From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention.
There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed1 against with less candor2 or criticised with less judgment3.
Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy4, they have endeavored to enlist5 all their jealousies6 and apprehensions7 in opposition8 to the intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo9, but as the full-grown progeny10, of that detested11 parent. To establish the pretended affinity12, they have not scrupled13 to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate14, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives15. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor16 to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem17 sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions18 and mistresses, giving audience to the envoys19 of foreign potentates20, in all the supercilious21 pomp of majesty22. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness23 have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.
Attempts so extravagant24 as these to disfigure or, it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain25 its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity26 and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit27 resemblances which have been so insidiously28, as well as industriously29, propagated.
In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous30 effort either to behold31 with moderation, or to treat with seriousness, the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived32 to pervert33 the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable licenses34 of party artifice35, that even in a disposition36 the most candid37 and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries38 to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow39 the imputation40 of deliberate imposture41 and deception42 upon the gross pretense43 of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold44 that imputation from the rash and barefaced45 expedients46 which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition.
In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity47 has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted48 to the Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies49 in the Senate.
This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party(1); and who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact, and let him, if he be able, justify50 or extenuate51 the shameful52 outrage53 he has offered to the dictates54 of truth and to the rules of fair dealing55.
The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers the President of the United States "to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls56, judges of the Supreme57 Court, and all other OFFICERS of United States whose appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW." Immediately after this clause follows another in these words: "The President shall have power to fill up all VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS58 OF THE SENATE, by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the deduction59 is not even colorable.
The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a mode for appointing such officers, "whose appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW"; of course it cannot extend to the appointments of senators, whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution(2), and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION, and will not require a future establishment by law. This position will hardly be contested.
The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary60 method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate61. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY62, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper63 to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen IN THEIR RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize64 the President, SINGLY, to make temporary appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session." Second. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary65 to the one which precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be construed66 to relate to the "officers" described in the preceding one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. Third. The time within which the power is to operate, "during the recess of the Senate," and the duration of the appointments, "to the end of the next session" of that body, conspire67 to elucidate68 the sense of the provision, which, if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments; and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized69 to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have governed the modification70 of a power which related to the temporary appointments; and as the national Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated71 in the clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes72 can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent73 agency with the President. But last, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article, not only obviate74 all possibility of doubt, but destroy the pretext75 of misconception. The former provides, that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for six years"; and the latter directs, that, "if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise, DURING THE RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this supposition, destitute76 as it is even of the merit of plausibility77, must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry78, too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy79.
I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial80 judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary81 of the proposed government, whether language can furnish epithets82 of too much asperity83, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.
