I— Plan of a Treatise1 on Morals
That great science which regards nature and the operations of the human mind, is popularly divided into Morals and Metaphysics. The latter relates to a just classification, and the assignment of distinct names to its ideas; the former regards simply the determination of that arrangement of them which produces the greatest and most solid happiness. It is admitted that a virtuous2 or moral action, is that action which, when considered in all its accessories and consequences, is fitted to produce the highest pleasure to the greatest number of sensitive beings. The laws according to which all pleasure, since it cannot be equally felt by all sensitive beings, ought to be distributed by a voluntary agent, are reserved for a separate chapter.
The design of this little treatise is restricted to the development of the elementary principles of morals. As far as regards that purpose, metaphysical science will be treated merely so far as a source of negative truth; whilst morality will be considered as a science, respecting which we can arrive at positive conclusions.
The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the ascertaining4 of what IS NOT TRUE, the principal direct service which metaphysical science can bestow5 upon moral science. Moral science itself is the doctrine6 of the voluntary actions of man, as a sentient7 and social being. These actions depend on the thoughts in his mind. But there is a mass of popular opinion, from which the most enlightened persons are seldom wholly free, into the truth or falsehood of which it is incumbent8 on us to inquire, before we can arrive at any firm conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow beings; or before we can ascertain3 the elementary laws, according to which these thoughts, from which these actions flow, are originally combined.
The object of the forms according to which human society is administered, is the happiness of the individuals composing the communities which they regard, and these forms are perfect or imperfect in proportion to the degree in which they promote this end.
This object is not merely the quantity of happiness enjoyed by individuals as sensitive beings, but the mode in which it should be distributed among them as social beings. It is not enough, if such a coincidence can be conceived as possible, that one person or class of persons should enjoy the highest happiness, whilst another is suffering a disproportionate degree of misery9. It is necessary that the happiness produced by the common efforts, and preserved by the common care, should be distributed according to the just claims of each individual; if not, although the quantity produced should be the same, the end of society would remain unfulfilled. The object is in a compound proportion to the quantity of happiness produced, and the correspondence of the mode in which it is distributed, to the elementary feelings of man as a social being.
The disposition10 in an individual to promote this object is called virtue11; and the two constituent12 parts of virtue, benevolence13 and justice, are correlative with these two great portions of the only true object of all voluntary actions of a human being. Benevolence is the desire to be the author of good, and justice the apprehension14 of the manner in which good ought to be done.
Justice and benevolence result from the elementary laws of the human mind.
Chapter I on the Nature of Virtue
SECT15. 1. General View of the Nature and Objects of Virtue. — 2. The Origin and Basis of Virtue, as founded on the Elementary Principles of Mind. — 3. The Laws which flow from the nature of Mind regulating the application of those principles to human actions; — 4. Virtue, a possible attribute of man.
We exist in the midst of a multitude of beings like ourselves, upon whose happiness most of our actions exert some obvious and decisive influence.
The regulation of this influence is the object of moral science. We know that we are susceptible16 of receiving painful or pleasurable impressions of greater or less intensity17 and duration. That is called good which produces pleasure; that is called evil which produces pain. These are general names, applicable to every class of causes, from which an overbalance of pain or pleasure may result. But when a human being is the active instrument of generating or diffusing18 happiness, the principle through which it is most effectually instrumental to that purpose, is called virtue. And benevolence, or the desire to be the author of good, united with justice, or an apprehension of the manner in which that good is to be done, constitutes virtue.
But wherefore should a man be benevolent19 and just? The immediate20 emotions of his nature, especially in its most inartificial state, prompt him to inflict21 pain, and to arrogate22 dominion23. He desires to heap superfluities to his own store, although others perish with famine. He is propelled to guard against the smallest invasion of his own liberty, though he reduces others to a condition of the most pitiless servitude. He is revengeful, proud and selfish. Wherefore should he curb24 these propensities25?
