For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 22, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify3 and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical4 project to another; we may try change after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements5 which owe their origin to a zeal6 for liberty more ardent7 than enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it the least countenance8; wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions10 on the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety11 of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and more extravagant12. As if the tone of government had been found too high, or too rigid13, the doctrines14 they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients15 which, upon other occasions, have been condemned16 or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation17 of invective18, that if the principles they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed19, they would utterly20 unfit the people of this country for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended21. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy22. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought23 a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely24 to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion25 of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative26 minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified27 by the events that have happened in other ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive28 from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch29 was almost unlimited30. Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative31, in favor of liberty, first by the barons32, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions33 became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant34. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing35 army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite36, beyond a prohibition37 of their being raised or kept up by the mere38 authority of the executive magistrate39. The patriots40, who effected that memorable41 revolution, were too temperate42, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint on the legislative discretion43. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons44 were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies45; that a power equal to every possible contingency46 must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment47 of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived48 an hereditary49 impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic9. The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous50, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated51, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable52, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated53 an interdiction54 of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity55 of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy56 and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion57 that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination58 to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded59 to and that which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the appropriations60 of money for military purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering62 clear of an imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly63 compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents64. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose65 in it so improper66 a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign67 the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation68. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition69; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant70 but suspicious and jealous guardians71 of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert72 the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy73 for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered74 in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial75 elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor76 to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise77 his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions78 can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment79 of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting80 the army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated81, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors82, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation61 of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed83 of a force large enough to awe84 the people into submission85, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense86 with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs87, upon what pretense88 could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell89 a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamities90 for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive91, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely92 less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state; nay93, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail94 the whole union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy95, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia96, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary97. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully98 shown in another place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
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1
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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rectify
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| v.订正，矫正，改正 | |
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chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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5
refinements
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| n.（生活）风雅；精炼( refinement的名词复数 )；改良品；细微的改良；优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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9
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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12
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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16
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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17
imputation
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| n.归罪，责难 | |
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invective
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| n.痛骂，恶意抨击 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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concisely
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| adv.简明地 | |
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25
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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28
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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prerogative
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| n.特权 | |
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barons
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| 男爵( baron的名词复数 )； 巨头； 大王； 大亨 | |
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pretensions
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| 自称( pretension的名词复数 )； 自命不凡； 要求； 权力 | |
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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36
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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41
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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42
temperate
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| adj.温和的，温带的，自我克制的，不过分的 | |
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43
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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44
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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45
exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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46
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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47
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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48
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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49
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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50
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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51
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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52
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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53
meditated
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| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
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54
interdiction
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| n.禁止；封锁 | |
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55
ambiguity
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| n.模棱两可；意义不明确 | |
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56
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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57
persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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58
inclination
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| n.倾斜；点头；弯腰；斜坡；倾度；倾向；爱好 | |
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59
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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60
appropriations
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| n.挪用（appropriation的复数形式） | |
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61
appropriation
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| n.拨款，批准支出 | |
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62
steering
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| n.操舵装置 | |
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63
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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65
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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66
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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67
arraign
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| v.提讯；控告 | |
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68
declamation
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| n. 雄辩，高调 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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vigilant
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| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
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71
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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subvert
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| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
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73
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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74
persevered
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| v.坚忍，坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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biennial
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| adj.两年一次的 | |
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traitor
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| n.叛徒，卖国贼 | |
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apprise
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| vt.通知，告知 | |
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presumptions
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| n.假定( presumption的名词复数 )；认定；推定；放肆 | |
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concealment
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| n.隐藏, 掩盖，隐瞒 | |
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80
augmenting
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| 使扩张 | |
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81
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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projectors
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| 电影放映机，幻灯机( projector的名词复数 ) | |
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83
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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84
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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85
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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86
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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87
recurs
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| 再发生，复发( recur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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88
pretense
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| n.矫饰，做作，借口 | |
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89
quell
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| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
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90
calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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91
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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92
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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93
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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94
assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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95
jeopardy
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| n.危险；危难 | |
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96
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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97
auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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98
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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