From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 8, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted2, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely3 of proprietors4 of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion5 or character of the government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive6.
The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity7 or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen8 manufacturer or stocking weaver9, than between the merchant and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor10 and industry; so that, unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity11 or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb12 to admit even of an accurate inspection13 of its real shape or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute15 of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed16 of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local circumstances, as applied17 to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive18 and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified19 to make a judicious20 selection of the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite21 to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination22 of internal taxes may be subdivided23 into those of the DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises24 on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended25. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured26 from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been previously27 appropriated to the use of a particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining28 the revenue system of each. This could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments29, at the discretion30, or according to the best judgment31, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon discreet32 persons in the character of commissioners33 or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government.
Let it be recollected34 that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be determined35 by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article. An actual census36 or enumeration37 of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection38. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States."
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the union should be discovered on experiment to be really inconvenient39, the federal government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly40 asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive41 for exertion42 on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the union, and of its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere14 with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems. An effectual expedient43 for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain44 from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an IMMEDIATE45 common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions46 of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful47 forms of odious48 and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity49 of political legerdemain50.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing51 the tax is exclusively vested in the union, which applies to the duties on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied52 for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived53 from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible54 of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest55 the councils of the union, the most certain road to the accomplishment56 of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the union by an accumulation of their emoluments57. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government, instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse58 current. But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished59 from the consideration of the great question before the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of the union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently60 improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur61 to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition62 to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed63 point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary64 to the public treasury65, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation66 of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple67, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1) which have uniformly been the most tenacious68 of their rights, I should lament69 to see them introduced into practice under the national government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will actually be laid? Every State in the union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatized70 as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety71 can the like power justify72 such a charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption73? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients74, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity75 of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar76 to itself, for not abridging77 the discretion of the national councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous78 conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt79 this portion of the globe from the common calamities80 that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm81 the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency82 might be usefully employed for the general defense83 and security.
(I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor84 authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy85 of the hostilities86 of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy87. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation88 under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries89 upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)
(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary objects of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in order to render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice of under the next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress already made will have sufficed to satisfy the candid90 and judicious part of the community that some of the objections which have been most strenuously91 urged against the Constitution, and which were most formidable in their first appearance, are not only destitute of substance, but if they had operated in the formation of the plan, would have rendered it incompetent92 to the great ends of public happiness and national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and more critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still more to every sincere and disinterested93 advocate for good government and will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety and expediency94 of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue95 enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!)(E1)
PUBLIUS
1. The New England States.
E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.
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1
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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proprietors
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| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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complexion
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| n.肤色；情况，局面；气质，性格 | |
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conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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affinity
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| n.亲和力，密切关系 | |
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linen
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| n.亚麻布，亚麻线，亚麻制品；adj.亚麻布制的，亚麻的 | |
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weaver
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| n.织布工；编织者 | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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garb
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| n.服装，装束 | |
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inspection
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| n.检查，审查，检阅 | |
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14
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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inquisitive
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| adj.求知欲强的，好奇的，好寻根究底的 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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denomination
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| n.命名，取名，(度量衡、货币等的)单位 | |
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subdivided
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| 再分，细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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excises
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| n.国内货物税，消费税( excise的名词复数 )v.切除，删去( excise的第三人称单数 ) | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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assessments
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| n.评估( assessment的名词复数 )；评价；（应偿付金额的）估定；（为征税对财产所作的）估价 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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discreet
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| adj.(言行)谨慎的；慎重的；有判断力的 | |
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commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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recollected
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| adj.冷静的；镇定的；被回忆起的；沉思默想的v.记起，想起( recollect的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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census
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| n.(官方的)人口调查，人口普查 | |
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enumeration
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| n.计数，列举；细目；详表；点查 | |
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circumspection
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| n.细心，慎重 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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triumphantly
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| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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dexterity
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| n.(手的)灵巧，灵活 | |
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legerdemain
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| n.戏法，诈术 | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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preoccupied
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| adj.全神贯注的，入神的；被抢先占有的；心事重重的v.占据（某人）思想，使对…全神贯注，使专心于( preoccupy的过去式) | |
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53
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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infest
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| v.大批出没于；侵扰；寄生于 | |
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accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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banished
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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61
recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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tributary
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| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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tenacious
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| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
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lament
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| n.悲叹，悔恨，恸哭；v.哀悼，悔恨，悲叹 | |
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stigmatized
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| v.使受耻辱，指责，污辱( stigmatize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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74
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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75
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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abridging
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| 节略( abridge的现在分词 )； 减少； 缩短； 剥夺（某人的）权利（或特权等） | |
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tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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80
calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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disarm
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| v.解除武装，回复平常的编制，缓和 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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inquiries
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| n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 )；疑问；探究；打听 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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94
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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