From The Independent Journal. Saturday, February 23, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding1 the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion2 of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged3, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering4 it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical5 suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition6 which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper7 a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate8 revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious9 seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious10 and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated11 and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible.
In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension12 on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different parts of the union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse13 under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently14 nourish different propensities15 and inclinations16 in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component17 parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection18 for any particular class of electors.
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous19 circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended20 would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur21 in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract22 that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed—whether in their hands or in those of the union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries23 to the Constitution, will it court the elevation24 of "the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple25 not to affirm, that it is infinitely26 less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue27 preference to either is much less to be dreaded28 from the former than from the latter.
The several States are in various degrees addicted29 to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse30 either of them with a decided31 partiality, than the representation of any single State.
In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate32 in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous33 votaries34 of State power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped35 from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primitive36 composition at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias37 towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.
In order, perhaps, to give countenance38 to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored39 answer to this question will be dispensed40 with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the union than in those of any of its members. Secondly41, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict42 upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned43 in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity.
I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate44 a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted45 to an odious46 pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage47 in the choice of that body.
But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated48 preference? Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous49 instinct or foresight50, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered51 over the face of the country as avarice52 or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors53? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,(1)) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive54 of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed55 in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.
Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient56 suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples57 which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue58 the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that the futility59 of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement60? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate61 themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation62, than to trust to precarious63 expedients64 which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious65 than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow66 their tyrants67, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge68 the violated majesty69 of the people?
PUBLIUS
1. Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.
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1
confiding
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| adj.相信人的，易于相信的v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的现在分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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2
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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3
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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4
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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5
chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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6
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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7
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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8
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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9
factious
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| adj.好搞宗派活动的，派系的，好争论的 | |
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10
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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11
situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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12
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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13
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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14
permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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15
propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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16
inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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17
component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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18
predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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19
extraneous
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| adj.体外的；外来的；外部的 | |
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20
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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22
counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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23
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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24
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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25
scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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26
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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28
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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29
addicted
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| adj.沉溺于....的，对...上瘾的 | |
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30
espouse
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| v.支持，赞成，嫁娶 | |
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31
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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32
preponderate
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| v.数目超过；占优势 | |
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33
credulous
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| adj.轻信的，易信的 | |
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34
votaries
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| n.信徒( votary的名词复数 )；追随者；（天主教）修士；修女 | |
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35
warped
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| adj.反常的；乖戾的；（变）弯曲的；变形的v.弄弯，变歪( warp的过去式和过去分词 )；使（行为等）不合情理，使乖戾， | |
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36
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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37
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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38
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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39
labored
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| adj.吃力的，谨慎的v.努力争取(for)( labor的过去式和过去分词 )；苦干；详细分析；（指引擎）缓慢而困难地运转 | |
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40
dispensed
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| v.分配( dispense的过去式和过去分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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41
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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42
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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43
importuned
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| v.纠缠，向（某人）不断要求( importune的过去式和过去分词 )；（妓女）拉（客） | |
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44
contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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45
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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46
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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47
suffrage
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| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
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48
meditated
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| 深思，沉思，冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 )； 内心策划，考虑 | |
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49
miraculous
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| adj.像奇迹一样的，不可思议的 | |
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50
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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51
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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52
avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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53
predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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54
subversive
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| adj.颠覆性的，破坏性的；n.破坏份子，危险份子 | |
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55
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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56
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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57
scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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58
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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59
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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60
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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61
perpetuate
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| v.使永存，使永记不忘 | |
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62
usurpation
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| n.篡位；霸占 | |
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63
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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64
expedients
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| n.应急有效的，权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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65
tenacious
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| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
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66
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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67
tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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68
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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69
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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