on the solicitude1 of the state for security with respect to such of the citizens’ actions as relate directly to others. (civil laws.)
The subject to which we have now to direct our attention, or the consideration of actions which relate immediately to others, although it is in general more complicated than the last, does not imply so much difficulty as regards the present inquiry3. For where rights are infringed4 on by such actions, it is clearly the duty of the State to restrict them, and compel the agents to repair the injury they have inflicted5. But according to the position we endeavoured to enforce in a preceding chapter, these actions do no violence to right except when they deprive another of a part of his freedom or possessions without, or against, his will. When any one has suffered wrong, he has a right to redress6; but when once, as a member of a community, he has transferred his private revenge to the State, to nothing more. He, therefore, who has committed the wrong is bound to restore to him who has sustained it, all of which he has been deprived; or, should this be impossible, to make sufficient amends8, standing9 security for this to the full extent of his means and of all that his powers may enable him to acquire. To deprive a man of his personal liberty,—as is practised, for instance, in the case of insolvent10 debtors11,—can only be admitted as a subordinate means, where otherwise the creditor12 should run the risk of losing the debtor’s future earnings13. Now while the State is not to refuse any just means of redress to the person injured, it must take care that a spirit of revenge does not turn this fair demand into a pretext14 for injustice15. This seems the more necessary when we reflect, first, that in a state of nature the person originally committing the wrong would resist him who sought satisfaction, should he trespass16 the confines of right in his eagerness for revenge; whereas here, the irresistible17 authority of the State comes in to check further retaliation18; and secondly19, that general definitions (which are always necessary when a third is to decide) invariably tend to encourage the pretext before-mentioned. The imprisonment20 of debtors therefore might seem to require still further exceptions, as the greater number of laws relating to them allow.
Actions which are undertaken by mutual21 agreement are exactly similar to those which a man performs of himself, without immediate2 reference to others, and I have only to repeat of them what I have already observed of the latter. There is one class of such actions, however, which requires wholly special regulations; I mean those which are not concluded at once, but extend in their operation to the future. Under this head come promises or engagements which impose perfect duties on the parties to the engagement, whether it be mutual or not. By these, portions of property are made over from one person to another; and if the party transferring it retracts22 from his engagement by trying to recover what has been transferred, security is disturbed. It is therefore one of the most important duties pertaining23 to the State to see that such engagements are binding24. But the restraint which every engagement imposes is then only just and salutary, when, firstly, the implied limitation extends to him alone who enters into it; and secondly, when he has in general, and at the time of the engagement, acted with a proper capacity of reflection, and exercised a free power of decision. Wherever such is not the case, coercion25 is as unjust in principle as it is pernicious in its effects. On the one hand, also, the deliberation as regards the future can never be perfectly26 just and complete; and on the other, there are many obligations contracted, of a nature to impose such fetters27 on liberty, as prove serious hindrances28 to the man’s complete development. Hence there devolves a second duty on the State—to refuse the support of the law to such engagements as are contrary to right, and to take all necessary precautions (consistent with the security of property) to prevent a moment’s want of reflection from entailing29 such restrictions30 on a man as to retard32 or prevent his own perfect development. It comes within the province of juridical theories, to detail all that is necessary for the validity of contracts or engagements. It only remains34 for me to observe, with regard to their objects, that a State, to which (according to our former principles) nothing beyond the solicitude for security is allowed, may not regard any other objects as exceptional save those which are already shown to be such by general considerations of right, or by the solicitude for security. Of this class we may notice the following cases, as being the most remarkable:—1. When the party promising35 cannot transfer any right of coercion without making himself a tool for the designs of others—as, for example, in every contract which ends in the slavery of the person contracting; 2. Where the party promising has no power to grant what is promised, according to its very nature—as is the case, for instance, in all matters of feeling or belief; 3. When the promise in itself, or in its implied consequences, is either incompatible36 with, or dangerous to, the rights of others, in which case the principles established in our last chapter are here also strictly37 applicable. Now the difference between these cases is this, that in the first and second the State must only refuse the right of coercion provided by its laws, without preventing the formation or execution of such engagements, in so far as this execution is mutual; while, in the last instance we have mentioned, it not only can, but must, forbid the very act of engagement itself.