It is inquired, for what reason a human being should engage in procuring26 the happiness, or refrain from producing the pain of another? When a reason is required to prove the necessity of adopting any system of conduct, what is it that the objector demands? He requires proof of that system of conduct being such as will most effectually promote the happiness of mankind. To demonstrate this, is to render a moral reason. Such is the object of virtue.
A common sophism27, which, like many others, depends on the abuse of a metaphorical28 expression to a literal purpose, has produced much of the confusion which has involved the theory of morals. It is said that no person is bound to be just or kind, if, on his neglect, he should fail to incur29 some penalty. Duty is obligation. There can be no obligation without an obliger. Virtue is a law, to which it is the will of the lawgiver that we should conform; which will we should in no manner be bound to obey, unless some dreadful punishment were attached to disobedience. This is the philosophy of slavery and superstition30.
In fact, no person can be BOUND or OBLIGED, without some power preceding to bind31 and oblige. If I observe a man bound hand and foot, I know that some one bound him. But if I observe him returning self-satisfied from the performance of some action, by which he has been the willing author of extensive benefit, I do not infer that the anticipation32 of hellish agonies, or the hope of heavenly reward, has constrained33 him to such an act.
. . . . . . .
It remains34 to be stated in what manner the sensations which constitute the basis of virtue originate in the human mind; what are the laws which it receives there; how far the principles of mind allow it to be an attribute of a human being; and, lastly, what is the probability of persuading mankind to adopt it as a universal and systematic35 motive36 of conduct.
Benevolence
There is a class of emotions which we instinctively37 avoid. A human being, such as is man considered in his origin, a child a month old, has a very imperfect consciousness of the existence of other natures resembling itself. All the energies of its being are directed to the extinction38 of the pains with which it is perpetually assailed39. At length it discovers that it is surrounded by natures susceptible of sensations similar to its own. It is very late before children attain40 to this knowledge. If a child observes, without emotion, its nurse or its mother suffering acute pain, it is attributable rather to ignorance than insensibility. So soon as the accents and gestures, significant of pain, are referred to the feelings which they express, they awaken41 in the mind of the beholder42 a desire that they should cease. Pain is thus apprehended43 to be evil for its own sake, without any other necessary reference to the mind by which its existence is perceived, than such as is indispensable to its perception. The tendencies of our original sensations, indeed, all have for their object the preservation44 of our individual being. But these are passive and unconscious. In proportion as the mind acquires an active power, the empire of these tendencies becomes limited. Thus an infant, a savage45, and a solitary46 beast, is selfish, because its mind is incapable47 of receiving an accurate intimation of the nature of pain as existing in beings resembling itself. The inhabitant of a highly civilized48 community will more acutely sympathize with the sufferings and enjoyments49 of others, than the inhabitant of a society of a less degree of civilization. He who shall have cultivated his intellectual powers by familiarity with the highest specimens50 of poetry and philosophy, will usually sympathize more than one engaged in the less refined functions of manual labour. Every one has experience of the fact, that to sympathize with the sufferings of another, is to enjoy a transitory oblivion of his own.
The mind thus acquires, by exercise, a habit, as it were, of perceiving and abhorring51 evil, however remote from the immediate sphere of sensations with which that individual mind is conversant52. Imagination or mind employed in prophetically imaging forth53 its objects, is that faculty54 of human nature on which every gradation of its progress, nay55, every, the minutest, change, depends. Pain or pleasure, if subtly analysed, will be found to consist entirely56 in prospect57. The only distinction between the selfish man and the virtuous man is, that the imagination of the former is confined within a narrow limit, whilst that of the latter embraces a comprehensive circumference58. In this sense, wisdom and virtue may be said to be inseparable, and criteria59 of each other. Selfishness is the offspring of ignorance and mistake; it is the portion of unreflecting infancy60, and savage solitude61, or of those whom toil62 or evil occupations have blunted or rendered torpid63; disinterested64 benevolence is the product of a cultivated imagination, and has an intimate connexion with all the arts which add ornament65, or dignity, or power, or stability to the social state of man. Virtue is thus entirely a refinement66 of civilized life; a creation of the human mind; or, rather, a combination which it has made, according to elementary rules contained within itself, of the feelings suggested by the relations established between man and man.
