THE BATTLE of Borodino with the occupation of Moscow and the flight of the French, that followed without any more battles, is one of the most instructive phenomena in history.

All historians are agreed that the external activity of states and peoples in their conflicts finds expression in wars; that the political power of states and peoples is increased or diminished as the immediate result of success or defeat in war.

Strange are the historical accounts that tell us how some king or emperor, quarrelling with another king or emperor, levies an army, fights a battle with the army of his foe, gains a victory, kills three, five, or ten thousand men, and consequently subdues a state and a whole people consisting of several millions; and incomprehensible it seems that the defeat of any army, one hundredth of the whole strength of a people, should force that people to submit. Yet all the facts of history (so far as we know it) confirm the truth of the statement, that the successes or defeats of a nation's army are the causes or, at least, the invariable symptoms of the increase or diminution of the power of a nation. An army gains a victory, and immediately the claims of the conquering people are increased to the detriment of the conquered. An army is defeated, and at once the people loses its rights in proportion to the magnitude of the defeat; and if its army is utterly defeated, the people is completely conquered. So (according to history) it has been from the most ancient times up to the present. All Napoleon's earlier wars serve as illustrations of the rule. As the Austrian armies were defeated, Austria was deprived of her rights, and the rights and power of France were increased. The victories of the French at Jena and at Auerstadt destroyed the independent existence of Prussia.

But suddenly, in 1812, the French gained a victory before Moscow. Moscow was taken, and in consequence of that, with no subsequent battles, not Russia, but the French army of six hundred thousand, and then Napoleonic France itself ceased to exist. To strain the facts to fit the rules of history, to maintain that the field of Borodino was left in the hands of the Russians, or that after the evacuation of Moscow, there were battles that destroyed Napoleon's army—is impossible.

After the victory of the French at Borodino, there was no general engagement, nor even a skirmish of any great importance, yet the French army ceased to exist. What is the meaning of it? If it had been an example from the history of China, we could have said it was not an historical fact (the resource of historians when anything will not fit in with their rules). If it had occurred in a conflict on a small scale, in which only small numbers of soldiers had taken part, we might have looked upon it as an exception. But all this took place before the eyes of our fathers, for whom it was a question of life and death for their country; and the war was on a larger scale than any wars we know of.

The sequel of the campaign of 1812—from Borodino to the final expulsion of the French—has proved that victories are not always a cause nor even an invariable sign of conquest; it has proved that the force that decides the fate of peoples does not lie in military leaders, nor even in armies and battles, but in something else.

The French historians, who describe the position of the French troops before they marched out of Moscow, assert that everything was in good order in the Grande Armée, except the cavalry, the artillery, and the transport, and that there was no forage for the horses and cattle. There was no remedy for this defect, because the peasants of the surrounding country burned their hay rather than let the French have it.

Victory did not bring forth its usual results, because the peasants, Karp and Vlas, by no means persons of heroic feelings (after the French evacuation, they hurried with their carts to pillage Moscow), and the immense multitude of others like them burnt their hay rather than bring it to Moscow, however high the prices offered them.

Let us imagine two men, who have come out to fight a duel with swords in accordance with all the rules of the art of swordsmanship. The fencing has lasted for some time. All at once one of the combatants, feeling that he is wounded, grasping that it is no joking matter, but a question of life and death, flings away his sword, and snatching up the first cudgel that comes handy, begins to brandish that. But let us imagine that the combatant, who has so sensibly made use of the best and simplest means for the attainment of his object, should be inspired by the traditions of chivalry to try and disguise the real cause of the conflict and should persist in declaring that he had been victor in the duel in accordance with all the rules of swordsmanship. One can imagine what confusion and obscurity would arise from his description of the duel!

The duellist, who insisted on the conflict being fought in accordance with the principles of the fencer's art, stands for the French; his opponent, who flung away his sword and snatched up a cudgel, did like the Russians; and the attempted description of the duel in accordance with the rules of swordsmanship has been given us by the historians of the war.

From the time of the burning of Smolensk a war began which did not follow any of the old traditions of warfare. The burning of towns and villages, the retreat after every battle, the blow dealt at Borodino and followed by retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, the seizing of transports,—the whole of the irregular warfare was a departure from the rules.

Napoleon was aware of it, and from the time when he stood waiting in Moscow in the correct pose of the victorious fencer, and instead of his opponent's sword, saw the bludgeon raised against him, he never ceased complaining to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war was being conducted contrary to all the rules of war. (As though any rules existed for the slaughter of men!)

In spite of the complaints of the French that they did not keep to the rules, in spite of the fact that the Russians in the highest positions felt it somehow shameful to be fighting with a cudgel, and wanted to take up the correct position en quarte or en tierce, to make a skilful thrust, en prime and so on, the cudgel of the people's war was raised in all its menacing and majestic power; and troubling itself about no question of any one's tastes or rules, about no fine distinctions, with stupid simplicity, with perfect consistency, it rose and fell and belaboured the French till the whole invading army had been driven out.

And happy the people that will not, as the French did in 1813, saluting according to the rules, gracefully and cautiously offer the sword hilt to the magnanimous conqueror. Happy the people who, in the moment of trial, asks no questions how others would act by the recognised rules in such cases, but with ease and directness picks up the first cudgel that comes handy and deals blows with it, till resentment and revenge give way to contempt and pity.

