From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent2 of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder3 in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims4 in geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics5 and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined6 to effect a purpose which is itself incapable7 of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates8 of common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible10.
The objects of geometrical inquiry11 are so entirely12 abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse13 paradoxes14 which, however they may appear susceptible15 of demonstration16, are at variance17 with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously18 leveled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less tractable19. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the case. Caution and investigation20 are a necessary armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may degenerate21 into obstinacy22, perverseness23, or disingenuity24. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward25 bias9, they entangle26 themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties27.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the union, should have to encounter any adversaries28 among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully29 stated, they will perhaps not be improperly30 recapitulated31 in this place, as introductory to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in substance as follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite32 to the full accomplishment33 of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defense34 and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies35 of the nation and the resources of the community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the national exigencies must be procured36, the power of procuring37 that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire38 to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that the propriety39 of a general power of taxation in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antagonists40 of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing41 in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous42 effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze43 the arguments with which they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored44 with that view, seem in substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of the union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the union; and the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the national government should possess the like faculty45 in respect to the wants of the union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might, and probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the union are to become the supreme46 law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense47 of an interference with its own. It might allege48 a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion49 and destruction of the State governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation50 in the national government; at other times it seems to be designed only as a deduction51 from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions52 to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures53 about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths54 of an enchanted55 castle, and knows not on which side to turn to extricate56 itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications57 of the powers of the union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy58 and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution59. I repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due dependence60 of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an impartial61 examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all apprehensions62 on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition63 in the State governments to encroach upon the rights of the union is quite as probable as a disposition in the union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ toward insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence64 and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium65 between the general and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate66 the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States.
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1 taxation | |
n.征税,税收,税金 | |
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2 assent | |
v.批准,认可;n.批准,认可 | |
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3 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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4 maxims | |
n.格言,座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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5 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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6 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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7 incapable | |
adj.无能力的,不能做某事的 | |
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8 dictates | |
n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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9 bias | |
n.偏见,偏心,偏袒;vt.使有偏见 | |
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10 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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11 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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12 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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13 abstruse | |
adj.深奥的,难解的 | |
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14 paradoxes | |
n.似非而是的隽语,看似矛盾而实际却可能正确的说法( paradox的名词复数 );用于语言文学中的上述隽语;有矛盾特点的人[事物,情况] | |
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15 susceptible | |
adj.过敏的,敏感的;易动感情的,易受感动的 | |
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16 demonstration | |
n.表明,示范,论证,示威 | |
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17 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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18 industriously | |
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19 tractable | |
adj.易驾驭的;温顺的 | |
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20 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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21 degenerate | |
v.退步,堕落;adj.退步的,堕落的;n.堕落者 | |
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22 obstinacy | |
n.顽固;(病痛等)难治 | |
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23 perverseness | |
n. 乖张, 倔强, 顽固 | |
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24 disingenuity | |
n.不坦率,不正直,不诚实;诡诈,狡猾 | |
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25 untoward | |
adj.不利的,不幸的,困难重重的 | |
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26 entangle | |
vt.缠住,套住;卷入,连累 | |
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27 subtleties | |
细微( subtlety的名词复数 ); 精细; 巧妙; 细微的差别等 | |
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28 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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29 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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30 improperly | |
不正确地,不适当地 | |
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31 recapitulated | |
v.总结,扼要重述( recapitulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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32 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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33 accomplishment | |
n.完成,成就,(pl.)造诣,技能 | |
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34 defense | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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35 exigencies | |
n.急切需要 | |
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36 procured | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 );拉皮条 | |
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37 procuring | |
v.(努力)取得, (设法)获得( procure的现在分词 );拉皮条 | |
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38 conspire | |
v.密谋,(事件等)巧合,共同导致 | |
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39 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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40 antagonists | |
对立[对抗] 者,对手,敌手( antagonist的名词复数 ); 对抗肌; 对抗药 | |
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41 acquiescing | |
v.默认,默许( acquiesce的现在分词 ) | |
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42 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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43 analyze | |
vt.分析,解析 (=analyse) | |
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44 labored | |
adj.吃力的,谨慎的v.努力争取(for)( labor的过去式和过去分词 );苦干;详细分析;(指引擎)缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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45 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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46 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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47 pretense | |
n.矫饰,做作,借口 | |
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48 allege | |
vt.宣称,申述,主张,断言 | |
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49 exclusion | |
n.拒绝,排除,排斥,远足,远途旅行 | |
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50 usurpation | |
n.篡位;霸占 | |
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51 deduction | |
n.减除,扣除,减除额;推论,推理,演绎 | |
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52 pretensions | |
自称( pretension的名词复数 ); 自命不凡; 要求; 权力 | |
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53 conjectures | |
推测,猜想( conjecture的名词复数 ) | |
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54 labyrinths | |
迷宫( labyrinth的名词复数 ); (文字,建筑)错综复杂的 | |
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55 enchanted | |
adj. 被施魔法的,陶醉的,入迷的 动词enchant的过去式和过去分词 | |
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56 extricate | |
v.拯救,救出;解脱 | |
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57 modifications | |
n.缓和( modification的名词复数 );限制;更改;改变 | |
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58 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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59 irresolution | |
n.不决断,优柔寡断,犹豫不定 | |
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60 dependence | |
n.依靠,依赖;信任,信赖;隶属 | |
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61 impartial | |
adj.(in,to)公正的,无偏见的 | |
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62 apprehensions | |
疑惧 | |
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63 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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64 prudence | |
n.谨慎,精明,节俭 | |
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65 equilibrium | |
n.平衡,均衡,相称,均势,平静 | |
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66 obviate | |
v.除去,排除,避免,预防 | |
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