All the theories which have refined and exalted67 humanity, or those which have been devised as alleviations of its mistakes and evils, have been based upon the elementary emotions of disinterestedness68, which we feel to constitute the majesty69 of our nature. Patriotism70, as it existed in the ancient republics, was never, as has been supposed, a calculation of personal advantages. When Mutius Scaevola thrust his hand into the burning coals, and Regulus returned to Carthage, and Epicharis sustained the rack silently, in the torments71 of which she knew that she would speedily perish, rather than betray the conspirators72 to the tyrant73 [Footnote: Tacitus.]; these illustrious persons certainly made a small estimate of their private interest. If it be said that they sought posthumous74 fame; instances are not wanting in history which prove that men have even defied infamy75 for the sake of good. But there is a great error in the world with respect to the selfishness of fame. It is certainly possible that a person should seek distinction as a medium of personal gratification. But the love of fame is frequently no more than a desire that the feelings of others should confirm, illustrate76, and sympathize with, our own. In this respect it is allied77 with all that draws us out of ourselves. It is the ‘last infirmity of noble minds’. Chivalry78 was likewise founded on the theory of self-sacrifice. Love possesses so extraordinary a power over the human heart, only because disinterestedness is united with the natural propensities. These propensities themselves are comparatively impotent in cases where the imagination of pleasure to be given, as well as to be received, does not enter into the account. Let it not be objected that patriotism, and chivalry, and sentimental79 love, have been the fountains of enormous mischief80. They are cited only to establish the proposition that, according to the elementary principles of mind, man is capable of desiring and pursuing good for its own sake.
Justice
The benevolent propensities are thus inherent in the human mind. We are impelled81 to seek the happiness of others. We experience a satisfaction in being the authors of that happiness. Everything that lives is open to impressions or pleasure and pain. We are led by our benevolent propensities to regard every human being indifferently with whom we come in contact. They have preference only with respect to those who offer themselves most obviously to our notice. Human beings are indiscriminating and blind; they will avoid inflicting82 pain, though that pain should be attended with eventual83 benefit; they will seek to confer pleasure without calculating the mischief that may result. They benefit one at the expense of many.
There is a sentiment in the human mind that regulates benevolence in its application as a principle of action. This is the sense of justice. Justice, as well as benevolence, is an elementary law of human nature. It is through this principle that men are impelled to distribute any means of pleasure which benevolence may suggest the communication of to others, in equal portions among an equal number of applicants84. If ten men are shipwrecked on a desert island, they distribute whatever subsistence may remain to them, into equal portions among themselves. If six of them conspire85 to deprive the remaining four of their share, their conduct is termed unjust.
The existence of pain has been shown to be a circumstance which the human mind regards with dissatisfaction, and of which it desires the cessation. It is equally according to its nature to desire that the advantages to be enjoyed by a limited number of persons should be enjoyed equally by all. This proposition is supported by the evidence of indisputable facts. Tell some ungarbled tale of a number of persons being made the victims of the enjoyments of one, and he who would appeal in favour of any system which might produce such an evil to the primary emotions of our nature, would have nothing to reply. Let two persons, equally strangers, make application for some benefit in the possession of a third to bestow, and to which he feels that they have an equal claim. They are both sensitive beings; pleasure and pain affect them alike.
Chapter II
It is foreign to the general scope of this little treatise to encumber86 a simple argument by controverting87 any of the trite88 objections of habit or fanaticism89. But there are two; the first, the basis of all political mistake, and the second, the prolific90 cause and effect of religious error, which it seems useful to refute.
First, it is inquired, ‘Wherefore should a man be benevolent and just?’ The answer has been given in the preceding chapter.