Still, even where there is nothing to be objected to the validity of a contract, the State should have the power of lessening38 the restrictions which men impose on one another, even with their own consent, and (by facilitating the release from such engagements) of preventing a moment’s decision from hindering their freedom of action for too long a period of life. When, however, a mere39 transfer of things is implied in the contract, without any other personal relation, I do not consider such a course to be advisable. For, firstly, these are seldom of such a kind as to lead to a lasting40 relation between the contracting parties; secondly, limitations directed to such engagements tend to disturb, far more hurtfully, the security of negotiations42; and lastly, for many reasons, but chiefly with respect to the exercise of judgement and strength of character, it is well that the word once given should be irrevocably binding; so that such an obligation should never be removed except where this is really necessary, and that such a necessity does not occur in the case of a transfer of things, is evident from the consideration that however they may hinder certain manifestations43 of human activity, they seldom tend to weaken the force of energy itself. But with contracts which render personal performance a duty, or still more with those which produce proper personal relations, the case is wholly different. With these, coercion operates hurtfully on man’s noblest powers; and since the success of the pursuit itself which is to be conducted in accordance with the contract, is more or less dependent on the continuing consent of the parties, a limitation of such a kind is in them productive of less serious injury. When therefore such a personal relation arises from the contract as not only to require certain single actions, but, in the strictest sense, to affect the person, and influence the whole manner of his existence; where that which is done or left undone44 is in the closest dependence45 on internal sensations; the option of separation should always remain open, and the step itself should not require any extenuating46 reasons. Thus it is with matrimony.
Where the relation is indeed less intimate, while the personal liberty is still narrowly restricted, I am of opinion that the State should fix a time (the length of which must be determined47 by the importance of the restriction31 on the one hand, and on the other by the nature of the pursuit) during which none of the parties should be allowed to detach themselves without mutual consent; but that after its expiration48, the contract, unless renewed, should not remain binding, even though the parties, in concluding the engagement, had abandoned the advantage to which such a law would entitle them. For although such a provision might seem to be nothing more than a boon49 of the law, and not to be enforced more than any other similar privilege, the course we suggest does not debar any one from entering into a lifelong contract, but guards against the possibility of constrained50 performance of an engagement, when such constraint51 would be injurious to the individual’s highest aims. And indeed it is the less a mere boon in this, that the cases I have quoted, and especially matrimony (as soon as freewill no longer accompanies that relation), differ only in degree from that in which one party surrenders himself as a mere tool into the hands of others, or rather is made a tool by the other to further his designs; and the competence52 to determine generally in these the boundary between just and unjust constraint, cannot be refused to the State, that is, to the common will of society; since it would only be possible in special cases to decide accurately53 and truthfully where the limitation arising from a contract was such as actually to render him who has changed his wishes, a mere tool of the other. Lastly, it cannot be called imposing54 a boon, when we do away with the power of resigning it by anticipation55.
