ONE of the most conspicuous and advantageous departures from the so-called rules of warfare is the independent action of men acting separately against men huddled together in a mass. Such independent activity is always seen in a war that assumes a national character. In this kind of warfare, instead of forming in a crowd to attack a crowd, men disperse in small groups, attack singly and at once fly, when attacked by superior forces, and then attack again, when an opportunity presents itself. Such were the methods of the guerillas in Spain; of the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, and of the Russians in 1812.

War of this kind has been called partisan warfare on the supposition that this name defined its special significance. But this kind of warfare does not follow any rules of war, but is in direct contradiction to a well-known rule of tactics, regarded as infallible. That rule lays it down that the attacking party must concentrate his forces in order to be stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.

Partisan warfare (always successful, as history testifies) acts in direct contradiction of this rule.

Military science assumes that the relative strength of forces is identical with their numerical proportions. Military science maintains that the greater the number of soldiers, the greater their strength. Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.

To say this is as though one were in mechanics to say that forces were equal or unequal simply because the masses of the moving bodies were equal or unequal.

Force (the volume of motion) is the product of the mass into the velocity.

In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown x.

Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognises the existence of this unknown factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical disposition of the troops, sometimes in the superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius of the leaders. But none of those factors yield results that agree with the historical facts.

One has but to renounce the false view that glorifies the effect of the activity of the heroes of history in warfare in order to discover this unknown quantity, x.

X is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty times a minute. The men who have the greater desire to fight always put themselves, too, in the more advantageous position for fighting. The spirit of the army is the factor which multiplied by the mass gives the product of the force. To define and express the significance of this unknown factor, the spirit of the army, is the problem of science.

This problem can only be solved when we cease arbitrarily substituting for that unknown factor x the conditions under which the force is manifested, such as the plans of the general, the arming of the men and so on, and recognise this unknown factor in its entirety as the greater or less desire to fight and face danger. Then only by expressing known historical facts in equations can one hope from comparison of the relative value of this unknown factor to approach its definition. Ten men, or battalions or divisions are victorious fighting with fifteen men or battalions or divisions, that is, they kill or take prisoner all of them while losing four of their own side, so that the loss has been four on one side and fifteen on the other. Consequently, four on one side have been equivalent to fifteen on the other, and consequently 4x = 15y. Consequently x/y = 15/4. This equation does not give us the value of the unknown factors, but it does give us the ratio between their values. And from the reduction to such equations of various historical units (battles, campaigns, periods of warfare) a series of numbers are obtained, in which there must be and may be discovered historical laws.

The strategic principle, that armies should act in masses on the offensive, and should break up into smaller groups for retreat, unconsciously confirms the truth that the force of an army depends on its spirit. To lead men forward under fire needs more discipline (which can only be attained by marching in masses) than is needed for self-defence when attacked. But this rule, which leaves out of sight the spirit of the army, is continually proving unsound, and is strikingly untrue in practice in all national wars, when there is a great rise or fall in the spirit of the armies.

The French, on their retreat in 1812, though they should, by the laws of tactics, have defended themselves in detached groups, huddled together in a crowd, because the spirit of the men had sunk so low that it was only their number that kept them up. The Russians should, on the contrary, by the laws of tactics, have attacked them in a mass, but in fact attacked in scattered companies, because the spirit of the men ran so high that individual men killed the French without orders, and needed no compulsion to face hardships and dangers.

有一种与所谓的战争规律相违背的最明显的也最有利的战斗行动，那就是分散成小股的部队攻击龟缩成一团的敌人。这种战斗行动常常具有人民战争的性质。这种行动不是两军对垒作战，而是一方把军队分散开来，小股军队单独行动，袭击敌人，遇到敌方大部队攻击时，立刻就跑，一有机会，又进行袭击。西班牙的义勇军是这样的；高加索的山民是这样干的；一八一二年的俄国人也是这样干的。

人们把这种战斗行动叫作游击战，这个名称本身就说明了它的意义。这类战斗行动不但不符合任何法则，而且与公认为绝对正确的著名的战术规则恰恰相反。法则规定，进攻者应当集中兵力，以便在交战时比对方更强大。

游击战争（历史证明游击战争常常是胜利的）恰好完全违背这个法则。

这一矛盾是由于军事科学认为，军队的力量和军队的数量是相一致的。军事科学家说，军队越多，力量就越大。Lesgrosebataillonsonttoujoursraison．①

①法语：权利永远是在军队多的一方。

军事学这种说法与力学在阐述运动的物体一样，力学研究仅仅以物体的质量为依据，研究表明，两种运动的物体力量是否相等，取决于彼此的质量是否相等。

力（运动量）是质量和速度的乘积。

在军事上，军队的力量是它的质量和一种未知数X的乘积。

历史上有数不清的军队的数量与力量不符合的例子——小部队打败大部队，于是军事学上便含糊其辞地承认，有一种未知的因子存在，军事学家力图在几何阵形、在军队的装备、最常见的——在统帅的天才上寻找这一未知的因子。但是，所有这一切努力，都不能得出与历史事实相吻合的结果。

其实，只要摒弃对最高当局在战时所发布的命令所持的不正确的看法（为了讨好英雄的），就可以找到这个未知的X了。

这个X就是军队的士气，就是组成这支军队的人所具有的昂扬斗志和敢于赴汤蹈火的决心，这种斗志和决心与统帅是否是天才，是排成三排还是排成两排，是用棍子还是用每分钟可以速射三十发的枪炮，完全无关。具有旺盛的斗志和抱有必胜的信念的战斗者，总是具有最有利的战斗条件。

军队的士气这个因子乘军队的数量，就得出力的积数。阐明这个未知因子——士气的价值，是科学的任务。

只有我们不再用诸如统帅的命令、军事装备等等作为显示力量的条件，当作因子的价值，任意用它来代替未知的X的价值，而是毫无保留地承认，这个未知的X不是别的，而是为战斗敢于赴汤蹈火所表现出来的决心，这一任务便可得以解决。只有用方程式来表明已知的历史事实，比较这个未知数的相对价值，才有可能确定这个未知数的本身。

十个人，十个营或者十个师同十五个人，十五个营或者十五个师作战，十个把十五个打败了，也就是把对方全部消灭了，或全部俘虏了，而自己只损失了四个；一方损失四个，一方损失十五个。因此4＝15，即4X＝16Y。于是X∶Y＝15∶4，这个方程并未告诉我们那个未知数的价值，然而他却告诉了我们两个未知数的比例。

可以援引各种不同的历史单位（战斗、战役、战争的各个阶段）的方程式中所获得的一系列数据，在这些数据中一定存在有一些规律，或许有可能揭示这些规律。

进攻时要集中优势兵力，退却时要分散行动，这一战术规则无形中证明了这样一个真理，即军队的力量在于它的士气。率领大军发起进攻比坚守阵地打退敌方进攻需要有更严明的纪律，而这样的纪律只有在集团行动中才能得以实现。无视军队士气的战术规则，不断地被证实是不正确的，特别是在所有的人民战争中军队士气的高低，这一事实与那种规则相矛盾的现象，尤为突出。

一八一二年法国人撤退时，在策略上本应分散防御，然而法军却缩成一团，因为法军士气已经低落到只有缩成一堆才不致于立刻垮掉。而俄国人则完全相反，在战略上本应集结军队大举进攻，而实际上却分散成小部队，因为军队士气已经高涨到士兵们不待命令下达就主动出击，没有任何强迫，士兵不怕疲劳，不怕牺牲。