Emotions are traditionally regarded by psychologists as a separate class of mental occurrences: I am, of course, not concerned to deny the obvious fact that they have characteristics which make a special investigation3 of them necessary. What I am concerned with is the analysis of emotions. It is clear that an emotion is essentially4 complex, and we have to inquire whether it ever contains any non-physiological5 material not reducible to sensations and images and their relations.
Although what specially6 concerns us is the analysis of emotions, we shall find that the more important topic is the physiological causation of emotions. This is a subject upon which much valuable and exceedingly interesting work has been done, whereas the bare analysis of emotions has proved somewhat barren. In view of the fact that we have defined perceptions, sensations, and images by their physiological causation, it is evident that our problem of the analysis of the emotions is bound up with the problem of their physiological causation.
Modern views on the causation of emotions begin with what is called the James-Lange theory. James states this view in the following terms ("Psychology7," vol. ii, p. 449):
"Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions, grief, fear, rage, love, is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that THE BODILY CHANGES FOLLOW DIRECTLY THE PERCEPTION OF THE EXCITING FACT, AND THAT OUR FEELING OF THE SAME CHANGES AS THEY OCCUR IS THE EMOTION (James's italics). Common sense says: we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations8 must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely9 cognitive10 in form, pale, colourless, destitute11 of emotional warmth."
Round this hypothesis a very voluminous literature has grown up. The history of its victory over earlier criticism, and its difficulties with the modern experimental work of Sherrington and Cannon12, is well told by James R. Angell in an article called "A Reconsideration of James's Theory of Emotion in the Light of Recent Criticisms."* In this article Angell defends James's theory and to me—though I speak with diffidence on a question as to which I have little competence—it appears that his defence is on the whole successful.
* "Psychological Review," 1916.
Sherrington, by experiments on dogs, showed that many of the usual marks of emotion were present in their behaviour even when, by severing13 the spinal14 cord in the lower cervical region, the viscera were cut off from all communication with the brain, except that existing through certain cranial nerves. He mentions the various signs which "contributed to indicate the existence of an emotion as lively as the animal had ever shown us before the spinal operation had been made."* He infers that the physiological condition of the viscera cannot be the cause of the emotion displayed under such circumstances, and concludes: "We are forced back toward the likelihood that the visceral expression of emotion is SECONDARY to the cerebral15 action occurring with the psychical16 state.... We may with James accept visceral and organic sensations and the memories and associations of them as contributory to primitive17 emotion, but we must regard them as re-enforcing rather than as initiating18 the psychosis."*
* Quoted by Angell, loc. cit.
Angell suggests that the display of emotion in such cases may be due to past experience, generating habits which would require only the stimulation19 of cerebral reflex arcs. Rage and some forms of fear, however, may, he thinks, gain expression without the brain. Rage and fear have been especially studied by Cannon, whose work is of the greatest importance. His results are given in his book, "Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage" (D. Appleton and Co., 1916).
The most interesting part of Cannon's book consists in the investigation of the effects produced by secretion20 of adrenin. Adrenin is a substance secreted21 into the blood by the adrenal glands22. These are among the ductless glands, the functions of which, both in physiology23 and in connection with the emotions, have only come to be known during recent years. Cannon found that pain, fear and rage occurred in circumstances which affected24 the supply of adrenin, and that an artificial injection of adrenin could, for example, produce all the symptoms of fear. He studied the effects of adrenin on various parts of the body; he found that it causes the pupils to dilate25, hairs to stand erect26, blood vessels27 to be constricted28, and so on. These effects were still produced if the parts in question were removed from the body and kept alive artificially.*
* Cannon's work is not unconnected with that of Mosso, who
maintains, as the result of much experimental work, that
"the seat of the emotions lies in the sympathetic nervous
system." An account of the work of both these men will be
found in Goddard's "Psychology of the Normal and Sub-normal"
(Kegan Paul, 1919), chap. vii and Appendix.
Cannon's chief argument against James is, if I understand him rightly, that similar affections of the viscera may accompany dissimilar emotions, especially fear and rage. Various different emotions make us cry, and therefore it cannot be true to say, as James does, that we "feel sorry because we cry," since sometimes we cry when we feel glad. This argument, however, is by no means conclusive29 against James, because it cannot be shown that there are no visceral differences for different emotions, and indeed it is unlikely that this is the case.
As Angell says (loc. cit.): "Fear and joy may both cause cardiac palpitation, but in one case we find high tonus of the skeletal muscles, in the other case relaxation30 and the general sense of weakness."
Angell's conclusion, after discussing the experiments of Sherrington and Cannon, is: "I would therefore submit that, so far as concerns the critical suggestions by these two psychologists, James's essential contentions31 are not materially affected." If it were necessary for me to take sides on this question, I should agree with this conclusion; but I think my thesis as to the analysis of emotion can be maintained without coming to a probably premature32 conclusion upon the doubtful parts of the physiological problem.
