For the Independent Journal. Saturday, February 9, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied1 to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule2 of pretending that any natural connection subsists3 between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue5 can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude6 for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates7 might be, if it were found expedient8, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation9 from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial10—as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished11 in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine12, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme13 power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative14 provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries15 of free government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount16 to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic17 exertions18? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal19, to erect20 some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited21 government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed22 point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations23 by the ordinary power of the government?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety24 of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment25 a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate26. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained27, or at least thoroughly28 attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite29 to the due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant30; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified31, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed32 by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously33 imposed and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia34 be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.
It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious35 task will be the proper inauguration36 of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts37 will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse39 among those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse40 a mutual41 knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify42 the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact38 it.
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations43 and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived44 from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn45 on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually46, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing47; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling48 to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares49 that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist4 between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled50 with the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled51 in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect52 of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit53 means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.
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1 applied | |
adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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2 ridicule | |
v.讥讽,挖苦;n.嘲弄 | |
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3 subsists | |
v.(靠很少的钱或食物)维持生活,生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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4 subsist | |
vi.生存,存在,供养 | |
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5 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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6 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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7 magistrates | |
地方法官,治安官( magistrate的名词复数 ) | |
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8 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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9 deviation | |
n.背离,偏离;偏差,偏向;离题 | |
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10 biennial | |
adj.两年一次的 | |
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11 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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12 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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13 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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14 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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15 votaries | |
n.信徒( votary的名词复数 );追随者;(天主教)修士;修女 | |
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16 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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17 patriotic | |
adj.爱国的,有爱国心的 | |
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18 exertions | |
n.努力( exertion的名词复数 );费力;(能力、权力等的)运用;行使 | |
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19 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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20 erect | |
n./v.树立,建立,使竖立;adj.直立的,垂直的 | |
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21 unlimited | |
adj.无限的,不受控制的,无条件的 | |
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22 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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23 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
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24 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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25 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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26 legislate | |
vt.制定法律;n.法规,律例;立法 | |
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27 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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28 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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29 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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30 conversant | |
adj.亲近的,有交情的,熟悉的 | |
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31 diversified | |
adj.多样化的,多种经营的v.使多样化,多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 );进入新的商业领域 | |
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32 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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33 judiciously | |
adv.明断地,明智而审慎地 | |
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34 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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35 laborious | |
adj.吃力的,努力的,不流畅 | |
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36 inauguration | |
n.开幕、就职典礼 | |
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37 draughts | |
n. <英>国际跳棋 | |
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38 transact | |
v.处理;做交易;谈判 | |
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39 intercourse | |
n.性交;交流,交往,交际 | |
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40 diffuse | |
v.扩散;传播;adj.冗长的;四散的,弥漫的 | |
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41 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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42 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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43 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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44 derived | |
vi.起源;由来;衍生;导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
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45 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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46 annually | |
adv.一年一次,每年 | |
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47 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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48 unwilling | |
adj.不情愿的 | |
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49 snares | |
n.陷阱( snare的名词复数 );圈套;诱人遭受失败(丢脸、损失等)的东西;诱惑物v.用罗网捕捉,诱陷,陷害( snare的第三人称单数 ) | |
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50 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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51 annulled | |
v.宣告无效( annul的过去式和过去分词 );取消;使消失;抹去 | |
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52 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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53 illicit | |
adj.非法的,禁止的,不正当的 | |
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