From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction2 of the union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury3. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety4, considered as the vital principle of the body politic5; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure6 a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder7, as a substitute for a more eligible8 mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy9, and, in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage10 the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies11 and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the union has gradually dwindled12 into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose13 in the United States, an unlimited14 power of providing for the pecuniary15 wants of the union. But proceeding16 upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely17 to have frustrated18 the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized19 to ascertain20 and call for any sums of money necessary, in their judgment21, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory22 upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion23 beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly24 and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement25 of the articles of union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly26 claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant27 in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries28. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification29 to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive30 system of quotas31 and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility32 on any subject; but no human ingenuity33 can point out any other expedient34 to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments35 naturally resulting from defective36 supplies of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries37 of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the maxim39 of good sense and sound policy, which dictates40 that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor41 or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted42 to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices43 and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel invincible44 repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable45 tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the union, and sow the seeds of discord46 and contention47 between the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected48 that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill49 the purposes of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth50? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients51 temporizing52, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate53 necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost38 duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence54 could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense55 of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed56 with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures57 for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors58, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums59.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness60 of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension61 on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice62.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling63 weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon64 scenes of the poetic65 or fabulous66 age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes67 and calamities68 which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold69 the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude70, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict71 upon it.
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1
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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6
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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7
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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8
eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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atrophy
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| n./v.萎缩，虚脱，衰退 | |
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pillage
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| v.抢劫；掠夺；n.抢劫，掠夺；掠夺物 | |
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exigencies
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| n.急切需要 | |
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dwindled
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| v.逐渐变少或变小( dwindle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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15
pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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18
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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19
authorized
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| a.委任的，许可的 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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28
inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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29
mortification
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| n.耻辱，屈辱 | |
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30
delusive
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| adj.欺骗的，妄想的 | |
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31
quotas
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| （正式限定的）定量( quota的名词复数 )； 定额； 指标； 摊派 | |
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32
plausibility
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| n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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34
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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embarrassments
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| n.尴尬( embarrassment的名词复数 )；难堪；局促不安；令人难堪或耻辱的事 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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impost
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| n.进口税，关税 | |
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maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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40
dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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41
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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42
adverted
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| 引起注意（advert的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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43
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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44
invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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45
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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46
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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47
contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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48
recollected
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| adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49
fulfill
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| vt.履行，实现，完成；满足，使满意 | |
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50
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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51
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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52
temporizing
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| v.敷衍( temporize的现在分词 )；拖延；顺应时势；暂时同意 | |
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53
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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54
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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55
defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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56
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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57
overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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debtors
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| n.债务人，借方( debtor的名词复数 ) | |
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premiums
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| n.费用( premium的名词复数 )；保险费；额外费用；（商品定价、贷款利息等以外的）加价 | |
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60
scantiness
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| n.缺乏 | |
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61
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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halcyon
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| n.平静的，愉快的 | |
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poetic
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| adj.富有诗意的，有诗人气质的，善于抒情的 | |
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fabulous
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| adj.极好的；极为巨大的；寓言中的，传说中的 | |
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vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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behold
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| v.看，注视，看到 | |
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solicitude
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| n.焦虑 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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