According to our definitions, if James is right, an emotion may be regarded as involving a confused perception of the viscera concerned in its causation, while if Cannon and Sherrington are right, an emotion involves a confused perception of its external stimulus33. This follows from what was said in Lecture VII. We there defined a perception as an appearance, however irregular, of one or more objects external to the brain. And in order to be an appearance of one or more objects, it is only necessary that the occurrence in question should be connected with them by a continuous chain, and should vary when they are varied34 sufficiently35. Thus the question whether a mental occurrence can be called a perception turns upon the question whether anything can be inferred from it as to its causes outside the brain: if such inference is possible, the occurrence in question will come within our definition of a perception. And in that case, according to the definition in Lecture VIII, its non-mnemic elements will be sensations. Accordingly, whether emotions are caused by changes in the viscera or by sensible objects, they contain elements which are sensations according to our definition.
An emotion in its entirety is, of course, something much more complex than a perception. An emotion is essentially a process, and it will be only what one may call a cross-section of the emotion that will be a perception, of a bodily condition according to James, or (in certain cases) of an external object according to his opponents. An emotion in its entirety contains dynamic elements, such as motor impulses, desires, pleasures and pains. Desires and pleasures and pains, according to the theory adopted in Lecture III, are characteristics of processes, not separate ingredients. An emotion—rage, for example—will be a certain kind of process, consisting of perceptions and (in general) bodily movements. The desires and pleasures and pains involved are properties of this process, not separate items in the stuff of which the emotion is composed. The dynamic elements in an emotion, if we are right in our analysis, contain, from our point of view, no ingredients beyond those contained in the processes considered in Lecture III. The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other according to a certain pattern. With this conclusion we may leave the emotions and pass to the consideration of the will.
The first thing to be defined when we are dealing36 with Will is a VOLUNTARY MOVEMENT. We have already defined vital movements, and we have maintained that, from a behaviourist standpoint, it is impossible to distinguish which among such movements are reflex and which voluntary. Nevertheless, there certainly is a distinction. When we decide in the morning that it is time to get up, our consequent movement is voluntary. The beating of the heart, on the other hand, is involuntary: we can neither cause it nor prevent it by any decision of our own, except indirectly37, as e.g. by drugs. Breathing is intermediate between the two: we normally breathe without the help of the will, but we can alter or stop our breathing if we choose.
James ("Psychology," chap. xxvi) maintains that the only distinctive38 characteristic of a voluntary act is that it involves an idea of the movement to be performed, made up of memory-images of the kinaesthetic sensations which we had when the same movement occurred on some former occasion. He points out that, on this view, no movement can be made voluntarily unless it has previously39 occurred involuntarily.*
* "Psychology," Vol. ii, pp. 492-3.
I see no reason to doubt the correctness of this view. We shall say, then, that movements which are accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations tend to be caused by the images of those sensations, and when so caused are called VOLUNTARY.
Volition40, in the emphatic41 sense, involves something more than voluntary movement. The sort of case I am thinking of is decision after deliberation. Voluntary movements are a part of this, but not the whole. There is, in addition to them, a judgment42: "This is what I shall do"; there is also a sensation of tension during doubt, followed by a different sensation at the moment of deciding. I see no reason whatever to suppose that there is any specifically new ingredient; sensations and images, with their relations and causal laws, yield all that seems to be wanted for the analysis of the will, together with the fact that kinaesthetic images tend to cause the movements with which they are connected. Conflict of desires is of course essential in the causation of the emphatic kind of will: there will be for a time kinaesthetic images of incompatible43 movements, followed by the exclusive image of the movement which is said to be willed. Thus will seems to add no new irreducible ingredient to the analysis of the mind.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
psychic
|
|
| n.对超自然力敏感的人；adj.有超自然力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
investigation
|
|
| n.调查，调查研究 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
essentially
|
|
| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
physiological
|
|
| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
specially
|
|
| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
psychology
|
|
| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
manifestations
|
|
| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
purely
|
|
| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
cognitive
|
|
| adj.认知的，认识的，有感知的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
destitute
|
|
| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
cannon
|
|
| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
severing
|
|
| v.切断，断绝( sever的现在分词 )；断，裂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
spinal
|
|
| adj.针的，尖刺的，尖刺状突起的；adj.脊骨的，脊髓的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
cerebral
|
|
| adj.脑的，大脑的；有智力的，理智型的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
psychical
|
|
| adj.有关特异功能现象的；有关特异功能官能的；灵魂的；心灵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
primitive
|
|
| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
initiating
|
|
| v.开始( initiate的现在分词 )；传授；发起；接纳新成员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
stimulation
|
|
| n.刺激，激励，鼓舞 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
secretion
|
|
| n.分泌 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
secreted
|
|
| v.（尤指动物或植物器官）分泌( secrete的过去式和过去分词 )；隐匿，隐藏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
glands
|
|
| n.腺( gland的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
physiology
|
|
| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
affected
|
|
| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
dilate
|
|
| vt.使膨胀，使扩大 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
erect
|
|
| n./v.树立，建立，使竖立；adj.直立的，垂直的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
vessels
|
|
| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
constricted
|
|
| adj.抑制的，约束的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
conclusive
|
|
| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
relaxation
|
|
| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
contentions
|
|
| n.竞争( contention的名词复数 )；争夺；争论；论点 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
premature
|
|
| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
stimulus
|
|
| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
varied
|
|
| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
sufficiently
|
|
| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
dealing
|
|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
indirectly
|
|
| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
distinctive
|
|
| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
previously
|
|
| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
volition
|
|
| n.意志；决意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
emphatic
|
|
| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
incompatible
|
|
| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |