Reprinted from The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology1 and Scientific Methods, vol. II, No. 9, April 27, 1905.
IF all the criticisms which the humanistic Weltanschauung is receiving were as sachgemass as Mr. Bode2's,95 the truth of the matter would more rapidly clear up. Not only is it excellently well written, but it brings its own point of view out clearly, and admits of a perfectly3 straight reply.
The argument (unless I fail to catch it) can be expressed as follows:
If a series of experiences be supposed, no one of which is endowed immediately with the selftranscendent function of reference to a reality beyond itself, no motive5 will occur within the series for supposing anything beyond it to exist. It will remain subjective6, and contentedly7 subjective, both as a whole and in its several parts.
Radical8 empiricism, trying, as it does, to account for objective knowledge by means of such a series, egregiously9 fails. It can not explain how the notion of a physical order, as distinguished10 from a subjectively11 biographical order, of experiences, ever arose.
It pretends to explain the notion of a physical order, but does so by playing fast and loose with the concept of objective reference. On the one hand, it denies that such reference implies self-transcendency on the part of any one experience; on the other hand, it claims that experiences point. But, critically considered, there can be no pointing unless self-transcendency be also allowed. The conjunctive function of pointing, as I have assumed it, is, according to my critic, vitiated by the fallacy of attaching a bilateral12 relation to a term ad quo, as if it could stick out substantively13 and, maintain itself in existence in advance of the term ad quem which is equally required for it to be a concretely experienced fact. If the relation be made concrete, the term ad quem is involved, which would mean (if I succeed in apprehending14 Mr. Bode rightly) that this latter term, although not empirically there, is yet noetically there, in advance-in other words it would mean that any experience that ‘ points’ must already have transcended15 itself, in the ordinary ‘epistemological’ sense of the word transcend4.
Something like this, if I understand Mr. Bode’s text, is the upshot of his state of mind. It is a reasonable sounding state of mind, but it is exactly the state of mind which radical empiricism, by its doctrine17 of the reality of conjunctive relations, seeks to dispel18. I very much fear — so difficult does mutual19 understanding seem in these exalted20 regions — that my able critic has failed to understand that doctrine as it is meant to be understood. I suspect that he performs on all these conjunctive relations (of which the aforesaid ‘pointing’ is only one) the usual rationalistic act of substitution — he takes them not as they are given in their first intention, as parts constitutive of experience’s living flow, but only as they appear in retrospect21, each fixed22 as a determinate object of conception, static, therefore, and contained within itself.
Against this rationalistic tendency to treat experience as chopped up into discontinuous static objects, radical empiricism protests. It insists on taking conjunctions at their ‘face-value,’ just as they come. Consider, for example, such conjunctions as ‘and,’ ‘with,’ ‘ near,’ ‘ plus,’ ’ towards.’ While we live in such conjunctions our state is one of transition in the most literal sense. We are expectant of a 0; more’ to come, and before the more has come, the transition, nevertheless, is directed towards it. I fail otherwise to see how, if one kind of more comes, there should be satisfaction and feeling of fulfilment; but disappointment if the more comes in another shape. One more will continue, another more will arrest or deflect23 the direction, in which our experience is moving even now. We can not, it is true, name our different living ‘ands’ or ‘withs’ except by naming the different terms towards which they are moving us, but we live their specifications24 and differences before those terms explicitly25 arrive. Thus, though the various ‘ands” are all bilateral relations, each requiring a term ad quem to define it when viewed in retrospect and articulately conceived, yet in its living moment any one of them may be treated as if it ‘stuck out’ from its term a quo and pointed26 in a special direction, much as a compass-needle (to use Mr. Bode’s excellent simile) points at the pole, even though it stirs not from its box.
In Professor Hoffding’s massive little article in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods,96 he quotes a saying of Kierkegaard’s to the effect that we live forwards, but we understand backwards27. Understanding backwards is, it must be confessed, a very frequent weakness of philosophers, both of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type. Radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life. A logic16 similar to that which my critic seems to employ here should, it seems to me, forbid him to say that our present is, while present, directed towards our future, or that any physical movement can have direction until its goal is actually reached.
At this point does it not seem as if the quarrel about self-transcendency in knowledge might drop? Is it not a purely28 verbal dispute? Call it self-transcendency or call it pointing, whichever you like — it makes no difference so long as real transitions towards real goals are admitted as things given in experience, and among experience’s most indefeasible parts. Radical empiricism, unable to close its eyes to the transitions caught in actu, accounts for the self-transcendency or the pointing (whichever you may call it) as a process that occurs within experience, as an empirically mediated29 thing of which a perfectly definite description can be given. ‘Epistemology,’ on the other hand, denies this; and pretends that the self-transcendency is unmediated or, if mediated, then mediated in a super-empirical world. To justify30 this pretension31, epistemology has first to transform all our conjunctions into static objects, and this, I submit, is an absolutely arbitrary act. But in spite of Mr. Bode’s maltreatment of conjunctions, as I understand them — and as I understand him — I believe that at bottom we are fighting for nothing different, but are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words.
There are other criticisms in the article in question, but, as this seems the most vital one, I will for the present, at any rate, leave them untouched.
1 psychology | |
n.心理,心理学,心理状态 | |
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2 bode | |
v.预示 | |
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3 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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4 transcend | |
vt.超出,超越(理性等)的范围 | |
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5 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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6 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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7 contentedly | |
adv.心满意足地 | |
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8 radical | |
n.激进份子,原子团,根号;adj.根本的,激进的,彻底的 | |
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9 egregiously | |
adv.过份地,卓越地 | |
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10 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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11 subjectively | |
主观地; 臆 | |
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12 bilateral | |
adj.双方的,两边的,两侧的 | |
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13 substantively | |
adv.真实地;实质上 | |
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14 apprehending | |
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的现在分词 ); 理解 | |
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15 transcended | |
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的过去式和过去分词 ); 优于或胜过… | |
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16 logic | |
n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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17 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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18 dispel | |
vt.驱走,驱散,消除 | |
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19 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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20 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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21 retrospect | |
n.回顾,追溯;v.回顾,回想,追溯 | |
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22 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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23 deflect | |
v.(使)偏斜,(使)偏离,(使)转向 | |
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24 specifications | |
n.规格;载明;详述;(产品等的)说明书;说明书( specification的名词复数 );详细的计划书;载明;详述 | |
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25 explicitly | |
ad.明确地,显然地 | |
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26 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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27 backwards | |
adv.往回地,向原处,倒,相反,前后倒置地 | |
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28 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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29 mediated | |
调停,调解,斡旋( mediate的过去式和过去分词 ); 居间促成; 影响…的发生; 使…可能发生 | |
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30 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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31 pretension | |
n.要求;自命,自称;自负 | |
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