From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor1 of the executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative2 department would be merely nominal4 and nugatory5. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments8 of the Chief Magistrate9, could render him as obsequious10 to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt11 him by largesses, to surrender at discretion6 his judgment12 to their inclinations13. These expressions, taken in all the latitude14 of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be distressed15 nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue16 is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation17 or seduction of the Executive by the terrors or allurements18 of the pecuniary19 arrangements of the legislative body.
It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious20 attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided that "The President of the United States shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument7 from the United States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been more eligible21 than this. The legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or diminution22, till a new period of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his fortitude23 by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt24 his integrity by appealing to his avarice25. Neither the union, nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument than that which may have been determined26 by the first act. He can, of course, have no pecuniary inducement to renounce27 or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution.
The last of the requisites28 to energy, which have been enumerated29, are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States.
The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the qualified30 negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of returning all bills with objections, to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified31 by two thirds of each of the component32 members of the legislative body.
The propensity33 of the legislative department to intrude34 upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere3 parchment delineation35 of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense36, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety37 of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations38 of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated39 by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense.
But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction40 of improper41 laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction42, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.
The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption43 should be entertained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body.
But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious44 than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition45 to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert46 its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn47. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion48 of some common passion or interest. It is far less probable, that culpable49 views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs50 of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish51 in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated52 by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint53 resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma54 of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the displeasure of the nation by an opposition55 to the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogatives56, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede57 to the justness of this remark. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exercised.
If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified58 as a British monarch59, would have scruples61 about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely62 republican?
It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency63, has been drawn64 from this very source. It has been represented, on this account, as a power odious65 in appearance, useless in practice. But it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate66 attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated67 by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents68, who, though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude69 them in a very plain case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard.
But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body. Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO, might not scruple60 to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house concurring70 in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark71 in it a very respectable proportion of the legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved72 by those to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason, it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counterposing weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views should taint73 the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions74 may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension75 of opposition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be feared.
This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the chancellor76 and judges of the Supreme77 Court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it, have from experience become its declared admirers.(1)
I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of the constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might receive an improper bias78, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation79 than that of expounding80 the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted81 or influenced by the Executive.
PUBLIUS
1. Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is of this number.
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1
vigor
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| n.活力，精力，元气 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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nugatory
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| adj.琐碎的，无价值的 | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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emolument
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| n.报酬，薪水 | |
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emoluments
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| n.报酬，薪水( emolument的名词复数 ) | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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obsequious
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| adj.谄媚的，奉承的，顺从的 | |
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tempt
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| vt.引诱，勾引，吸引，引起…的兴趣 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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inclinations
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| 倾向( inclination的名词复数 )； 倾斜； 爱好； 斜坡 | |
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latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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distressed
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| 痛苦的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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intimidation
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| n.恐吓，威胁 | |
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allurements
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| n.诱惑( allurement的名词复数 )；吸引；诱惑物；有诱惑力的事物 | |
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pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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eligible
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| adj.有条件被选中的；(尤指婚姻等)合适(意)的 | |
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diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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requisites
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| n.必要的事物( requisite的名词复数 ) | |
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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ratified
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| v.批准，签认（合约等）( ratify的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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component
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| n.组成部分，成分，元件；adj.组成的，合成的 | |
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propensity
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| n.倾向；习性 | |
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intrude
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| vi.闯入；侵入；打扰，侵扰 | |
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delineation
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| n.记述；描写 | |
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defense
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| n.防御，保卫；[pl.]防务工事；辩护，答辩 | |
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propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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depredations
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| n.劫掠，毁坏( depredation的名词复数 ) | |
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annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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enaction
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| 设定，制定 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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faction
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| n.宗派，小集团；派别；派系斗争 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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pervert
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| n.堕落者，反常者；vt.误用，滥用；使人堕落，使入邪路 | |
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condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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culpable
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| adj.有罪的，该受谴责的 | |
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mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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blemish
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| v.损害；玷污；瑕疵，缺点 | |
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compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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prerogatives
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| n.权利( prerogative的名词复数 )；特权；大主教法庭；总督委任组成的法庭 | |
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accede
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| v.应允，同意 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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stimulated
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| a.刺激的 | |
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constituents
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| n.选民( constituent的名词复数 )；成分；构成部分；要素 | |
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delude
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| vt.欺骗；哄骗 | |
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concurring
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| 同时发生的，并发的 | |
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embark
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| vi.乘船，着手，从事，上飞机 | |
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disapproved
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| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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taint
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| n.污点；感染；腐坏；v.使感染；污染 | |
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obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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avocation
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| n.副业，业余爱好 | |
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expounding
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| 论述，详细讲解( expound的现在分词 ) | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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