From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 12, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a little remarkable1 that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent2 wisdom and approved integrity.
Minos, we learn, was the primitive3 founder4 of the government of Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition5 of royalty6 the consular7 administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged8, had been prepared by Tullius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent9 and ratification10 of the senate and people. This remark is applicable to confederate governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus, and its second from Aratus.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate11 authority of the people, cannot in every instance be ascertained12. In some, however, the proceeding13 was strictly14 regular. Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage15 of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution. The proceedings16 under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated17 patriot18 and sage19, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention20 of a deliberative body of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible21 depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their posterity22, than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully23 answered, without supposing that the fears of discord24 and disunion among a number of counsellors exceeded the apprehension25 of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients26 which they were obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more temporizing27 policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition28, and of securing his final success by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on the other, to admonish29 us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable30 conjecture31, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation32 of it; and, consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed33 them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and amendments34 suggested by the several States, when these articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes36 to the great and radical37 error which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey38 was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar39 foresight40, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify41 a revision of the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous inflexibility42, in some States, had not a zeal43 for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled44 by the more powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence45, although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels47 of our country. Nor was her pliancy48 in the end effected by a less motive49, than the fear of being chargeable with protracting50 the public calamities51, and endangering the event of the contest. Every candid52 reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts.
A patient who finds his disorder53 daily growing worse, and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after coolly revolving54 his situation, and the characters of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend; the case of the patient is carefully examined; a consultation55 is held; they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The prescription56 is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not act prudently57 in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?
Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment. She has been sensible of her malady58. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals. Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs59 in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous60 and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation61. The patriotic62 adversary63 in a State of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible64 tendency to monarchy65; that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias66 towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities67. With another class of adversaries68 to the Constitution the language is that the legislative69, executive, and judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government and all the requisite70 precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions, there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon the subject. In the eyes of one the junction71 of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion72 of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption73 and partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious74. With another, the admission of the President into any share of a power which ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate75, is an unpardonable violation76 of the maxims77 of republican jealousy78. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments79 by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department. "We concur46 fully," reply others, "in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment35 of the error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged80 in that department." Even among the zealous81 patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable82 variance83 is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President himself.
As it can give no umbrage84 to the writers against the plan of the federal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose that their country should concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided85 by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors86, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord and ferment87 that would mark their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality88, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass89 for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy90 in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering91 habitation for a firm and commodious92 building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving93 illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper94 and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury95, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme96 law of the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.
I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence97 of Congress on the State for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly98 of declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering99 them absolutely nugatory100; and, in the next place, that if the union is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended101 from a defective102 construction of the supreme government of the union. It is now no longer a point of speculation103 and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate104 them from their present distresses105, or for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding106 similar proofs of their equity107 and generosity108. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a national stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect109 temporary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect110, but who are advocates for the system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more consistency111, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to guard the union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly?
I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure112 on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation113 is the dreadful dilemma114 to which it is continually exposed.
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1
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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preeminent
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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royalty
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| n.皇家，皇族 | |
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consular
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| a.领事的 | |
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alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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ratification
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| n.批准，认可 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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sage
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| n.圣人，哲人；adj.贤明的，明智的 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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temporizing
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| v.敷衍( temporize的现在分词 )；拖延；顺应时势；暂时同意 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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admonish
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| v.训戒；警告；劝告 | |
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unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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amendments
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| （法律、文件的）改动( amendment的名词复数 )； 修正案； 修改； （美国宪法的）修正案 | |
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amendment
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| n.改正，修正，改善，修正案 | |
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alludes
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| 提及，暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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jersey
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| n.运动衫 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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inflexibility
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| n.不屈性，顽固，不变性；不可弯曲；非挠性；刚性 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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stifled
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| （使）窒息， （使）窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 )； 镇压，遏制； 堵 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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bowels
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| n.肠，内脏，内部；肠( bowel的名词复数 )；内部，最深处 | |
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pliancy
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| n.柔软，柔顺 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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protracting
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| v.延长，拖延（某事物）( protract的现在分词 ) | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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54
revolving
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| adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想 | |
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consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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56
prescription
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| n.处方，开药；指示，规定 | |
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prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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concurs
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| 同意（concur的第三人称单数形式） | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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65
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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70
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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71
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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72
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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73
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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obnoxious
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| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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78
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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79
impeachments
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| n.控告( impeachment的名词复数 )；检举；弹劾；怀疑 | |
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80
lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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81
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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82
irreconcilable
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| adj.（指人）难和解的，势不两立的 | |
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83
variance
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| n.矛盾，不同 | |
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84
umbrage
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| n.不快；树荫 | |
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85
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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86
predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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ferment
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| vt.使发酵；n./vt.（使）激动，（使）动乱 | |
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88
immortality
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| n.不死，不朽 | |
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89
brass
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| n.黄铜；黄铜器，铜管乐器 | |
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90
alloy
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| n.合金，(金属的)成色 | |
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tottering
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| adj.蹒跚的，动摇的v.走得或动得不稳( totter的现在分词 )；踉跄；蹒跚；摇摇欲坠 | |
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commodious
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| adj.宽敞的；使用方便的 | |
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waiving
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| v.宣布放弃( waive的现在分词 )；搁置；推迟；放弃（权利、要求等） | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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96
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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97
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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98
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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100
nugatory
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| adj.琐碎的，无价值的 | |
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101
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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102
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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103
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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104
extricate
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| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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105
distresses
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| n.悲痛( distress的名词复数 )；痛苦；贫困；危险 | |
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106
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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107
equity
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| n.公正，公平，（无固定利息的）股票 | |
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108
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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109
erect
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| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
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110
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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111
consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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112
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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113
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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114
dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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