The fundamental principles of right themselves establish it, and it has been already expressly laid down, that no one can make a valid33 contract, or, in general, enter into any engagement with regard to anything save that which is really his property, that is, his actions or his possessions. It is evident moreover that the chief solicitude of the State for the security of its citizens (in so far as this is affected56 by the operation of contracts or engagements), consists in watching and maintaining the observance of this principle. Still there are certain entire departments of transaction to which this fundamental rule has not been applied57. Such, for example, are all dispositions58 of property to be observed after the death of the disposer, whether they be made directly or indirectly60, incidentally in another contract or in a special contract or testament61, or in any disposition59 of whatever nature. Right of any kind can only relate immediately to the person: its relation to things is only conceivable in so far as these are connected with the person by actions. With the decease of the person, therefore, this right is also at an end. Hence, as long as he lives, man is free to dispose of his things as he pleases, to alienate62 them in part or altogether—their substance, use, or possession; and further, to limit his actions and the employment of his means by anticipation, according as he thinks good. But he is in no respect entitled to define, in any way binding on others, what shall be done with his property after his decease, or to determine how its future possessor is to act or not. I will not here stay to examine the objections which may be urged against these positions. The reasons on both sides have been already sufficiently63 exhausted64 in the well-known question of the validity of testaments65 according to natural right; and the point of right is, on the whole, of less importance in this case, as the competence of the whole society to attach that validity to testamentary dispositions which they would otherwise want, is clearly unquestionable. But as regards the practical extension afforded to testaments according to the system of our common law, (which, in this particular at least, unites the subtlety66 of the Roman jurisconsults with the love of power so eminently67 characteristic of the feudal68 system)—as regards this extension, they operate at once to restrict that freedom which is essential to human development, and so run counter to every principle we have unfolded. For they furnish the principal means through which one generation succeeds in prescribing laws to another—through which abuses and prejudices, not likely otherwise to survive the causes which rendered their growth inevitable69, or their existence indispensable, continue strong and living by inheritance, from century to century; lastly, through which it comes, that instead of man giving their proper form and character to things, these latter, on the contrary, bring man under their subjection. Further, they divert man’s views, beyond all else, from true power and its development, and direct them exclusively to external fortune and possessions; since these are clearly the only means of securing obedience70 to their wishes after death. Finally, the arbitrary power of disposing property by testament is often, nay71 generally, made subservient72 to man’s less worthy73 passions of pride, vanity, desire for dominion74, etc., of which we are the more assured when we observe that it is not the best or wisest of men who avail themselves of this power: while the wise are not solicitous75 to arrange anything for a length of time, the individual circumstances of which they are too shortsighted to foresee, the good, so far from eagerly seeking for such opportunities, are too glad not to find an occasion which compels them to impose limits on the will of others. Too often, even, the considerations of secresy and of security against the censure76 of the world may induce men to make dispositions which otherwise very shame had suppressed. These reasons may serve to show the necessity of guarding against the dangers which may follow to the citizens from the practice of testamentary dispositions.
But what is to supply the place of such dispositions of property if (as principle strictly demands) the State were wholly to abolish the right of making them? As the necessary preservation77 of order and tranquillity78 precludes79 the possibility of any one taking possession, there clearly remains nothing but an hereditary80 succession ab intestato to be decided81 by the State. But to transfer to the political power such a mighty82 positive influence as it would acquire by the right of settling this hereditary succession, and by utterly83 abolishing the personal will of the ancestor, is forbidden by the principles we have already agreed upon. The close connection which subsists84 between laws on succession ab intestato with the political constitution of States has been frequently observed; and this source of influence might be employed to further other designs. On the whole, the manifold and ever-varying plans and wishes of individual men are to be preferred to the uniform and unchangeable will of the State. And we should remember, further, that whatever evils may flow from the practice of testamentary dispositions, it seems hard to deprive man of the innocent joy which attends the thought of continuing to do good with his means even after death; and although this feeling, it is true, begets85 an excessive solicitude for property, when too much encouraged, the utter absence of it might lead perhaps to the opposite evil. The liberty too, which men enjoy, of leaving their means behind them according to their own free disposal, creates a new bond of union among them, which, though often the source of abuse, may yet be attended with the happiest results. And indeed the whole tenour of the ideas and arguments unfolded in this essay might fairly be reduced to this, that while they would break all social fetters asunder86, they discover a thousand new and closer ties to reunite the web of human union, with the force of far deeper and more lasting sympathies. He who is isolated87 is no more able to develope himself than he who is bound by enthralling88 fetters. Lastly, it differs little whether a man really gives away what belongs to him at the very hour of death, or bequeaths it by will; and to the former he has an undoubted and inalienable right.
