What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI, and makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people's masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience1; and that in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.
When therefore the people sets up an hereditary2 government, whether it be monarchical3 and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking4; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.
It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible5 with the public good; but the circumspection6 this involves is a maxim7 of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.
It is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe, in such cases, all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate8 act from a seditious tumult9, and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a faction10. Here above all no further concession11 should be made to the untoward12 possibility than cannot, in the strictest logic13, be refused it. From this obligation the prince derives14 a great advantage in preserving his power despite the people, without it being possible to say he has usurped15 it; for, seeming to avail himself only of his rights, he finds it very easy to extend them, and to prevent, under the pretext16 of keeping the peace, assemblies that are destined17 to the re-establishment of order; with the result that he takes advantage of a silence he does not allow to be broken, or of irregularities he causes to be committed, to assume that he has the support of those whom fear prevents from speaking, and to punish those who dare to speak. Thus it was that the decemvirs, first elected for one year and then kept on in office for a second, tried to perpetuate18 their power by forbidding the comitia to assemble; and by this easy method every government in the world, once clothed with the public power, sooner or later usurps19 the sovereign authority.
The periodical assemblies of which I have already spoken are designed to prevent or postpone20 this calamity21, above all when they need no formal summoning; for in that case, the prince cannot stop them without openly declaring himself a law-breaker and an enemy of the State.
The opening of these assemblies, whose sole object is the maintenance of the social treaty, should always take the form of putting two propositions that may not be suppressed, which should be voted on separately.
The first is: "Does it please the Sovereign to preserve the present form of government?"
The second is: "Does it please the people to leave its administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of it?"
I am here assuming what I think I have shown; that there is in the State no fundamental law that cannot be revoked22, not excluding the social compact itself; for if all the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact, it is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately23 broken. Grotius even thinks that each man can renounce24 his membership of his own State, and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leaving the country.[1] It would be indeed absurd if all the citizens in assembly could not do what each can do by himself.
[1] Provided, of course, he does not leave to escape his obligations and avoid having to serve his country in the hour of need. Flight in such a case would be criminal and punishable, and would be, not withdrawal25, but desertion.
点击收听单词发音
1 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 monarchical | |
adj. 国王的,帝王的,君主的,拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 undertaking | |
n.保证,许诺,事业 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 circumspection | |
n.细心,慎重 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 maxim | |
n.格言,箴言 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 tumult | |
n.喧哗;激动,混乱;吵闹 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 concession | |
n.让步,妥协;特许(权) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 untoward | |
adj.不利的,不幸的,困难重重的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 derives | |
v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 );(从…中)得到获得;源于;(从…中)提取 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 usurped | |
篡夺,霸占( usurp的过去式和过去分词 ); 盗用; 篡夺,篡权 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 destined | |
adj.命中注定的;(for)以…为目的地的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 perpetuate | |
v.使永存,使永记不忘 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 usurps | |
篡夺,霸占( usurp的第三人称单数 ); 盗用; 篡夺,篡权 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20 postpone | |
v.延期,推迟 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21 calamity | |
n.灾害,祸患,不幸事件 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22 revoked | |
adj.[法]取消的v.撤销,取消,废除( revoke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23 legitimately | |
ad.合法地;正当地,合理地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24 renounce | |
v.放弃;拒绝承认,宣布与…断绝关系 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25 withdrawal | |
n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |