IF ONE ADMITS, as historians do, that great men lead humanity to the attainment of certain ends, such as the aggrandisement of Russia or of France, or the balance of power, or the diffusion of the ideas of the revolution, or of general progress, or anything else you like, it becomes impossible to explain the phenomena of history apart from the conceptions of chance and genius.

If the object of the European wars of the beginning of this century had been the aggrandisement of Russia, that object might have been attained without any of the preceding wars, and without invasion of foreign territory.

If the object were the aggrandisement of France, that aim might have been attained apart from the revolution and the empire. If the object were the diffusion of ideas, the printing of books would have attained that object much more effectually than soldiers. If the object were the progress of civilisation, one may very readily assume that there are other more effectual means of diffusing civilisation than the slaughter of men and the destruction of their property.

Why did it come to pass in this way and no other? Because it happened so. “Chance created the position; genius took advantage of it,” says history.

But what is chance? What is genius?

The words chance and genius mean nothing actually existing, and so cannot be defined. These words merely denote a certain stage in the comprehension of phenomena. I do not know how some phenomenon is brought about; I believe that I cannot know; consequently I do not want to know and talk of chance. I see a force producing an effect out of proportion with the average effect of human powers; I do not understand how this is brought about, and I talk about genius.

To a flock of sheep the sheep who is every evening driven by the shepherd into a special pen to feed, and becomes twice as fat as the rest, must seem to be a genius. And the circumstance that every evening that sheep does not come into the common fold, but into a special pen full of oats, and that that same sheep grows fat and is killed for mutton, must present itself to the minds of the other sheep as a singular conjunction of genius with a whole series of exceptional chances.

But the sheep need only cease to assume that all that is done to them is with a view to the attainment of their sheepish ends; they need only admit that the events that occur to them may have ends beyond their ken, and they will at once see a unity and a coherence in what happens with the fatted sheep. Even though they will not know for what end he is fattened, at least they will know that all what happens to him does not happen by chance, and they will have no need to resort to the conception of chance, nor to the conception of genius.

It is only by renouncing all claims to knowledge of an immediate comprehensible aim, and acknowledging the final aim to be beyond our ken, that we see a consistent whole in the life of historical persons. The cause is then revealed to us of that effect produced by them out of proportion with the common powers of humanity; and we have no need of the words chance and genius.

We have only to admit that the object of the convulsions of the European nations is beyond our knowledge, and that we know only the facts, consisting mainly of murders committed at first in France, then in Italy, then in Africa, in Prussia, in Austria, in Spain, and in Russia, and that the movements from west to east and from east to west constitute the essence and end of those events, and we shall not need to see something exceptional—genius—in the characters of Napoleon and of Alexander, and shall indeed be unable to conceive of those persons as being in any way different from everybody else. And far from having to explain as chance those petty events, which made those men what they were, it will be clear to us that all those petty details were inevitable.

When we give up all claim to a knowledge of the final end, we shall clearly perceive that just as we cannot invent any flower or seed more truly appropriate to a plant than those it produces, so we cannot imagine any two persons, with all their past in such complete congruity down to the smallest details, with the part they were destined to play.

如果像史学家那样认为，是伟大的人物引导着人类达到一定的目的——如俄国或法国的强大，欧洲的均衡，革命思想的传播，普遍的进步，或者是其他任何方面，那么不用机遇和天才这两个概念，就无法解释历史现象了。

如果本世纪（十九世纪）初欧洲历次战争的目的乃在于实现俄国的强大，那么，没有战争和侵略也能达到这个目的。如果目的是为了法国的强大，那么，不进行革命，不建立帝国，这个目的也能达到。如果目的是传播思想，那么，出版书籍就比动用武力有效得多。如果目的是为了文明进步，那么，不用多说，除了使用屠杀生命和销毁财富的手段之外，还有其他更适宜于传播文明的途径。

那么，为什么事情是这样发生而不是另一种情况呢？

历史告诉我们：“机遇创造时势，天才加以利用。”事情就是这样。

但什么是机遇？什么是天才？

机遇和天才并不表示任何现实中存在的东西，因此无法下定义。这两个词只表示对现象的某种程度的理解。我不知道某种现象怎么会发生。我想，我无法知道，因此也不想知道，我就说：这是机遇。我看到一种力量，这种力量产生同人类本性不相称的行为。我不明白为什么会发生这样的事，所以我只好说，这是天才。

羊群中有一头公羊，每天晚上牧羊人把它赶进一个特殊的单独羊圈，去喂养，于是它长得比别的羊肥一倍，对这群羊来说，这只羊似乎是一个天才。这头羊每天晚上不是进普通的羊圈，而是到特殊的单独羊圈里去吃燕麦，于是这头羊长得特别肥，被作为肉羊送去屠宰。这种情况应该说是天才与一系列特殊的偶然机会的奇妙结合。

但是，那些绵羊只要不再认为，它们所遇到的一切都是为了达到它们这群羊的目的；只要认为它们周围所发生的事件可能有它们所不了解的种种目的。那么，它们就会立刻看到，那头养肥的公羊所遇到的事情具有连贯性和统一性。即使它们不知道喂肥这头公羊的目的何在，它们起码知道，那只公羊的遭遇绝非偶然，因此，不论是机遇还是天才这些概念，它们已经无须去了解了。

只要不去探求眼前容易理解的目的，并承认最终目的是无法知道的，我们就能看出那些历史人物一生中遇到的事情的连贯性和合理性。我们才能发现他们那种不符合人类本性的行为的原因，因而我们也就不需要机会和天才这些名词了。

我们只有承认，欧洲各国人民动乱的目的究竟是什么，我们并不清楚。我们只知道以下事实；起初在法国，后来在意大利，在非洲，在普鲁士，在奥地利，在西班牙，在俄国——在这些地方都发生了屠杀事件；还有，西方向东方进军，东方向西方进军，所有这些事件构成了一个共同的本质。这样我们不仅不必在拿破仑和亚历山大二人的性格中去找他们独有的特点和天才，而且对这两个人也不可另眼相看，认为跟其他人有什么不同。同时我们也无须用偶然性来解释促使这些历史人物本身发生变化的那些琐事，而且将会明显地看出，这一些琐事也是必然会发生的。

放弃对最终目的的探求，我们便会清楚地看到，一种植物有一种植物的花朵和种子，我们无法去空想更适合于这种植物的其他花朵和种子。同样，我们也无法想象其他两个有各自经历的人能比拿破仑和亚历山大更合适地、更细致地和更彻底地完成他们天赋的使命。