波罗底诺战役之后，莫斯科被法军占领，法军又逃跑了，在此期间没有新的战役——这是一个最典型的，最富有教育意义的历史现象。

所有历史学家都认为，国家之间和民族之间在相互交往中，彼此发生冲突的最高表现形式是战争；战争的结果，将直接影响国家和民族的政治力量的消长。

无论是哪一个国王或者皇帝的历史记载都表明，在他们和另一个国王或者皇帝之间发生争执之后，他们便集结军队同对方厮杀，战胜者杀死了对方三千、五千、以致上万人，于是便征服了人口数以百万计的国家和整个民族；令人难以理解的是，为什么只有一个民族力量的百分之一的军队战败，就使整个民族屈服，——所有的历史事实（就我们所知道的）都证实了一个道理：一个民族的军队在同另一个民族的军队作战时所获得战果的大小，是这个和那个民族实力增长或削弱的根本原因，或者至少也是一个最重要的标志。军队打了胜仗，战胜的民族的权利由于损害战败者而立即增长了。军队打了败仗，那个民族立刻按照失败的程度而失去它的权利，如果它的军队彻底失败，那个民族就彻底被征服。

纵观历史，从古至今，历来如此。所有拿破仑的战争都证明了这一条法则。按照奥国军队失败的程度，奥地利丧失了自己的权利，而法国的权利和力量增加了。法国人在耶拿和奥尔施泰特的胜利，使普鲁士丧失了独立。

出人意外，一八一二年法国人在莫斯科附近打了大胜仗，法军占领了莫斯科，自那以后没有新的战役，但是毁灭的不是俄国，而是拿破仑所拥有的六十万军队和拿破仑的法国。编造事实以符合历史规律，硬说波罗底诺战场依旧在俄国人手中，或说莫斯科被占领后又有多次歼灭拿破仑军队的战役，都是不可能的。

在波罗底诺法国人打了大胜仗之后，不仅没有打过大仗，甚至连一次像样的战役也没有发生，而法国军队就不复存在了。这是什么意思呢？如果这是中国历史上的例子，我们可以说这一现象与史实不符（当问题不符合历史学家的尺度时，他们便以此为遁词）；如果这只是在小部队之间的短暂冲突，我们可以把这种现象看作是一种例外；但是这一事件是在我们的父辈亲眼目睹下发生的，是决定祖国生死存亡的大事，这次战争在他们已知的所有战争中是一次最大的战争……

在一八一二年，从波罗底诺战役到赶走法国人的事实证明：赢得一个战役的胜利，不仅不是征服的原因，甚至也不是征服的标志；证明了决定民族命运的力量不在于征服者，甚至也不在于军队和战斗，而在于一种别的什么东西。

法国的历史学家在描述法军在退出莫斯科之前的状况时说，大军井井有序，只有骑兵、炮兵和辎重兵除外，他们没有草料喂牲口，对这一灾难束手无策，因为城郊的农民宁肯把自己的草料都烧光，也不留一点给法国人。

打了胜仗并没有带来通常的结果，因为农民卡尔普和弗拉斯在法军退出莫斯科后赶着大车进莫斯科进行全城大抢劫，他们并未表现出个人的英雄气概，但是不为能卖好价钱把干草运到莫斯科，宁肯烧掉，像这样的农民则不胜枚举。

我们可以想象，两个持剑的人按照剑术的全部规则进行决斗；决斗已持续了很久，忽然有一方觉得自己受了伤——他知道这非同小可，是性命交关的大事，于是，他扔掉剑，顺手抄起身旁的一根棍子挥舞起来。但是可以想象，这个为了达到目的而明智地使用最好的、最简单的工具战胜了对方，而这个战胜者由于受骑士传统的影响，他要隐瞒事情的真相，于是他硬说他是按照剑术的全部规则打赢的。可以想象，如果这样描述战斗的经过，将会引起多大的混乱。

要求按照击剑规则来决斗的是法国人，把剑扔掉而抄起棍子打的是法国人的对手——俄国人；极力按照击剑规则说明问题的是描述这场战争的历史学家。

从斯摩棱斯克大火起，一场没有任何先例的战争开始了。边打边退，撤退时，把城市和村庄都烧掉，波罗底诺战役后又撤退，莫斯科大火，搜捕法国抢掠兵，截击运输队，游击战——所有这一切都不符合战争的常规。

拿破仑已感知道了这一点，自从他在莫斯科摆出正确的击剑姿态，他看到的不是剑，而是对方将一根木棍高举在他的头上，他便抱怨库图佐夫和亚历山大皇帝，说这场战争违反了一切规则（就好像杀人也有什么规则一样）。尽管法国人抱怨不遵守规则，尽管俄国的上层人士不知为什么也觉得用棍子作战是可耻的，希望按照规则站好enquarte或者entirece①姿势，摆出prime②姿势巧妙一击，但是人民战争的棍子以其可怕而又威严的力量举了起来，不管合不合某些人的口味和什么规则，以近乎愚鲁的纯朴，然而目标明确，不管三七二十一结结实实地举起和落下人民战争的棍子，直到把法国侵略者击退。

①法语：第四，第三。

②法语：第一。

这个民族多好啊，他不像一八一三年的法国人，按照一切剑术规则先行礼，再调转剑柄，优雅地、彬彬有礼地拱手把剑交给宽宏大量的胜利者，这个民族多好啊，他在危及国家和民族生死存亡的紧要关心，他不管别人在这种情况下怎样行事，自己憨厚纯朴地顺手抄起一根木棍抡了过去，一直打到完全泄出胸中屈辱和复仇的感情，替换成蔑视和怜悯的感情为止。