But I think there is a limit, and a highly legitimate9 limit, to this process. I think a man may praise Pindar without knowing the top of a Greek letter from the bottom. But I think that if a man is going to abuse Pindar, if he is going to denounce, refute, and utterly10 expose Pindar, if he is going to show Pindar up as the utter ignoramus and outrageous11 impostor that he is, then I think it will be just as well perhaps—I think, at any rate, it would do no harm—if he did know a little Greek, and even had read a little Pindar. And I think the same situation would be involved if the critic were concerned to point out that Pindar was scandalously immoral12, pestilently cynical13, or low and beastly in his views of life. When people brought such attacks against the morality of Pindar, I should regret that they could not read Greek; and when they bring such attacks against the morality of Fielding, I regret very much that they cannot read English.
There seems to be an extraordinary idea abroad that Fielding was in some way an immoral or offensive writer. I have been astounded14 by the number of the leading articles, literary articles, and other articles written about him just now in which there is a curious tone of apologising for the man. One critic says that after all he couldn't help it, because he lived in the eighteenth century; another says that we must allow for the change of manners and ideas; another says that he was not altogether without generous and humane15 feelings; another suggests that he clung feebly, after all, to a few of the less important virtues17. What on earth does all this mean? Fielding described Tom Jones as going on in a certain way, in which, most unfortunately, a very large number of young men do go on. It is unnecessary to say that Henry Fielding knew that it was an unfortunate way of going on. Even Tom Jones knew that. He said in so many words that it was a very unfortunate way of going on; he said, one may almost say, that it had ruined his life; the passage is there for the benefit of any one who may take the trouble to read the book. There is ample evidence (though even this is of a mystical and indirect kind), there is ample evidence that Fielding probably thought that it was better to be Tom Jones than to be an utter coward and sneak18. There is simply not one rag or thread or speck19 of evidence to show that Fielding thought that it was better to be Tom Jones than to be a good man. All that he is concerned with is the description of a definite and very real type of young man; the young man whose passions and whose selfish necessities sometimes seemed to be stronger than anything else in him.
The practical morality of Tom Jones is bad, though not so bad, spiritually speaking, as the practical morality of Arthur Pendennis or the practical morality of Pip, and certainly nothing like so bad as the profound practical immorality20 of Daniel Deronda. The practical morality of Tom Jones is bad; but I cannot see any proof that his theoretical morality was particularly bad. There is no need to tell the majority of modern young men even to live up to the theoretical ethics21 of Henry Fielding. They would suddenly spring into the stature22 of archangels if they lived up to the theoretic ethics of poor Tom Jones. Tom Jones is still alive, with all his good and all his evil; he is walking about the streets; we meet him every day. We meet with him, we drink with him, we smoke with him, we talk with him, we talk about him. The only difference is that we have no longer the intellectual courage to write about him. We split up the supreme23 and central human being, Tom Jones, into a number of separate aspects. We let Mr. J.M. Barrie write about him in his good moments, and make him out better than he is. We let Zola write about him in his bad moments, and make him out much worse than he is. We let Maeterlinck celebrate those moments of spiritual panic which he knows to be cowardly; we let Mr. Rudyard Kipling celebrate those moments of brutality24 which he knows to be far more cowardly. We let obscene writers write about the obscenities of this ordinary man. We let puritan writers write about the purities of this ordinary man. We look through one peephole that makes men out as devils, and we call it the new art. We look through another peephole that makes men out as angels, and we call it the New Theology. But if we pull down some dusty old books from the bookshelf, if we turn over some old mildewed25 leaves, and if in that obscurity and decay we find some faint traces of a tale about a complete man, such a man as is walking on the pavement outside, we suddenly pull a long face, and we call it the coarse morals of a bygone age.