PUBLIUS
1. See CATO, No. V.
2. Article I, section 3, clause 1.
点击收听单词发音
1 inveighed | |
v.猛烈抨击,痛骂,谩骂( inveigh的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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2 candor | |
n.坦白,率真 | |
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3 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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4 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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5 enlist | |
vt.谋取(支持等),赢得;征募;vi.入伍 | |
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6 jealousies | |
n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 );妒羡 | |
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7 apprehensions | |
疑惧 | |
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8 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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9 embryo | |
n.胚胎,萌芽的事物 | |
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10 progeny | |
n.后代,子孙;结果 | |
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11 detested | |
v.憎恶,嫌恶,痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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12 affinity | |
n.亲和力,密切关系 | |
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13 scrupled | |
v.感到于心不安,有顾忌( scruple的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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14 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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15 prerogatives | |
n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 );特权;大主教法庭;总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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16 splendor | |
n.光彩;壮丽,华丽;显赫,辉煌 | |
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17 diadem | |
n.王冠,冕 | |
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18 minions | |
n.奴颜婢膝的仆从( minion的名词复数 );走狗;宠儿;受人崇拜者 | |
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19 envoys | |
使节( envoy的名词复数 ); 公使; 谈判代表; 使节身份 | |
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20 potentates | |
n.君主,统治者( potentate的名词复数 );有权势的人 | |
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21 supercilious | |
adj.目中无人的,高傲的;adv.高傲地;n.高傲 | |
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22 majesty | |
n.雄伟,壮丽,庄严,威严;最高权威,王权 | |
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23 voluptuousness | |
n.风骚,体态丰满 | |
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24 extravagant | |
adj.奢侈的;过分的;(言行等)放肆的 | |
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25 ascertain | |
vt.发现,确定,查明,弄清 | |
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26 disingenuity | |
n.不坦率,不正直,不诚实;诡诈,狡猾 | |
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27 counterfeit | |
vt.伪造,仿造;adj.伪造的,假冒的 | |
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28 insidiously | |
潜在地,隐伏地,阴险地 | |
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29 industriously | |
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30 arduous | |
adj.艰苦的,费力的,陡峭的 | |
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31 behold | |
v.看,注视,看到 | |
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32 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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33 pervert | |
n.堕落者,反常者;vt.误用,滥用;使人堕落,使入邪路 | |
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34 licenses | |
n.执照( license的名词复数 )v.批准,许可,颁发执照( license的第三人称单数 ) | |
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35 artifice | |
n.妙计,高明的手段;狡诈,诡计 | |
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36 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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37 candid | |
adj.公正的,正直的;坦率的 | |
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38 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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39 bestow | |
v.把…赠与,把…授予;花费 | |
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40 imputation | |
n.归罪,责难 | |
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41 imposture | |
n.冒名顶替,欺骗 | |
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42 deception | |
n.欺骗,欺诈;骗局,诡计 | |
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43 pretense | |
n.矫饰,做作,借口 | |
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44 withhold | |
v.拒绝,不给;使停止,阻挡 | |
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45 barefaced | |
adj.厚颜无耻的,公然的 | |
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46 expedients | |
n.应急有效的,权宜之计的( expedient的名词复数 ) | |
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47 temerity | |
n.鲁莽,冒失 | |
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48 allotted | |
分配,拨给,摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49 vacancies | |
n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 );空虚;空白;空缺 | |
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50 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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51 extenuate | |
v.减轻,使人原谅 | |
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52 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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53 outrage | |
n.暴行,侮辱,愤怒;vt.凌辱,激怒 | |
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54 dictates | |
n.命令,规定,要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 );口授;支配;摆布 | |
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55 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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56 consuls | |
领事( consul的名词复数 ); (古罗马共和国时期)执政官 (古罗马共和国及其军队的最高首长,同时共有两位,每年选举一次) | |
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57 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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58 recess | |
n.短期休息,壁凹(墙上装架子,柜子等凹处) | |
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59 deduction | |
n.减除,扣除,减除额;推论,推理,演绎 | |
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60 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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61 inadequate | |
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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62 jointly | |
ad.联合地,共同地 | |
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63 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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64 authorize | |
v.授权,委任;批准,认可 | |
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65 supplementary | |
adj.补充的,附加的 | |
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66 construed | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的过去式和过去分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
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67 conspire | |
v.密谋,(事件等)巧合,共同导致 | |
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68 elucidate | |
v.阐明,说明 | |
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69 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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70 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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71 contemplated | |
adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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72 alludes | |
提及,暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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73 concurrent | |
adj.同时发生的,一致的 | |
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74 obviate | |
v.除去,排除,避免,预防 | |
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75 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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76 destitute | |
adj.缺乏的;穷困的 | |
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77 plausibility | |
n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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78 sophistry | |
n.诡辩 | |
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79 hypocrisy | |
n.伪善,虚伪 | |
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80 impartial | |
adj.(in,to)公正的,无偏见的 | |
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81 adversary | |
adj.敌手,对手 | |
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82 epithets | |
n.(表示性质、特征等的)词语( epithet的名词复数 ) | |
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83 asperity | |
n.粗鲁,艰苦 | |
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