of the solicitude1 of the state for the negative welfare of the citizen—for his security.
To counteract2 the evil which arises from the tendency man has to transgress3 his own appropriate limits,1 and the discord4 occasioned by such unjust encroachment5 on the rights of others, constitutes the essential ground and object of State-union. If it were the same with these subversive6 manifestations7 to which we allude8, as with the physical violence of nature, or with the working of that moral evil which disturbs the natural order of things through excessive enjoyment9 or privation, or through other actions inconsistent with that order—then would such unions no longer be necessary. The former, or physical, evil would be encountered by the unaided efforts of human courage, skill, and forethought: the latter, or moral, by the wisdom which is matured in experience; and with either, in any case, the removal of an evil would be the termination of a struggle. Under such a supposition, therefore, any ultimate, absolute authority, such as properly constitutes the idea of the State, would be wholly unneeded. But, as it is, human variance10 and discord are utterly11 different in their nature from these, and positively12 necessitate13 at all times the existence of some supreme14 power like that to which we refer. For in this discordancy15 one conflict springs immediately from another. Wrong begets16 revenge; and revenge is but a new wrong. And hence it becomes necessary to look for some species of revenge which does not admit of any other retaliation—that is the punishment inflicted17 by the State, or for a settlement of the controversy18 which obliges the the parties to rest satisfied, viz. the decision of the judge. There is nothing, moreover, which necessitates19 such stringent20 coercion21 and such unconditional22 obedience23 as man’s spirit of enterprise against his fellow-men, whether we regard the expulsion of foreign enemies, or the preservation24 of security within the State itself. Now, without security, it is impossible for man either to develope his powers, or to enjoy the fruits of his exertion25; for, without security, there can be no freedom. But it will be seen at once that this is a condition which man is wholly unable to realize by his own individual efforts; the reasons we have just hinted at serve to show this, and we are confirmed in the conviction by experience; for although we observe that our States are in a far more favourable26 position than we can conceive that of man in a state of nature to be (closely knit together, as they are, by innumerable treaties and bonds of alliance, and by mutual27 fear, which so constantly prevents the actual outbreaks of violence)—we must allow, notwithstanding, that they do not possess that freedom which under the most ordinary constitution the very meanest subject enjoys. Whilst, therefore, I have hitherto found reasons for withdrawing the exercise of State solicitude from many important objects, because the nation can accomplish them as effectually and without incurring28 the evils which flow from State interference, I must for similar reasons direct it to Security as to the only thing2 which the individual cannot obtain for himself and by his own unaided efforts. I would therefore lay down as the first positive principle—a principle to be more carefully defined and limited in the subsequent course of inquiry—that the maintenance of security, as well with regard to the attacks of foreign enemies as to the danger of internal discord, constitutes the true end of the State, and must especially occupy its activity.
Hitherto I have attempted only to define this true end of the State in a negative way, by showing that the latter should not, at least, extend the sphere of its solicitude any further.
If we refer to the pages of history we only find additional confirmation29 of the position we would establish, in the fact that the kings in all earlier nations were in reality nothing more than leaders in war, and judges in times of peace. I says, kings. For (if I may be pardoned this digression), in those very periods in which men most fondly cherish the feeling of freedom—possessing, as they do, but little property, and only knowing and prizing personal force, and placing the highest enjoyment in its exercise—in those very periods, however strange it may seem, history shows us nothing but kings and monarchies30. We observe this in all the Asiatic political unions, in those of the earliest ages of Greece, of Italy, and of those tribes who loved freedom more devotedly31 than all—the German.3 If we examine into the reasons for this seeming contradiction, we are struck with the truth, that the very choice of a monarchy32 is a proof that those who select that form of government are in the enjoyment of the highest freedom. The idea of a chief ruler arises only, as was before observed, from the deep-felt necessity for some military leader and umpire of disputes. Now to have one general or umpire is unquestionably the happiest provision for such a necessity. The apprehension33 that the one person so selected may ultimately become a master is unknown to the man who is truly free; he does not even dream of such a possibility; to no one does he attribute the power of subjugating34 his liberty, and to no one that is himself free the wish to lord it over others—for he who is utterly insensible to the sublime35 beauty of liberty and thirsts only for dominion36, is in reality in love with slavery, so long as he does not contemplate37 the likelihood of being himself a slave; and thus it is, that as the science of morals originated in crime, and theology in heresy38, so politics sprang into existence with servitude.
And yet, although we find their prototypes in antiquity39, it is certain that our monarchs40 have not the honeyed and persuasive41 speech which characterized the kings of Homer and Hesiod.4
1 solicitude | |
n.焦虑 | |
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2 counteract | |
vt.对…起反作用,对抗,抵消 | |
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3 transgress | |
vt.违反,逾越 | |
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4 discord | |
n.不和,意见不合,争论,(音乐)不和谐 | |
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5 encroachment | |
n.侵入,蚕食 | |
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6 subversive | |
adj.颠覆性的,破坏性的;n.破坏份子,危险份子 | |
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7 manifestations | |
n.表示,显示(manifestation的复数形式) | |
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8 allude | |
v.提及,暗指 | |
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9 enjoyment | |
n.乐趣;享有;享用 | |
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10 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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11 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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12 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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13 necessitate | |
v.使成为必要,需要 | |
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14 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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15 discordancy | |
n.不一致,不和 | |
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16 begets | |
v.为…之生父( beget的第三人称单数 );产生,引起 | |
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17 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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18 controversy | |
n.争论,辩论,争吵 | |
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19 necessitates | |
使…成为必要,需要( necessitate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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20 stringent | |
adj.严厉的;令人信服的;银根紧的 | |
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21 coercion | |
n.强制,高压统治 | |
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22 unconditional | |
adj.无条件的,无限制的,绝对的 | |
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23 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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24 preservation | |
n.保护,维护,保存,保留,保持 | |
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25 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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26 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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27 mutual | |
adj.相互的,彼此的;共同的,共有的 | |
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28 incurring | |
遭受,招致,引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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29 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
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30 monarchies | |
n. 君主政体, 君主国, 君主政治 | |
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31 devotedly | |
专心地; 恩爱地; 忠实地; 一心一意地 | |
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32 monarchy | |
n.君主,最高统治者;君主政体,君主国 | |
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33 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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34 subjugating | |
v.征服,降伏( subjugate的现在分词 ) | |
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35 sublime | |
adj.崇高的,伟大的;极度的,不顾后果的 | |
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36 dominion | |
n.统治,管辖,支配权;领土,版图 | |
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37 contemplate | |
vt.盘算,计议;周密考虑;注视,凝视 | |
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38 heresy | |
n.异端邪说;异教 | |
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39 antiquity | |
n.古老;高龄;古物,古迹 | |
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40 monarchs | |
君主,帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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41 persuasive | |
adj.有说服力的,能说得使人相信的 | |
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