The contradiction seemingly involved in the reasons here advanced on both sides of the question, is reconciled when we remember that the dispositions of a testament admit of two kinds of settlement:—1. Who shall be the next heir to the property bequeathed? 2. How is he to manage it; to whom it is to be willed in turn, and, in general, what is to be done with it for the future?—and when we perceive that all the disadvantages above enumerated89 apply exclusively to the latter determination, while all the contrasting advantages flow only from the former. For if the laws have only provided, by determining the portion due to his family1 (as indeed they must so determine), that no testator can be guilty of real wrong or injustice, it seems as if the mere kindly90 wish to gratify, even after death, would leave no especial danger to be apprehended91. The principles, moreover, by which men are guided in such actions will evidently be much the same at any given time, and nearly universal in their application; and the frequency or rarity of testaments will, in any period, serve to show the legislator whether the order of succession ab intestato which he has introduced, be still appropriate or not. It might perhaps, then, be advisable to make a corresponding division of the State measures which relate to testaments, according to the twofold character of the objects we have noticed as embraced by them; that is, to allow every man, on the one hand, to determine who shall inherit his fortune after his death, subject only to the limitation as regards the portion due to his family, but to forbid him, on the other, to enjoin92 in any way whatever how it shall be managed or employed. Now it is certain that the first of these privileges, which we suppose to be allowed by the State, might be seriously abused, and made the very means of doing that which it would prohibit. But it should be the object of the legislator to endeavour to obviate93 this abuse by special and precise regulations. This is not the place to enter into a full exposition of this subject, but I may propose the following as convenient examples of such regulations: that the heir, in order that he be really the heir, be marked out by no express condition to be fulfilled after the death of the testator; that the testator nominate only the next heir to his possessions and never a subsequent one, since by this process the liberty of the first would be restricted; that the testator have the power of appointing several heirs, but must do this in a direct way; that he be allowed to divide a thing according to its extent, but never with respect to the rights connected with it—as, for instance, substance and usufruct, etc. From these flow manifold inconveniences and limitations of freedom, as also from the idea connected with them, that the heir is the representative of the testator,—an idea which (like so many others which have since become so extremely important) is founded, I believe, on a formality of the Romans, and therefore on the necessarily imperfect arrangement of the juridical constitution of a people who were only in process of formation. But we shall be able to rid ourselves of all these falser notions if we keep the position distinctly in view, that nothing further is to be granted to the testator than, at the most, to appoint his heir; and that the State, while it should assist the latter to secure possession when his appointment is valid, must not lend its aid to the enforcement of any disposition on the part of the testator extending beyond this.
In case no heir has been appointed by the dying person, the State must arrange an order of succession ab intestato. But it does not come within my present design to develope the principles on which such an arrangement should proceed, nor of those which relate to the portion always due to the testator’s family: I will content myself with observing, that the State should not have scope afforded it for the furtherance of its own positive aims in these, as in the other regulations we have considered—as in maintaining the splendour and prosperity of families, or the opposite extreme, of dissipating large fortunes by increasing the number of inheritors; but that it must always act in accordance with ideas of right, which are restricted in this case to the limits of the former co-proprietorship in the testator’s lifetime, and must thus give the first claim to the family, the next to the municipality2 , etc.
Very closely connected with the subject of inheritance is the question as to how far contracts between living persons may be transmitted to their heirs. We shall find the answer to this question in the principle we have already established: this is, that a man during lifetime may restrict his actions and alienate his property just as he pleases, but is not allowed to limit the actions of his heir after his own death, or, under such circumstances to make any other disposition except such as would secure a valid succession to his property. Hence all those obligations must pass over to the heir and must be fulfilled towards him, which really include the transfer of a portion of the property, and which therefore have either lessened94 or augmented95 the means of the testator; but, on the other hand, none of those obligations remain which have either simply consisted in actions of the testator, or related solely96 to his person. But, even after having made these limitations, there still remains too great danger of entangling97 the descendants in relations which are binding, by means of contracts concluded in the lifetime of the testator. For rights can be alienated98 as well as separate lots of property, and such alienations must necessarily be binding on the heirs, who cannot come into any other position than that which has been held by the testator; and thus the several possession of divided rights in one and the same thing, invariably leads to oppressive personal relations. It might therefore be advisable, if not necessary, for the State to prohibit the extension of such contracts beyond the lifetime of the persons concluding them, or, at least, to facilitate the means for effecting a real division of property, where such a relation has once arisen. To enter into fuller details to be observed in such an arrangement, does not come within my present design; and this is the less necessary when I consider that it should not be based so much on general principles, as determined by single laws, having distinct reference to single contracts.
