For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 26, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated3 to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated4 the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic5 as tumors and eruptions6 from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains7 the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief8. If it should be a slight commotion9 in a small part of a State, the militia10 of the residue11 would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption12 is that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate13 cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion14 had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents15; and if the general government should be found in practice conducive16 to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational17 to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade18 a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders19 within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere20 apprehension21 of commotions22 among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction23 over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring24 to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the national government might be under a like necessity, in similar extremities25, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment26 to the union in the abstract, should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable27 consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations28 and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges29 of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients30 for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of a general union? All candid31 and intelligent men must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for all the States, or different governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory32 provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable33 in civil society.(1)
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents34, there is then no resource left but in the exertion35 of that original right of self-defense which is paramount36 to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely38 better prospect39 of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme40 power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition41 in embryo42. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic43 plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar44 coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation37 and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely45 the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition46 towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate47. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress48. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies49, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses50 so likely to escape the penetration51 of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely52 the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell53 the resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue54 the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission55 was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect56 that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting57 a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity58, and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS
1. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
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1
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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corroborated
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| v.证实，支持（某种说法、信仰、理论等）( corroborate的过去式 ) | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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eruptions
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| n.喷发，爆发( eruption的名词复数 ) | |
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disdains
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| 鄙视，轻蔑( disdain的名词复数 ) | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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commotion
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| n.骚动，动乱 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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residue
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| n.残余，剩余，残渣 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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pervade
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| v.弥漫，遍及，充满，渗透，漫延 | |
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disorders
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| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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commotions
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| n.混乱，喧闹，骚动( commotion的名词复数 ) | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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recurring
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| adj.往复的，再次发生的 | |
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extremities
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| n.端点( extremity的名词复数 )；尽头；手和足；极窘迫的境地 | |
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attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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agitations
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| （液体等的）摇动( agitation的名词复数 )； 鼓动； 激烈争论； （情绪等的）纷乱 | |
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29
scourges
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| 带来灾难的人或东西，祸害( scourge的名词复数 )； 鞭子 | |
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expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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33
attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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37
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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40
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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41
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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42
embryo
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| n.胚胎，萌芽的事物 | |
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43
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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44
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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45
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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46
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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47
preponderate
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| v.数目超过；占优势 | |
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48
redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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49
contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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50
pretenses
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| n.借口（pretense的复数形式） | |
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51
penetration
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| n.穿透，穿人，渗透 | |
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52
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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53
quell
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| v.压制，平息，减轻 | |
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54
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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55
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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56
recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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57
erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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