.危险;危难 | |
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39 eluding | |
v.(尤指机敏地)避开( elude的现在分词 );逃避;躲避;使达不到 | |
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40 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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41 usurpation | |
n.篡位;霸占 | |
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42 hostilities | |
n.战争;敌意(hostility的复数);敌对状态;战事 | |
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43 instigated | |
v.使(某事物)开始或发生,鼓动( instigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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44 provocations | |
n.挑衅( provocation的名词复数 );激怒;刺激;愤怒的原因 | |
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45 appeased | |
安抚,抚慰( appease的过去式和过去分词 ); 绥靖(满足另一国的要求以避免战争) | |
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46 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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47 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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48 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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49 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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50 obviate | |
v.除去,排除,避免,预防 | |
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51 levies | |
(部队)征兵( levy的名词复数 ); 募捐; 被征募的军队 | |
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52 gathering | |
n.集会,聚会,聚集 | |
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53 abstained | |
v.戒(尤指酒),戒除( abstain的过去式和过去分词 );弃权(不投票) | |
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54 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
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55 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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56 invaders | |
入侵者,侵略者,侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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57 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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58 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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59 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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60 bulwark | |
n.堡垒,保障,防御 | |
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61 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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62 vigor | |
n.活力,精力,元气 | |
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63 valor | |
n.勇气,英勇 | |
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64 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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65 perseverance | |
n.坚持不懈,不屈不挠 | |
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66 disorders | |
n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 );凌乱;骚乱;(身心、机能)失调 | |
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67 quell | |
v.压制,平息,减轻 | |
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68 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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69 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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70 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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71 constituents | |
n.选民( constituent的名词复数 );成分;构成部分;要素 | |
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72 commonwealth | |
n.共和国,联邦,共同体 | |
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73 semblance | |
n.外貌,外表 | |
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74 adherence | |
n.信奉,依附,坚持,固着 | |
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75 subterfuge | |
n.诡计;藉口 | |
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76 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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77 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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78 fettering | |
v.给…上脚镣,束缚( fetter的现在分词 ) | |
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79 restrictions | |
约束( restriction的名词复数 ); 管制; 制约因素; 带限制性的条件(或规则) | |
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80 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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81 dictated | |
v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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82 impairs | |
v.损害,削弱( impair的第三人称单数 ) | |
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83 reverence | |
n.敬畏,尊敬,尊严;Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称;v.尊敬,敬畏,崇敬 | |
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84 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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85 breaches | |
破坏( breach的名词复数 ); 破裂; 缺口; 违背 | |
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