THE LIFE of nations is not contained in the life of a few men, since the connection between those few men and the nations has not been found. The theory that this connection is based on the delegation of the combined will of a people to its historical leaders is an hypothesis, not supported by the testimony of history.

The theory of the delegation of the combined will of the masses to historical personages may perhaps explain a great deal in the domain of the science of law, and is possibly essential for its purposes. But in its application to history, as soon as revolutions, wars, civil disturbances arise, as soon as history begins in fact—this theory explains nothing.

This theory appears irrefutable, just because the act of delegating the will of the people can never be verified, since it has never existed.

Whatever event might take place, and whoever might be taking the lead in such an event, the theory can always say that such a person took the lead in bringing about that event because the combined will was vested in him.

The answers given by this theory to historical questions are like the answers of a man who, watching the movements of a flock, should pay no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different parts of the field, nor to the actions of the shepherd, but should look for the causes of the flock taking this or that direction simply in the animal that happened to be foremost in it.

“The flock moves in this direction because the animal in front leads it, and the combined will of all the other animals is delegated to the leader of the flock.” Such is the answer given by the first class of historians, who suppose an unconditional delegation of will to the authority.

“If the animals leading the flock are changed for others, it is due to the fact that the combined will of all the beasts is transferred from one leader to another owing to the fact that the first leader did not follow the direction chosen by all the flock.” Such is the reply of those historians who assume that the combined will of the masses is vested in their rulers on conditions which they regard as unknown. (With this method of observation it very often happens that the observer, judging from the direction chosen by him, reckons as leaders those who, when the direction of the masses is changed, are not in front, but on one side, and even sometimes the hindmost.)

“If the beasts that are foremost are constantly being changed, and the direction taken by the flock too is continually changing, that is due to the fact that to attain a certain direction known to us the beasts delegate their wills to those beasts which attract our attention, and to study the movements of the flock we ought to observe all the noticeable animals that are moving on all sides of the flock.” So say the third class of historians, who accept all historical characters as the expression of their age from monarchs to journalists.

The theory of the transference of the will of the masses to historical characters is only a paraphrase—only a restatement of the question in other words.

What is the cause of historical events? Power.

What is Power? Power is the combined will of the masses vested in one person.

On what conditions are the wills of the masses vested in one person? On condition of that person's expressing the will of all men. That is, power is power. That is, power is a word the meaning of which is beyond our comprehension.

If the domain of human knowledge were confined to abstract reasoning alone, then, after subjecting the explanation of power given by science to criticism, humanity would come to the conclusion that power is only a word, and that it has no existence in reality. But for the knowledge of phenomena, man has besides abstract reasoning another instrument—experience—by which he verifies the results of reasoning. And experience tells him that power is not merely a word, but an actually existing phenomenon.

To say nothing of the fact that not a single account of the combined action of men can omit the conception of power, the reality of power is shown us, not only by history, but by observation of contemporary events.

Whenever an event takes place, a man or men appear by whose will the event is conceived to have been accomplished. Napoleon III. gives an order, and the French go to Mexico. The Prussian King and Bismarck give certain orders, and troops go to Bohemia. Napoleon I. gives a command, and soldiers march into Russia. Alexander I. gives a command, and the French submit to the Bourbons. Experience shows us that whatever takes place, it is always connected with the will of one or of several men, who decreed it should be so.

Historians, from the old habit of recognising divine intervention in the affairs of humanity, are inclined to look for the cause of events in the exercise of the will of the person endowed with power; but this conclusion is not confirmed either by reason or by experience.

On one side reason shows that the expression of the will of a man—his words, in fact, are only a part of the general activity expressed in an event, such as a revolution or a war, and therefore without the assumption of an incomprehensible, supernatural force—a miracle—it cannot be admitted that these words can be the immediate cause of the movements of millions of men.

On the other side, even if one admits that words may be the cause of an event, history shows us that the expression of the will of historical personages in the great majority of cases does not lead to any effect at all—that is, that their commands are often not carried out, and, in fact, sometimes the very opposite of what they have commanded is done.

Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanity, we cannot accept power as a cause of events.

Power, from the point of view of experience, is only the dependence existing between the expression of the will of a person and the carrying out of that will by others.

To explain the conditions of that dependence, we have, first of all, to reinstate the conception of the expression of will, referring it to man, and not to the Deity.

If the Deity gives a command, expresses His will, as the history of the ancients tell us, the expression of that will is independent of time, and is not called forth by anything, as the Deity is not connected with the event. But when we speak of commands that are the expression of the will of men, acting in time and connected with one another, we must, if we are to understand the connection of the command with the event, restore (1) the conditions of all the circumstances that took place, the dynamic continuity in time both of the event and of the person commanding it; and (2) the condition of the inevitable connection in which the person commanding stands with those who carry out his command.