If a man persists to inquire why he ought to promote the happiness of mankind, he demands a mathematical or metaphysical reason for a moral action. The absurdity91 of this scepticism is more apparent, but not less real than the exacting92 a moral reason for a mathematical or metaphysical fact. If any person should refuse to admit that all the radii93 of a circle are of equal length, or that human actions are necessarily determined94 by motives95, until it could be proved that these radii and these actions uniformly tended to the production of the greatest general good, who would not wonder at the unreasonable96 and capricious association of his ideas?
The writer of a philosophical97 treatise may, I imagine, at this advanced era of human intellect, be held excused from entering into a controversy98 with those reasoners, if such there are, who would claim an exemption99 from its decrees in favour of any one among those diversified101 systems of obscure opinion respecting morals, which, under the name of religions, have in various ages and countries prevailed among mankind. Besides that if, as these reasoners have pretended, eternal torture or happiness will ensue as the consequence of certain actions, we should be no nearer the possession of a standard to determine what actions were right and wrong, even if this pretended revelation, which is by no means the case, had furnished us with a complete catalogue of them. The character of actions as virtuous or vicious would by no means be determined alone by the personal advantage or disadvantage of each moral agent individually considered. Indeed, an action is often virtuous in proportion to the greatness of the personal calamity102 which the author willingly draws upon himself by daring to perform it. It is because an action produces an overbalance of pleasure or pain to the greatest number of sentient beings, and not merely because its consequences are beneficial or injurious to the author of that action, that it is good or evil. Nay, this latter consideration has a tendency to pollute the purity of virtue, inasmuch as it consists in the motive rather than in the consequences of an action. A person who should labour for the happiness of mankind lest he should be tormented103 eternally in Hell, would, with reference to that motive, possess as little claim to the epithet104 of virtuous, as he who should torture, imprison105, and burn them alive, a more usual and natural consequence of such principles, for the sake of the enjoyments of Heaven.
My neighbour, presuming on his strength, may direct me to perform or to refrain from a particular action; indicating a certain arbitrary penalty in the event of disobedience within power to inflict. My action, if modified by his menaces, can no degree participate in virtue. He has afforded me no criterion as to what is right or wrong. A king, or an assembly of men, may publish a proclamation affixing106 any penalty to any particular action, but that is not immoral107 because such penalty is affixed108. Nothing is more evident than that the epithet of virtue is inapplicable to the refraining from that action on account of the evil arbitrarily attached to it. If the action is in itself beneficial, virtue would rather consist in not refraining from it, but in firmly defying the personal consequences attached to its performance.
Some usurper109 of supernatural energy might subdue110 the whole globe to his power; he might possess new and unheard-of resources for enduing111 his punishments with the most terrible attributes or pain. The torments of his victims might be intense in their degree, and protracted112 to an infinite duration. Still the ‘will of the lawgiver’ would afford no surer criterion as to what actions were right or wrong. It would only increase the possible virtue of those who refuse to become the instruments of his tyranny.
II— Moral Science Consists in Considering the Difference, not the Resemblance, of Persons
The internal influence, derived113 from the constitution of the mind from which they flow, produces that peculiar114 modification115 of actions, which makes them intrinsically good or evil.
To attain an apprehension of the importance of this distinction, let us visit, in imagination, the proceedings116 of some metropolis117. Consider the multitude of human beings who inhabit it, and survey, in thought, the actions of the several classes into which they are divided. Their obvious actions are apparently118 uniform: the stability of human society seems to be maintained sufficiently119 by the uniformity of the conduct of its members, both with regard to themselves, and with regard to others. The labourer arises at a certain hour, and applies himself to the task enjoined120 him. The functionaries121 of government and law are regularly employed in their offices and courts. The trader holds a train of conduct from which he never deviates122. The ministers of religion employ an accustomed language, and maintain a decent and equable regard. The army is drawn123 forth, the motions of every soldier are such as they were expected to be; the general commands, and his words are echoed from troop to troop. The domestic actions of men are, for the most part, undistinguishable one from the other, at a superficial glance. The actions which are classed under the general appellation124 of marriage, education, friendship, &c., are perpetually going on, and to a superficial glance, are similar one to the other.
