From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 26, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE more candid1 opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety2 of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions3, it might not have been undesirable4. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended5; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial6 and judicious7 examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.
If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy8 only, would exercise it in a careful inspection9 of the several State constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude10 which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The constitution of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages11 of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the union, by the like expedient12. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference13 discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable14 a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT15 DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification16 of the federal power of regulating elections will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit17 the one, and to condemn18 the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption19 is that they are rather the cavilling20 refinements21 of a predetermined opposition22, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions23 in the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes24 in the plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust25 of power, or other sinister26 motives27, than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert28 the liberties of three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute29 of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction30 in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication31 of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains32 to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this disposition33, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude34 to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation35 of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation36 of the body at one time. If an improper37 spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions38. There is a contagion39 in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations40.
Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite41 for executing the idea of a regular rotation42 in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year.
It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed43 in the Constitution? As the most zealous44 adversaries45 of the plan of the convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be entrusted46 to legislative47 discretion48; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative49, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation50 to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government at the same epochs.
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1 candid | |
adj.公正的,正直的;坦率的 | |
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2 propriety | |
n.正当行为;正当;适当 | |
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3 apprehensions | |
疑惧 | |
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4 undesirable | |
adj.不受欢迎的,不良的,不合意的,讨厌的;n.不受欢迎的人,不良分子 | |
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5 apprehended | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解 | |
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6 impartial | |
adj.(in,to)公正的,无偏见的 | |
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7 judicious | |
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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8 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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9 inspection | |
n.检查,审查,检阅 | |
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10 latitude | |
n.纬度,行动或言论的自由(范围),(pl.)地区 | |
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11 suffrages | |
(政治性选举的)选举权,投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
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12 expedient | |
adj.有用的,有利的;n.紧急的办法,权宜之计 | |
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13 indifference | |
n.不感兴趣,不关心,冷淡,不在乎 | |
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14 invaluable | |
adj.无价的,非常宝贵的,极为贵重的 | |
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15 inconvenient | |
adj.不方便的,令人感到麻烦的 | |
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16 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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17 acquit | |
vt.宣判无罪;(oneself)使(自己)表现出 | |
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18 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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19 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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20 cavilling | |
n.(矿工的)工作地点抽签法v.挑剔,吹毛求疵( cavil的现在分词 ) | |
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21 refinements | |
n.(生活)风雅;精炼( refinement的名词复数 );改良品;细微的改良;优雅或高贵的动作 | |
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22 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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23 omissions | |
n.省略( omission的名词复数 );删节;遗漏;略去或漏掉的事(或人) | |
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24 blemishes | |
n.(身体的)瘢点( blemish的名词复数 );伤疤;瑕疵;污点 | |
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25 lust | |
n.性(淫)欲;渴(欲)望;vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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26 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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27 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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28 subvert | |
v.推翻;暗中破坏;搅乱 | |
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29 destitute | |
adj.缺乏的;穷困的 | |
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30 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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31 vindication | |
n.洗冤,证实 | |
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32 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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33 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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34 allude | |
v.提及,暗指 | |
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35 perpetuation | |
n.永存,不朽 | |
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36 renovation | |
n.革新,整修 | |
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37 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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38 accretions | |
n.堆积( accretion的名词复数 );连生;添加生长;吸积 | |
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39 contagion | |
n.(通过接触的疾病)传染;蔓延 | |
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40 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
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41 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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42 rotation | |
n.旋转;循环,轮流 | |
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43 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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44 zealous | |
adj.狂热的,热心的 | |
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45 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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46 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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47 legislative | |
n.立法机构,立法权;adj.立法的,有立法权的 | |
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48 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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49 speculative | |
adj.思索性的,暝想性的,推理的 | |
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50 speculation | |
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机 | |
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