From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged3 on that side, rests on mere4 general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible5 designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving6 any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption8 of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition9 in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience10 to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely11 on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims12.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude13 of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar14 care and judgment15; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted16 by the spirit of faction17, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities18, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget19 injustice20 and oppression of a part of the community, and engender21 schemes which, though they gratify a momentary22 inclination7 or desire, terminate in general distress23, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify24 that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice25 which we are invited to erect26. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify27 an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious28 or contemptible29 to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the union will meet with any greater obstruction30 from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.
The hope of impunity31 is a strong incitement32 to sedition33; the dread34 of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the government of the union, which, if possessed35 of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment36 of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less occasion to recur37 to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous38 expedients39 of compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed40, if at all, by war and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension41, all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED42 and LEGITIMATE43 objects of its jurisdiction44, will become the SUPREME45 LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial46, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates47, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary48 to the enforcement of its laws.(1) Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence49. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate50 the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries51 of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives52 of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment53, can be promoted by such a conduct?
PUBLIUS
1. The sophistry54 which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place, be fully55 detected.
点击收听单词发音
1 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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2 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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3 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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4 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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5 intelligible | |
adj.可理解的,明白易懂的,清楚的 | |
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6 waiving | |
v.宣布放弃( waive的现在分词 );搁置;推迟;放弃(权利、要求等) | |
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7 inclination | |
n.倾斜;点头;弯腰;斜坡;倾度;倾向;爱好 | |
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8 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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9 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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10 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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11 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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12 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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13 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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14 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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15 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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16 tainted | |
adj.腐坏的;污染的;沾污的;感染的v.使变质( taint的过去式和过去分词 );使污染;败坏;被污染,腐坏,败坏 | |
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17 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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18 propensities | |
n.倾向,习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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19 beget | |
v.引起;产生 | |
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20 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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21 engender | |
v.产生,引起 | |
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22 momentary | |
adj.片刻的,瞬息的;短暂的 | |
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23 distress | |
n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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24 fortify | |
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化 | |
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25 edifice | |
n.宏伟的建筑物(如宫殿,教室) | |
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26 erect | |
n./v.树立,建立,使竖立;adj.直立的,垂直的 | |
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27 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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28 odious | |
adj.可憎的,讨厌的 | |
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29 contemptible | |
adj.可鄙的,可轻视的,卑劣的 | |
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30 obstruction | |
n.阻塞,堵塞;障碍物 | |
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31 impunity | |
n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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32 incitement | |
激励; 刺激; 煽动; 激励物 | |
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33 sedition | |
n.煽动叛乱 | |
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34 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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35 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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36 attachment | |
n.附属物,附件;依恋;依附 | |
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37 recur | |
vi.复发,重现,再发生 | |
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38 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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39 expedients | |
n.应急有效的,权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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40 redressed | |
v.改正( redress的过去式和过去分词 );重加权衡;恢复平衡 | |
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41 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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42 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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43 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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44 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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45 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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46 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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47 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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48 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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49 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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50 precipitate | |
adj.突如其来的;vt.使突然发生;n.沉淀物 | |
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51 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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52 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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53 encroachment | |
n.侵入,蚕食 | |
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54 sophistry | |
n.诡辩 | |
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55 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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