But, if we would see the truth of things, they must be stripped of this fallacious appearance of uniformity. In truth, no one action has, when considered in its whole extent, any essential resemblance with any other. Each individual, who composes the vast multitude which we have been contemplating125, has a peculiar frame of mind, which, whilst the features of the great mass of his actions remain uniform, impresses the minuter lineaments with its peculiar hues126. Thus, whilst his life, as a whole, is like the lives of other men, in detail, it is most unlike; and the more subdivided127 the actions become; that is, the more they enter into that class which have a vital influence on the happiness of others and his own, so much the more are they distinct from those of other men.
Those little, nameless, unremembered acts
Of kindness and of love,
as well as those deadly outrages128 which are inflicted129 by a look, a word — or less — the very refraining from some faint and most evanescent expression of countenance130; these flow from a profounder source than the series of our habitual131 conduct, which, it has been already said, derives132 its origin from without. These are the actions, and such as these, which make human life what it is, and are the fountains of all the good and evil with which its entire surface is so widely and impartially133 overspread; and though they are called minute, they are called so in compliance134 with the blindness of those who cannot estimate their importance. It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their peculiarities135, and in cultivating the habit of acquiring decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising out of them in particular cases, that the most important part of moral science consists. The deepest abyss of these vast and multitudinous caverns136, it is necessary that we should visit.
This is the difference between social and individual man. Not that this distinction is to be considered definite, or characteristic of one human being as compared with another; it denotes rather two classes of agency, common in a degree to every human being. None is exempt100, indeed, from that species of influence which affects, as it were, the surface of his being, and gives the specific outline to his conduct. Almost all that is ostensible137 submits to that legislature created by the general representation of the past feelings of mankind — imperfect as it is from a variety of causes, as it exists in the government, the religion, and domestic habits. Those who do not nominally138, yet actually, submit to the same power. The external features of their conduct, indeed, can no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream of the wind; and his opinion, which he often hopes he has dispassionately secured from all contagion139 of prejudice and vulgarity, would be found, on examination, to be the inevitable140 excrescence of the very usages from which he vehemently141 dissents142. Internally all is conducted otherwise; the efficiency, the essence, the vitality143 of actions, derives its colour from what is no ways contributed to from any external source. Like the plant which while it derives the accident of its size and shape from the soil in which it springs, and is cankered, or distorted, or inflated144, yet retains those qualities which essentially145 divide it from all others; so that hemlock146 continues to be poison, and the violet does not cease to emit its odour in whatever soil it may grow.
We consider our own nature too superficially. We look on all that in ourselves with which we can discover a resemblance in others; and consider those resemblances as the materials of moral knowledge. It is in the differences that it actually consists.