少数几个人的生活并不能包括各民族的生活，因为还没有发现那几个人和各民族之间的关系。有一种理论说，作为这种关系的基础的，是把群众意志的总和移交给历史人物，但是，这种理论只不过是假说，并未得到历史经验的证实。

群众意志的总和移交给一些历史人物的理论，在法学领域内也许可以说明许多问题，对法学的目的而言也许是有必要的；但是，一应用到历史上，一当出现革命、征服，或内战，也就是说，一当历史时期开始，这种理论就不能说明什么问题了。

那种理论好像是驳不倒的，因为人民意志移交的活动是无法检验的。

不管发生什么事件，不管事件由什么人领头，那种理论总可以说，某某人所以成为事件的领导，是因为意志的总和移交给他了。

一个人看见一群牲口移动，而不注意不同地区的不同性质的牧场，也不注意牧人的驱策，就断言那群牲口之所以从这个方向或从那个方面走动、是由于那头牲口引路的缘故，这个人的答案就跟那种理论对历史问题的答案一样。

“牲口所以朝那个方向走，是因为那只在前面走的牲口引导着它，所以别的牲口的意志总和都交给那群牲畜的头头。”

这就是第一类历史学家——那些认为无条件移交权力的人——的回答。

“假如带领那群牲口的牲畜更换了，那是因为那头牲口带领的方向不是一群牲口所选择的方向，所有牲畜的意志的总和就由一个头头移交给另一个头头。”这就是那些认为群众意志的总和在他们认为已知的条件下移交给统治者的史学家的答案。（使用这种观察方法就常常发生以下的情形：那个观察者按照他所选定的方向，把那些由于群众改变方向，不再走在前头、而走在一边、甚至有时把落在后面的人当作带头的人。）

“假如前头的牲口不断地更换，一群牲口的方向不断地变换，那是因为，为要到达既定的方向，牲口把它们的意志移交给我们注目的那些牲口，因此，为研究一群牲口的运动，我们应当观察这群牲口周围走动的所有令人注目的牲口。”认为所有历史人物——从帝王到新闻记者——是他们时代的代表的第三类史学家就是这样说的。

群众意志移交给历史人物的理论，不过是一种代用语——不过是对那个问题换一种说法而已。

历史事件的原因是什么呢？——是权力。权力是什么呢？权力是移交给一个人的意志的总和。群众意志是在什么条件下移交给一个人呢？——在那个人代表全体人民的意志的条件下。这就是说，权力是权力，即是说，权力就是我们不解其含义的词语。

假如人类知识的领域只限于抽象的思维，那么，把科学对权力所作的解释加以批判后，人类就可以得出这样的结论：权力不过是一个词语，实际是不存在的。但是，为了认识现象，人类除了抽象的思维，还有一个用来检测思维结果的工具——经验，而经验告诉我们，权力不仅是一个词语，而且是一个实际存在的现象。

不待说，没有权力的观念，就无法叙述人们的集体活动，而且权力的存在已经由历史和对当代事件的观察所证实。

一桩事件发生了，总有一个人或几个人出现，那桩事件好像由于他或他们的意志发生的。拿破仑三世颁布一道命令，于是法国人到墨西哥去了①。普鲁士国王和俾斯麦颁布一道命令，于是一支军队进入了波西米亚②。拿破仑一世颁布一道命令，于是一支军队进入了俄国。亚历山大一世颁布一道命令，于是法国人服从了波旁王朝。经验告诉我们，无论发生什么事件，那桩事件总与颁布命令一个人或几个人的意志相联系。

①一八六四年，在法军支持下，马克西米连取得了墨西哥王位。

②指一八六六年奥、普战争。

史学家们依照旧习惯——承认神干预人类的事务，想从赋有权力的个人的意志表现上寻找事件发生的原因；但是，这种结论即不能用推理证实，也不能用经验证实。

一方面，推理表明，一个人的意志的表现——他说的话——只是表现在一桩事件上（例如在一场战争中或一次革命中的全部活动的一部分）；所以，不承认一种不可理解的超自然的力量——奇迹，就不能设想几句话会是千百万人的运动的直接原因，另一方面，即使我们假设几句话可以是事件发生的原因，但是历史又表明，历史人物的意志的表现在许多情形下不产生任何效果，就是说，他们的命令非但时常不被执行，有时竟出现与他们的命令完全相反的情况。

不假设神干预人类的事务，我们就不能把权力当作事件发生的原因。

从经验的观点来看，权力不过是存在于个人意志的表现和另一些人对履行这个意志之间的依赖关系。

为了说清楚这种依赖关系的条件，我们首先应当确定意志表现的概念，承认它是属于人的，而不是属于神的。

假如神发布一道命令，表示自己的意志，就像古代历史告诉我们那样，那么，这种意志的表示与时间无关，也不由任何东西引起，因为神与事件并无牵连。但是，如果谈到命令——它是在一定时间行动的、彼此相关的人们的意志的表现，为了说明命令和事件的关系，就应当重新确定：一、发生一切的条件：事件和发布命令的人在一定时间内行动的连续性，二、发布命令的人和那些执行他的命令的人之间的必然联系的条件。