means for the preservation1 of the state organism. completion of the theory.
According to the plan I proposed to myself in a former chapter,1 I have now completed such portions of the whole inquiry2 as remained to be examined, and have, therefore, given as full and accurate a solution of the great question before us as my ability would allow. I might fairly conclude my task, then, at this point, were it not incumbent3 on me to refer, before doing so, to one final consideration, which is of the greatest importance as regards the whole subject; I allude4 to the means which are necessary, not only to render the activity of the State possible, but even to secure existence to the political power.
In order to accomplish even the most limited objects, it is evident that the State must be possessed6 of sufficient sources of revenue. My ignorance of all that is called finance prevents my entering here on an elaborate disquisition as regards that subject; but this is not to be regretted, seeing that such a discussion does not necessarily come within our present design. For, as I took occasion to observe in the outset, we are not supposing the case of a State whose objects are determined7 by the extent and efficiency of the means it may happen to possess, but rather that of one in which the latter are subordinate to and determined by the former. I have only to observe, for the sake of consistency8, that it is no less our duty to regard, in financial arrangements also, the true end of man as member of the body politic5, and the limitations naturally arising from such a connection. Even a moment’s reflection on the close interdependence that subsists9 between police and financial regulations is sufficient to convince us of this. There are then, it seems to me, but three sources of State revenue:—1. The property which has been previously10 reserved for the State, or subsequently acquired; 2. Direct taxation11; 3. Indirect taxation. The possession of any State property is attended with injurious consequences. I have already shown that the State must, by its very nature, obtain a preponderating12 power compared with private individuals; and in becoming proprietor13, it must necessarily become mixed up with many private relations, while it preserves all its peculiar14 attributes. Now, it is the necessity for security which alone dictates15 the expediency16 of a political organization. But this necessity does not presuppose any particular division of property, or any determination of proprietors17; and yet the State, in becoming proprietor, will extend all that influence to its interests of property, which has been granted for wholly different purposes, and will thus be able to outweigh18 all private individuals in this respect. Indirect taxation likewise is not free from hurtful consequences. Experience teaches us what a multiplicity of institutions is required to arrange and levy19 them; and of all these, according to our previous reasoning, we must unhesitatingly disapprove20. Direct taxation, then, is all that remains21. Now, of all the possible systems of direct taxation, the physiocratical2 is unquestionably the simplest. But, as it has been frequently objected, one of the most natural products of all is overlooked in such a system; I mean human power, which, with our institutions, is also a disposable commodity, both in its working and results, and must therefore be subject likewise to direct taxation. If, however, the system of direct taxation (to which we are reduced) is not unjustly condemned22 as the worst and clumsiest of all financial systems, we must not forget that the government, whose activity we have so narrowly circumscribed23, does not stand in need of such abundant sources of revenue, and that the State which has no peculiar interest of its own, apart from those of its citizens, will be more certainly assured of support from a free and therefore prosperous nation.
As the administration of financial affairs may create obstacles to the practical application of the principles we have urged, this is still more to be feared as regards the internal arrangements of the political constitution. That is, some means must be provided to connect the governing and governed classes of the nation together,—to secure the former in the possession of the power confided24 to them, and the latter in the enjoyment25 of what freedom remains after this necessary deduction26. Different methods have been adopted in different States for this purpose: in some, it has been sought to strengthen the physical power of the government (a plan somewhat perilous27 for freedom); in others, the accomplishment28 of this end has been attempted by bringing contending and counterbalancing forces into opposition29; and in others, by diffusing30 throughout the nation a spirit favourable31 to the constitution. The last method we have mentioned, although often productive of beautiful results (as we notice more especially in antiquity), has too hurtful a tendency on the individual development of the citizen, too easily induces one-sidedness in the national character, and is therefore most foreign to the system we have proposed. According to this, we should rather look for a constitution which should have the least possible positive or special influence on the character of the citizens, and would fill their hearts with nothing but the deepest regard for the rights of others, combined with the most enthusiastic love for their own liberty. I shall not here attempt to discover which constitution may be supposed to resemble this most faithfully. Such an investigation33 belongs evidently to a strict theory of politics; and I shall content myself with a few brief considerations, which may serve to show more clearly the possibility of such a constitution. The system I have proposed tends to strengthen and multiply the private interests of the citizen, and it may therefore seem calculated in that way to weaken the public interest. But it interweaves the two so closely together, that the latter seems rather to be based on the former; and especially so appears to the citizen, who wishes to be at once secure and free. Thus then, with such a system, that love for the constitution might be most surely preserved, which it is so often vainly sought to cultivate in the hearts of the citizens by artificial means. In this case of a State, moreover, in which the sphere of action is so narrow and limited, a less degree of power is necessary, and this requires proportionately less defence. Lastly, it follows of course, that, as power and enjoyment are often to be sacrificed on both sides to secure given results, in order to protect both from a greater loss, the same necessary accommodations are to be supposed in the system we have propounded34.