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treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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ascertaining
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的现在分词 ) | |
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bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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sentient
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| adj.有知觉的，知悉的；adv.有感觉能力地 | |
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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sect
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| n.派别，宗教，学派，派系 | |
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susceptible
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| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
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intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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diffusing
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的现在分词 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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arrogate
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| v.冒称具有...权利，霸占 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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curb
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| n.场外证券市场，场外交易；vt.制止，抑制 | |
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propensities
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| n.倾向，习性( propensity的名词复数 ) | |
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procuring
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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sophism
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| n.诡辩 | |
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metaphorical
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| a.隐喻的，比喻的 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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superstition
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| n.迷信，迷信行为 | |
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bind
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| vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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instinctively
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| adv.本能地 | |
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extinction
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| n.熄灭，消亡，消灭，灭绝，绝种 | |
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assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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awaken
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| vi.醒，觉醒；vt.唤醒，使觉醒，唤起，激起 | |
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beholder
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| n.观看者，旁观者 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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enjoyments
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| 愉快( enjoyment的名词复数 )； 令人愉快的事物； 享有； 享受 | |
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50
specimens
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| n.样品( specimen的名词复数 )；范例；（化验的）抽样；某种类型的人 | |
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abhorring
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| v.憎恶( abhor的现在分词 )；（厌恶地）回避；拒绝；淘汰 | |
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52
conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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53
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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54
faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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55
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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56
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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57
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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58
circumference
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| n.圆周，周长，圆周线 | |
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59
criteria
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| n.标准 | |
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60
infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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61
solitude
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| n. 孤独; 独居,荒僻之地,幽静的地方 | |
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toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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63
torpid
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| adj.麻痹的，麻木的，迟钝的 | |
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64
disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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65
ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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66
refinement
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| n.文雅；高尚；精美；精制；精炼 | |
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67
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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68
disinterestedness
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69
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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70
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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71
torments
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| （肉体或精神上的）折磨，痛苦( torment的名词复数 )； 造成痛苦的事物[人] | |
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72
conspirators
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| n.共谋者，阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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73
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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posthumous
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| adj.遗腹的；父亡后出生的；死后的，身后的 | |
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infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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76
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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sentimental
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| adj.多愁善感的，感伤的 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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82
inflicting
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的现在分词 ) | |
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eventual
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| adj.最后的，结局的，最终的 | |
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84
applicants
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| 申请人，求职人( applicant的名词复数 ) | |
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85
conspire
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| v.密谋，（事件等）巧合，共同导致 | |
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encumber
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| v.阻碍行动，妨碍，堆满 | |
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controverting
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| v.争论，反驳，否定( controvert的现在分词 ) | |
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88
trite
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| adj.陈腐的 | |
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fanaticism
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| n.狂热，盲信 | |
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90
prolific
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| adj.丰富的，大量的；多产的，富有创造力的 | |
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absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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93
radii
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| n.半径；半径（距离）( radius的名词复数 )；用半径度量的圆形面积；半径范围；桡骨 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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96
unreasonable
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| adj.不讲道理的，不合情理的，过度的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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99
exemption
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| n.豁免，免税额，免除 | |
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exempt
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| adj.免除的；v.使免除；n.免税者，被免除义务者 | |
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101
diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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102
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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103
tormented
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| 饱受折磨的 | |
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104
epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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105
imprison
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| vt.监禁，关押，限制，束缚 | |
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106
affixing
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| v.附加( affix的现在分词 )；粘贴；加以；盖（印章） | |
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107
immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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108
affixed
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| adj.[医]附着的，附着的v.附加( affix的过去式和过去分词 )；粘贴；加以；盖（印章） | |
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109
usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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110
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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111
enduing
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| v.授予，赋予（特性、才能等）( endue的现在分词 ) | |
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112
protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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113
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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114
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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115
modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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116
proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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117
metropolis
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| n.首府；大城市 | |
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118
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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119
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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120
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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121
functionaries
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| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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122
deviates
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| v.偏离，越轨( deviate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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123
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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124
appellation
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| n.名称，称呼 | |
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125
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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126
hues
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| 色彩( hue的名词复数 )； 色调； 信仰； 观点 | |
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127
subdivided
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| 再分，细分( subdivide的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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128
outrages
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| 引起…的义愤，激怒( outrage的第三人称单数 ) | |
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129
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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130
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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131
habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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132
derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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133
impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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134
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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135
peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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136
caverns
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| 大山洞，大洞穴( cavern的名词复数 ) | |
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137
ostensible
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| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
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138
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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139
contagion
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| n.(通过接触的疾病)传染；蔓延 | |
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140
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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141
vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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142
dissents
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| 意见的分歧( dissent的名词复数 ) | |
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143
vitality
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| n.活力，生命力，效力 | |
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144
inflated
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| adj.（价格）飞涨的；（通货）膨胀的；言过其实的；充了气的v.使充气（于轮胎、气球等）( inflate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）膨胀；（使）通货膨胀；物价上涨 | |
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145
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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146
hemlock
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| n.毒胡萝卜，铁杉 | |
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