From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 12, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate1 of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure2, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation3 from its opponents. The most plausible4 of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned5 to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.(1) I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent6 degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.(E1)
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided7. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate8 election should be made by men most capable of analyzing9 the qualities adapted to the station, and acting10 under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious11 combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite12 to such complicated investigations13.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult14 and disorder15. This evil was not least to be dreaded16 in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief17. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments18, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened19 at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal20, intrigue21, and corruption23. These most deadly adversaries24 of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper25 ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident26 and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered27 with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility28 to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting29 the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister30 bias31. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect32 of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark33 them, dispersed34 as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives35, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt22, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted36 to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance37 for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive38, it is provided that, in such a contingency39, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified40 for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem41 and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished42 office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue43. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce44 in the political heresy45 of the poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest—That which is best administered is best,"—yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude46 and tendency to produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous47, if not mischievous48. It has been alleged49, that it would have been preferable to have authorized50 the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify52 the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent53 vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme54 executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable55 that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize51 the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide federal farmer.
E1. Some editions substitute "desired" for "wished for".
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1 magistrate | |
n.地方行政官,地方法官,治安官 | |
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2 censure | |
v./n.责备;非难;责难 | |
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3 approbation | |
n.称赞;认可 | |
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4 plausible | |
adj.似真实的,似乎有理的,似乎可信的 | |
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5 deigned | |
v.屈尊,俯就( deign的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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6 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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7 confided | |
v.吐露(秘密,心事等)( confide的过去式和过去分词 );(向某人)吐露(隐私、秘密等) | |
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8 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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9 analyzing | |
v.分析;分析( analyze的现在分词 );分解;解释;对…进行心理分析n.分析 | |
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10 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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11 judicious | |
adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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12 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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13 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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14 tumult | |
n.喧哗;激动,混乱;吵闹 | |
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15 disorder | |
n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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16 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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17 mischief | |
n.损害,伤害,危害;恶作剧,捣蛋,胡闹 | |
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18 ferments | |
n.酵素( ferment的名词复数 );激动;骚动;动荡v.(使)发酵( ferment的第三人称单数 );(使)激动;骚动;骚扰 | |
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19 convened | |
召开( convene的过去式 ); 召集; (为正式会议而)聚集; 集合 | |
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20 cabal | |
n.政治阴谋小集团 | |
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21 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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22 corrupt | |
v.贿赂,收买;adj.腐败的,贪污的 | |
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23 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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24 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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25 improper | |
adj.不适当的,不合适的,不正确的,不合礼仪的 | |
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26 provident | |
adj.为将来做准备的,有先见之明的 | |
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27 tampered | |
v.窜改( tamper的过去式 );篡改;(用不正当手段)影响;瞎摆弄 | |
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28 eligibility | |
n.合格,资格 | |
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29 corrupting | |
(使)败坏( corrupt的现在分词 ); (使)腐化; 引起(计算机文件等的)错误; 破坏 | |
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30 sinister | |
adj.不吉利的,凶恶的,左边的 | |
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31 bias | |
n.偏见,偏心,偏袒;vt.使有偏见 | |
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32 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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33 embark | |
vi.乘船,着手,从事,上飞机 | |
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34 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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35 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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36 tempted | |
v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
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37 complaisance | |
n.彬彬有礼,殷勤,柔顺 | |
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38 conclusive | |
adj.最后的,结论的;确凿的,消除怀疑的 | |
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39 contingency | |
n.意外事件,可能性 | |
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40 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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41 esteem | |
n.尊敬,尊重;vt.尊重,敬重;把…看作 | |
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42 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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43 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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44 acquiesce | |
vi.默许,顺从,同意 | |
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45 heresy | |
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
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46 aptitude | |
n.(学习方面的)才能,资质,天资 | |
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47 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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48 mischievous | |
adj.调皮的,恶作剧的,有害的,伤人的 | |
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49 alleged | |
a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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50 authorized | |
a.委任的,许可的 | |
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51 authorize | |
v.授权,委任;批准,认可 | |
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52 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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53 contingent | |
adj.视条件而定的;n.一组,代表团,分遣队 | |
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54 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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55 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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