I have now succeeded, then, in answering the question I proposed myself, as far as my present powers would allow, and have traced out the sphere of political activity, and confined it within such limits as seemed to me most conducive35 and necessary to man’s highest interests. In this endeavour I have invariably set out with a view to discover what was best in the several cases; although it might not be uninteresting to ascertain36 what course was most strictly37 accordant with the principles of right. But when a State union has once proposed to itself a certain aim, and has voluntarily prescribed certain limits to its activity, those ends and limits are naturally in accordance with right, so long as they are such that those who defined them were adequate to their important task. Where such an express determination of ends and limits has not been made, the State must naturally endeavour to bring its activity within the sphere which abstract theory prescribes, but must also be guided by the consideration of such obstacles, as, if overlooked, would lead to far more hurtful consequences. The nation can always demand the adoption38 of such a theory, in so far as these obstacles render it practicable, but no further. I have not hitherto taken these obstacles into consideration, but have contented39 myself with developing the pure and abstract theory. I have in general aimed at discovering the most favourable position which man can occupy as member of a political community. And it has appeared to me to be, that in which the most manifold individuality and the most original independence subsisted40, with the most various and intimate union of a number of men—a problem which nothing but the most absolute liberty can ever hope to solve. To point out the possibility of a political organization which should fall as little short of this end as possible, and bring man nearer to such a position, has been my strict design in these pages, and has for some time been the subject of all my thoughts and researches. I shall be satisfied to have shown that this principle should be, at least, the guiding one in all political constitutions, and the system which is based upon it the high ideal of the legislator.
These ideas might have been forcibly illustrated41 by historical and statistical42 considerations, if both were directed to this end. On the whole there seems to me to be much need of reform in statistical science. Instead of giving us the mere43 data of area, population, wealth, and industry in a State, from which its real condition can never be fully32 and accurately44 determined, it should proceed from a consideration of the real state of the country and its inhabitants, and endeavour to convey the extent and nature of their active, passive, and enjoying powers, with such gradual modifications45 as these receive, either from the force of national union, or from the influence of the political organization. For the State constitution and the national union, however closely they may be interwoven with each other, should not be confounded together. While the State constitution, by the force of law, or custom, or its own preponderating power, imparts a definite relation to the citizens, there is still another which is wholly distinct from this—chosen of their own free-will, infinitely46 various, and in its nature ever-changing. And it is strictly this last,—the mutual47 freedom of activity among all the members of the nation,—which secures all those benefits for which men longed when they formed themselves into a society. The State constitution itself is strictly subordinate to this, as to the end for which it was chosen as a necessary means; and, since it is always attended with restrictions48 in freedom, as a necessary evil.
It has, therefore, been my secondary design in these pages to point out the fatal consequences which flow for human enjoyment, power, and character, from confounding the free activity of the nation with that which is enforced upon its members by the political constitution.
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preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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incumbent
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| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
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allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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preponderating
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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proprietor
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| n.所有人；业主；经营者 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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proprietors
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| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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disapprove
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| v.不赞成，不同意，不批准 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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confided
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| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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accomplishment
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| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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diffusing
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的现在分词 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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conducive
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| adj.有益的，有助的 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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subsisted
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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statistical
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| adj.统计的，统计学的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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45
modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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48
restrictions
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| 约束( restriction的名词复数 )； 管制； 制约因素； 带限制性的条件（或规则） | |
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