The less a man is induced to act otherwise than his wish suggests or his powers permit, the more favourable99 does his position as a member of a civil community become. If, in view of this truth (around which all the ideas advanced in this essay properly revolve), we cast a glance at the field of civil jurisprudence, there seems to me, among other important objects, one that especially claims attention; I mean those societies which we are accustomed to denote as aggregate100 corporations. As they are always characterized by a unity7, independent of the number of members who compose them,—a unity which, with unimportant modifications101, maintains itself through a long series of years,—they produce in the end all those hurtful consequences which have been observed to flow from the practice of testamentary dispositions. For although, with us, much of their hurtfulness proceeds from an arrangement not necessarily connected with their nature,—namely, the exclusive privileges now expressly accorded them by the State, and now tacitly sanctioned by custom, and from which they often become real political bodies,—still they are essentially102 calculated of themselves to introduce many inconveniences. But these only arise when the nature of their constitution either forces on all the members certain applications of the common means, or, at least, by the necessity for unanimity103, allows the will of the majority to be fettered104 by that of the minority. Still, unions and associations, so far from producing injurious consequences of themselves, are one of the surest and most appropriate means for promoting and accelerating human development. All that we should expect therefore from the State would be an arrangement, that every corporation or association should be regarded simply as a union of the constituent105 members at any given time; and hence, that all obstacles be removed which would prevent them deciding in any given case, on the application of their common means according to the majority. It only remains to provide that those on whom the society really depends should be considered as members, and not those only who are connected with it as instruments and accessories,—a confusion which has often occurred, and especially in decisions on the rights of the clergy106; where the rights of the clergy have sometimes been mistaken for those of the Church.
From the reasons I have brought forward I would therefore deduce the following principles:—
Where man does not confine himself to the immediate province of his own powers and property, but performs actions relating directly to others, the solicitude for security imposes on the State the following duties:—
As regards those actions which are done without, or against, the will of another, it must prohibit any wrong to the latter in the enjoyment107 of his powers or the possession of his property; further, should he have actually sustained injury in these respects, it must compel him who has committed the wrong to give redress, while it prevents the sufferer from wreaking108 his private revenge on the other, upon this or any other pretext.
Those actions which are undertaken with the free consent of the second party must be confined within the same (and not narrower) restrictions, as those which have already been prescribed in the case of actions relating to the agent only.
If of those actions already specified109 there are some from which future rights and obligations arise between the parties (single or mutual engagements, contracts, etc.), the State must protect the right of enforcement where it depends on what has been agreed on with due capacity for deliberation, so long as it refers to objects within the disposal of the transferring party, and has been transferred with full power of decision; but this in no case where the latter conditions are wanting, or where a third person would be unjustly restricted without or against his will.
Even in the case of valid contracts, if such personal obligations, or, still more, such a continuing personal relation follows as is calculated to impose narrow restrictions on freedom, the State must facilitate a release from the contract, even against the will of one party, and always according to the degree of its hurtful limitations on internal development. Hence, in cases where the discharge of the duties arising from the relation is closely interwoven with the inner sensations, it must always grant the power of unconditional110 release; but wherever (the limitation still being somewhat narrow) this connection is not so intimate, it must allow the power of withdrawal111 after the lapse112 of a certain time, this time to be determined according to the importance of the limitation and the nature of the pursuit.
If any one is desirous of disposing of his fortune in the event of his death, it might be deemed advisable to allow him to appoint his immediate heir, but without any condition being appended to limit the inheritor’s power of disposing of the fortune according to his views and wishes.
It is necessary however to prohibit all further dispositions of this nature, to decide on some order of succession ab intestato, and to affix113 the portion due to the testator’s family.
Although contracts concluded by living persons pass over to their heirs, and must be fulfilled towards them, inasmuch as they modify what is left behind, the State should not only prevent the further extension of this principle, but it would be expedient114 to limit certain single contracts which give rise to intimate and restrictive relations between the parties (as, for instance, the division of rights in one thing among several persons) to the period of life only; or, at least, to facilitate their dissolution by the heirs of one or the other party. For although the same reasons do not apply as in the previous case of personal relations, yet the will of the heirs is less free, and the continuance of the relation indefinitely long.
