For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 2, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia," quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught1 of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth2. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy3 of attention as it equally displays a fervent4 attachment5 to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities6 against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry7, ought not to be overlooked.
His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur8 in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES9 OF IT, a convention shall be called for the purpose."
As the people are the only legitimate10 fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived12, it seems strictly13 consonant14 to the republican theory, to recur15 to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the government, but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments being perfectly16 co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed17, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance?
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence18 to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits.
In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative19 authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives20 of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive11 no advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to be rather against the modification21 of the principle, than against the principle itself.
In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that veneration22 which time bestows23 on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite24 stability. If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify25 opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence26 for the laws would be sufficiently27 inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical28 race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous29 advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side.
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity30 by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much honor to the virtue31 and intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish32 a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect33 that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord34; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic35 leaders, which stifled36 the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; of a universal ardor37 for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment38 and indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle39 its leaven40 in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended41.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium42 of the government. We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement43 of the legislative at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy44, and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential45 part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential46 guardians47 of the rights and liberties of the people. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse48 party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.
But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department whose conduct was arraigned49. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be decided50 by them.
It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. The usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious51 coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar52 favorite of the people. In such a posture53 of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably54 be connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished55 character and extensive influence in the community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of, the measures to which the decision would relate. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in judgment56. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.
We found in the last paper, that mere57 declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity58 and precision.
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1
draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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3
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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4
fervent
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| adj.热的，热烈的，热情的 | |
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5
attachment
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| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
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6
propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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7
inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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8
concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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9
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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10
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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11
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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12
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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13
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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14
consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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15
recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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16
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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17
redressed
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| v.改正( redress的过去式和过去分词 )；重加权衡；恢复平衡 | |
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18
recurrence
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| n.复发，反复，重现 | |
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19
legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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21
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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22
veneration
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| n.尊敬，崇拜 | |
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bestows
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的第三人称单数 ) | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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28
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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29
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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30
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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ticklish
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| adj.怕痒的；问题棘手的；adv.怕痒地；n.怕痒，小心处理 | |
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33
recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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34
concord
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| n.和谐；协调 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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36
stifled
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| （使）窒息， （使）窒闷( stifle的过去式和过去分词 )； 镇压，遏制； 堵 | |
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ardor
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| n.热情，狂热 | |
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38
resentment
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| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
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39
mingle
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| vt.使混合，使相混；vi.混合起来；相交往 | |
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40
leaven
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| v.使发酵；n.酵母；影响 | |
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41
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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42
equilibrium
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| n.平衡，均衡，相称，均势，平静 | |
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43
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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44
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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45
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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46
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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47
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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48
adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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49
arraigned
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| v.告发( arraign的过去式和过去分词 )；控告；传讯；指责 | |
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50
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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51
specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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52
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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53
posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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54
inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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55
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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56
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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57
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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58
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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