From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots1 to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation2 with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial3 character as a court for the trial of impeachments5. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction6 are those offenses7 which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation9 of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar10 propriety11 be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution13 of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate14 the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions15, and will enlist17 all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations18 of innocence20 or guilt21.
The delicacy22 and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely23 on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous24 characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction16, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite25 neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny26.
The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning27 that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry28, or, in other words, of preferring the impeachment4, ought to be lodged29 in the hands of one branch of the legislative30 body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed31 out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle32 in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?
Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently33 dignified34, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality35 between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?
Could the Supreme36 Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent37 a portion of fortitude38, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation39 brought by their immediate12 representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity40. The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering41 that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated42 by the nature of the proceeding43. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation44 of the offense8 by the prosecutors45, or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion46 of courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom47 to honor or to infamy48 the most confidential49 and the most distinguished50 characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.
These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize51 a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper52 substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains53 a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement54 of the offender55. After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism56 from the esteem57 and confidence, and honors and emoluments58 of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend59, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias60 of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion61 of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future, office. It may be said, that the intervention62 of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate63 the danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting64 under the auspices65 of judges who had predetermined his guilt?
Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the convention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation66 of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent67 mean. I forbear to remark upon the additional pretext68 for clamor against the judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded.
Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of, such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity69 of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be questionable70. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary71 at the seat of government, and of course entitled to fixed72 and regular stipends73, or of certain officers of the State governments to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. The second will be espoused74 with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed75 over the whole union; the injury to the innocent, from the procrastinated76 determination of the charges which might be brought against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue77 and corruption78; and in some cases the detriment79 to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution80 of an intemperate81 or designing majority in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon19 of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men.
But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought preferable to the plan in this respect, reported by the convention, it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general scene of anarchy82, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant83 opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment84 of it; and to prevail upon one conceited85 projector86 to renounce87 his INFALLIBLE criterion for the FALLIBLE criterion of his more CONCEITED NEIGHBOR? To answer the purpose of the adversaries88 of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious.
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1
allots
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的第三人称单数 ) | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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impeachment
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| n.弹劾；控告；怀疑 | |
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impeachments
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| n.控告( impeachment的名词复数 )；检举；弹劾；怀疑 | |
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jurisdiction
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| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
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offenses
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| n.进攻( offense的名词复数 )；（球队的）前锋；进攻方法；攻势 | |
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offense
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| n.犯规，违法行为；冒犯，得罪 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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14
agitate
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| vi.(for,against)煽动，鼓动；vt.搅动 | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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demonstrations
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| 证明( demonstration的名词复数 )； 表明； 表达； 游行示威 | |
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demon
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| n.魔鬼，恶魔 | |
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innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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guilt
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| n.犯罪；内疚；过失，罪责 | |
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delicacy
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| n.精致，细微，微妙，精良；美味，佳肴 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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25
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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scrutiny
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| n.详细检查，仔细观察 | |
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condemning
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的现在分词 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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lodged
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| v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 )；暂住；埋入；（权利、权威等）归属 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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bridle
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| n.笼头，束缚；vt.抑制，约束；动怒 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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40
tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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42
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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43
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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delineation
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| n.记述；描写 | |
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45
prosecutors
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| 检举人( prosecutor的名词复数 )； 告发人； 起诉人； 公诉人 | |
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46
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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doom
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| n.厄运，劫数；v.注定，命定 | |
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48
infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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49
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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50
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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51
authorize
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| v.授权，委任；批准，认可 | |
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52
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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53
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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54
chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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56
ostracism
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| n.放逐；排斥 | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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58
emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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59
apprehend
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| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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complexion
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| n.肤色；情况，局面；气质，性格 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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63
obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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64
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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auspices
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| n.资助，赞助 | |
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incorporation
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| n.设立，合并，法人组织 | |
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67
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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68
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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questionable
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| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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stipends
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| n.（尤指牧师的）薪俸( stipend的名词复数 ) | |
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espoused
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| v.（决定）支持，拥护（目标、主张等）( espouse的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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procrastinated
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| 拖延，耽搁( procrastinate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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detriment
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| n.损害；损害物，造成损害的根源 | |
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persecution
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| n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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intemperate
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| adj.无节制的，放纵的 | |
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82
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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discordant
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| adj.不调和的 | |
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84
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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85
conceited
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| adj.自负的，骄傲自满的 | |
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86
projector
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| n.投影机，放映机，幻灯机 | |
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87
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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88
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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