From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 5, 1788.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures1 to such things only in either as are worthy2 of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives3 of their conduct, who condemn5 the proposed Constitution in the aggregate6, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.
The second section gives power to the President, "BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR7."
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified8 for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive9 to the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive10 to both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal11, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished12 by their abilities and virtue13, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment15, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism16, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion17 and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged18.
Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently19 impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect20 that such a body must necessarily be inadequate21 to the attainment22 of those great objects, which require to be steadily23 contemplated24 in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly25 acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a a system for the management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information, and of rendering27 their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence28 in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to obviate29 the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely30 to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue31 of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information will be preserved.
There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity32 be carefully maintained; and they who assent33 to the truth of this position will see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence34 of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation35 of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect SECRECY36 and immediate37 DESPATCH38 are sometimes requisite39. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions40 of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide14 in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days, nay41, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture42 and aspect of affairs, may turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially43 have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective44, if no attention had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations45 usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary46 measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time convene47 them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived48 from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations49, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other.
Some are displeased51 with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative52 authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments53 of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are as valid54 and as binding55 on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial56 department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory57 they may be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much propriety58, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected59.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse60 to their being the SUPREME61 laws of the land. They insist, and profess62 to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable63 at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar65 to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend66 or repeal64 them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful67 reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of government.
However useful jealousy68 may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds69 too much in the body politic26, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive70 appearances which that malady71 casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly72, they can be punished; and if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties?
As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents74, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention, and the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter.
As to corruption75, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse76 with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible77 of such impressions, who can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family affections and attachments78, afford security for their fidelity79. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous73 as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive4 to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments80.
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1
censures
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| v.指责，非难，谴责( censure的第三人称单数 ) | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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attentive
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| adj.注意的，专心的；关心(别人)的，殷勤的 | |
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zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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confide
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| v.向某人吐露秘密 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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recollect
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| v.回忆，想起，记起，忆起，记得 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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attainment
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| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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residue
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| n.残余，剩余，残渣 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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posture
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| n.姿势，姿态，心态，态度；v.作出某种姿势 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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auxiliary
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| adj.辅助的，备用的 | |
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convene
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| v.集合，召集，召唤，聚集，集合 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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investigations
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| （正式的）调查( investigation的名词复数 )； 侦查； 科学研究； 学术研究 | |
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50
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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displeased
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| a.不快的 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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54
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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averse
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| adj.厌恶的；反对的，不乐意的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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repealable
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| 可重复的，（实验、实验结果等）可复验的 | |
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repeal
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| n.废止，撤消；v.废止，撤消 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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amend
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| vt.修改，修订，改进；n.[pl.]赔罪，赔偿 | |
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lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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abounds
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的第三人称单数 ) | |
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delusive
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| adj.欺骗的，妄想的 | |
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malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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corruptly
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| 腐败（堕落）地，可被收买的 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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attachments
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| n.（用电子邮件发送的）附件( attachment的名词复数 )；附着；连接；附属物 | |
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fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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impeachments
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| n.控告( impeachment的名词复数 )；检举；弹劾；怀疑 | |
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