Should I have succeeded in fully41 conveying my views by the recapitulation of these principles, they will serve to point out the true course to be pursued in all those cases which relate to the provisions for security designed by civil legislation. It is for this reason, for instance, that I have omitted all mention, in this recapitulation, of those incorporate bodies to which I referred; since, according to the origin of such societies in testament or contract, they are to be judged of by the principles established with respect to these. I cannot help feeling, however, that the very number and variety of the cases which come under the head of civil law, forbid my priding myself on any presumed success in this design.
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solicitude
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| n.焦虑 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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infringed
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| v.违反（规章等）( infringe的过去式和过去分词 )；侵犯（某人的权利）；侵害（某人的自由、权益等） | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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amends
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| n. 赔偿 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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insolvent
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| adj.破产的，无偿还能力的 | |
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debtors
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| n.债务人，借方( debtor的名词复数 ) | |
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creditor
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| n.债仅人，债主，贷方 | |
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earnings
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| n.工资收人；利润，利益，所得 | |
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pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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trespass
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| n./v.侵犯，闯入私人领地 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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retaliation
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| n.报复，反击 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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imprisonment
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| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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retracts
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| v.撤回或撤消( retract的第三人称单数 )；拒绝执行或遵守；缩回；拉回 | |
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pertaining
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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coercion
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| n.强制，高压统治 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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fetters
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| n.脚镣( fetter的名词复数 )；束缚v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的第三人称单数 ) | |
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hindrances
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| 阻碍者( hindrance的名词复数 )； 障碍物； 受到妨碍的状态 | |
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entailing
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| 使…成为必要( entail的现在分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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retard
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| n.阻止，延迟；vt.妨碍，延迟，使减速 | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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36
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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37
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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38
lessening
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| 减轻，减少，变小 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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41
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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42
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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43
manifestations
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| n.表示，显示（manifestation的复数形式） | |
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44
undone
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| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
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45
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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46
extenuating
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| adj.使减轻的，情有可原的v.（用偏袒的辩解或借口）减轻( extenuate的现在分词 )；低估，藐视 | |
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47
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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48
expiration
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| n.终结，期满，呼气，呼出物 | |
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49
boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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51
constraint
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| n.(on)约束，限制；限制(或约束)性的事物 | |
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52
competence
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| n.能力，胜任，称职 | |
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53
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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54
imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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56
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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57
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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58
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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60
indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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61
testament
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| n.遗嘱；证明 | |
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62
alienate
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| vt.使疏远，离间；转让(财产等) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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testaments
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| n.遗嘱( testament的名词复数 )；实际的证明 | |
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subtlety
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| n.微妙，敏锐，精巧；微妙之处，细微的区别 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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solicitous
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| adj.热切的，挂念的 | |
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76
censure
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| v./n.责备；非难；责难 | |
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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tranquillity
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| n. 平静, 安静 | |
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precludes
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| v.阻止( preclude的第三人称单数 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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83
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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begets
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| v.为…之生父( beget的第三人称单数 )；产生，引起 | |
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86
asunder
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| adj.分离的，化为碎片 | |
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87
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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88
enthralling
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| 迷人的 | |
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enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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92
enjoin
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| v.命令；吩咐；禁止 | |
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93
obviate
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| v.除去，排除，避免，预防 | |
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94
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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95
Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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97
entangling
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| v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的现在分词 ) | |
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alienated
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| adj.感到孤独的，不合群的v.使疏远( alienate的过去式和过去分词 )；使不友好；转让；让渡（财产等） | |
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99
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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100
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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101
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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102
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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103
unanimity
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| n.全体一致，一致同意 | |
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104
fettered
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| v.给…上脚镣，束缚( fetter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
constituent
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| n.选民；成分，组分；adj.组成的，构成的 | |
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106
clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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107
enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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108
wreaking
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| 诉诸（武力），施行（暴力），发（脾气）( wreak的现在分词 ) | |
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109
specified
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| adj.特定的 | |
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110
unconditional
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| adj.无条件的，无限制的，绝对的 | |
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111
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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112
lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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113
affix
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| n.附件，附录 vt.附贴，盖(章)，签署 | |
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114
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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