From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients1, I confine myself to their aptitude2 for ENFORCING the Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed3 periods appear to be nearly as ineligible4 as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals5, the measures to be reviewed and rectified6 will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert7 the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect8 of public censure9 would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the force of present motives10. Is it to be imagined that a legislative11 assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent12 on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn13 from a censorial14 revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous15 effects before the remedial provision would be applied16. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing17, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated18.
The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent breaches19 of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the Council of Censors20 which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, "whether the constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments had encroached upon each other." This important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar21, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive22. But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed.
First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the council, that some, at least, of its most active members had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State.
Second. It appears that the same active and leading members of the council had been active and influential23 members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other members of the executive council, within the seven preceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others distinguished24 members, of the legislative assembly within the same period.
Third. Every page of their proceedings25 witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented26 by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, PASSION, not REASON, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably27 fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.
Fourth. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.
Fifth. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed in the contest.
This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy.
This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging28 that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch29 the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other given period, will be exempt30 from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction31 of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the people, to revise the preceding administration of the government, all persons who should have been concerned with the government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated32. The important task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified33. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under their auspices34.
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1 expedients | |
n.应急有效的,权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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2 aptitude | |
n.(学习方面的)才能,资质,天资 | |
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3 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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4 ineligible | |
adj.无资格的,不适当的 | |
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5 intervals | |
n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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6 rectified | |
[医]矫正的,调整的 | |
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7 pervert | |
n.堕落者,反常者;vt.误用,滥用;使人堕落,使入邪路 | |
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8 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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9 censure | |
v./n.责备;非难;责难 | |
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10 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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11 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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12 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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13 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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14 censorial | |
监察官的,审查员的 | |
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15 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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16 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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17 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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18 extirpated | |
v.消灭,灭绝( extirpate的过去式和过去分词 );根除 | |
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19 breaches | |
破坏( breach的名词复数 ); 破裂; 缺口; 违背 | |
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20 censors | |
删剪(书籍、电影等中被认为犯忌、违反道德或政治上危险的内容)( censor的第三人称单数 ) | |
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21 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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22 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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23 influential | |
adj.有影响的,有权势的 | |
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24 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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25 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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26 lamented | |
adj.被哀悼的,令人遗憾的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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27 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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28 alleging | |
断言,宣称,辩解( allege的现在分词 ) | |
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29 epoch | |
n.(新)时代;历元 | |
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30 exempt | |
adj.免除的;v.使免除;n.免税者,被免除义务者 | |
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31 extinction | |
n.熄灭,消亡,消灭,灭绝,绝种 | |
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32 obviated | |
v.避免,消除(贫困、不方便等)( obviate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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33 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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34 auspices | |
n.资助,赞助 | |
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