The truth is that all these things mark a certain change in the general view of morals; not, I think, a change for the better. We have grown to associate morality in a book with a kind of optimism and prettiness; according to us, a moral book is a book about moral people. But the old idea was almost exactly the opposite; a moral book was a book about immoral people. A moral book was full of pictures like Hogarth's "Gin Lane" or "Stages of Cruelty," or it recorded, like the popular broadsheet, "God's dreadful judgment26" against some blasphemer or murderer. There is a philosophical27 reason for this change. The homeless scepticism of our time has reached a sub-conscious feeling that morality is somehow merely a matter of human taste—an accident of psychology28. And if goodness only exists in certain human minds, a man wishing to praise goodness will naturally exaggerate the amount of it that there is in human minds or the number of human minds in which it is supreme. Every confession29 that man is vicious is a confession that virtue16 is visionary. Every book which admits that evil is real is felt in some vague way to be admitting that good is unreal. The modern instinct is that if the heart of man is evil, there is nothing that remains30 good. But the older feeling was that if the heart of man was ever so evil, there was something that remained good—goodness remained good. An actual avenging31 virtue existed outside the human race; to that men rose, or from that men fell away. Therefore, of course, this law itself was as much demonstrated in the breach32 as in the observance. If Tom Jones violated morality, so much the worse for Tom Jones. Fielding did not feel, as a melancholy33 modern would have done, that every sin of Tom Jones was in some way breaking the spell, or we may even say destroying the fiction of morality. Men spoke34 of the sinner breaking the law; but it was rather the law that broke him. And what modern people call the foulness35 and freedom of Fielding is generally the severity and moral stringency36 of Fielding. He would not have thought that he was serving morality at all if he had written a book all about nice people. Fielding would have considered Mr. Ian Maclaren extremely immoral; and there is something to be said for that view. Telling the truth about the terrible struggle of the human soul is surely a very elementary part of the ethics of honesty. If the characters are not wicked, the book is. This older and firmer conception of right as existing outside human weakness and without reference to human error can be felt in the very lightest and loosest of the works of old English literature. It is commonly unmeaning enough to call Shakspere a great moralist; but in this particular way Shakspere is a very typical moralist. Whenever he alludes to right and wrong it is always with this old implication. Right is right, even if nobody does it. Wrong is wrong, even if everybody is wrong about it.
点击收听单词发音
1 celebrated | |
adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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2 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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3 chronological | |
adj.按年月顺序排列的,年代学的 | |
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4 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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5 unreasonable | |
adj.不讲道理的,不合情理的,过度的 | |
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6 alludes | |
提及,暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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7 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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8 sneer | |
v.轻蔑;嘲笑;n.嘲笑,讥讽的言语 | |
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9 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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10 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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11 outrageous | |
adj.无理的,令人不能容忍的 | |
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12 immoral | |
adj.不道德的,淫荡的,荒淫的,有伤风化的 | |
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13 cynical | |
adj.(对人性或动机)怀疑的,不信世道向善的 | |
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14 astounded | |
v.使震惊(astound的过去式和过去分词);愕然;愕;惊讶 | |
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15 humane | |
adj.人道的,富有同情心的 | |
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16 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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17 virtues | |
美德( virtue的名词复数 ); 德行; 优点; 长处 | |
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18 sneak | |
vt.潜行(隐藏,填石缝);偷偷摸摸做;n.潜行;adj.暗中进行 | |
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19 speck | |
n.微粒,小污点,小斑点 | |
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20 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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21 ethics | |
n.伦理学;伦理观,道德标准 | |
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22 stature | |
n.(高度)水平,(高度)境界,身高,身材 | |
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23 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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24 brutality | |
n.野蛮的行为,残忍,野蛮 | |
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25 mildewed | |
adj.发了霉的,陈腐的,长了霉花的v.(使)发霉,(使)长霉( mildew的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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26 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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27 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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28 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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29 confession | |
n.自白,供认,承认 | |
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30 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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31 avenging | |
adj.报仇的,复仇的v.为…复仇,报…之仇( avenge的现在分词 );为…报复 | |
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32 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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33 melancholy | |
n.忧郁,愁思;adj.令人感伤(沮丧)的,忧郁的 | |
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34 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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35 foulness | |
n. 纠缠, 卑鄙 | |
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36 stringency | |
n.严格,紧迫,说服力;严格性;强度 | |
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