ONLY THE EXPRESSION of the will of the Deity, not depending on time, can relate to a whole series of events that have to take place during several years or centuries; and only the Deity, acting by His will alone, not affected by any cause, can determine the direction of the movement of humanity. Man acts in time, and himself takes part in the event.

Restoring the first condition that was omitted, the condition of time, we perceive that no single command can be carried out apart from preceding commands that have made the execution of the last command possible.

Never is a single command given quite independently and arbitrarily, nor does it cover a whole series of events. Every command is the sequel to some other; and it never relates to a whole course of events, but only to one moment in those events.

When we say, for instance, that Napoleon commanded the army to go to fight, we sum up in one single expression a series of consecutive commands, depending one upon another. Napoleon could not command a campaign against Russia, and never did command it. He commanded one day certain papers to be written to Vienna, to Berlin, and to Petersburg; next day certain decrees and instructions to the army, the fleet, and the commissariat, and so on and so on—millions of separate commands, making up a whole series of commands, corresponding to a series of events leading the French soldiers to Russia.

Napoleon was giving commands all through his reign for an expedition to England. On no one of his undertakings did he waste so much time and so much effort, and yet not once during his reign was an attempt made to carry out his design. Yet he made an expedition against Russia, with which, according to his repeatedly expressed conviction, it was to his advantage to be in alliance; and this is due to the fact that his commands in the first case did not, and in the second did, correspond with the course of events.

In order that a command should certainly be carried out, it is necessary that the man should give a command that can be carried out. To know what can and what cannot be carried out is impossible, not only in the case of Napoleon's campaign against Russia, in which millions took part, but even in the case of the simplest event, since millions of obstacles may always arise to prevent its being carried out. Every command that is carried out is always one out of a mass of commands that are not carried out. All the impossible commands are inconsistent with the course of events and are not carried out. Only those which are possible are connected with consecutive series of commands, consistent with series of events, and they are carried out.

Our false conception that the command that precedes an event is the cause of an event is due to the fact that when the event has taken place and those few out of thousands of commands, which happen to be consistent with the course of events, are carried out, we forget those which were not, because they could not be carried out. Apart from that, the chief source of our error arises from the fact that in the historical account a whole series of innumerable, various, and most minute events, as, for instance, all that led the French soldiers to Russia, are generalised into a single event, in accordance with the result produced by that series of events; and by a corresponding generalisation a whole series of commands too is summed up into a single expression of will.

We say: Napoleon chose to invade Russia and he did so. In reality we never find in all Napoleon's doings anything like an expression of that design: what we find is a series of commands or expressions of his will of the most various and undefined tendency. Out of many series of innumerable commands of Napoleon not carried out, one series of commands for the campaign of 1812 was carried out; not from any essential difference between the commands carried out and those not carried out, but simply because the former coincided with the course of events that led the French soldiers into Russia; just as in stencil-work one figure or another is sketched, not because the colours are laid on this side or in that way, but because on the figure cut out in stencil, colours are laid on all sides.

So that examining in time the relation of commands to events, we find that the command can never in any case be the cause of the event, but that a certain definite dependence exists between them. To understand of what this dependence consists, it is essential to restore the other circumstance lost sight of, a condition accompanying any command issuing not from the Deity, but from man. That circumstance is that the man giving the command is himself taking part in the event.

That relation of the commanding person to those he commands is indeed precisely what is called power. That relation may be analysed as follows.

For common action, men always unite in certain combinations, in which, in spite of the difference of the objects aimed at by common action, the relation between the men taking a part in the action always remains the same.

Uniting in these combinations, men always stand in such a relation to one another that the largest number of men take a greater direct share, and a smaller number of men a less direct share in the combined action for which they are united. Of all such combinations in which men are organised for the performance of common action, one of the most striking and definite examples is the army.

Every army is composed of members of lower military standing—the private soldiers, who are always the largest proportion of the whole, of members of a slightly higher military standing—corporals and non-commissioned officers, who are fewer in number than the privates; of still higher officers, whose numbers are even less; and so on, up to the chief military command of all, which is concentrated in one person.

The military organisation may be with perfect accuracy compared to the figure of a cone, the base of which, with the largest diameter, consists of privates; the next higher and smaller plane, of the lower officers; and so on up to the apex of the cone, which will be the commander-in-chief.

The soldiers, who are the largest number, form the lowest plane and the base of the cone. The soldier himself does the stabbing and hacking, and burning and pillaging, and always receives commands to perform these acts from the persons in the plane next above. He himself never gives a command. The non-commissioned officer (these are fewer in number) more rarely performs the immediate act than the soldier; but he gives commands. The officer next above him still more rarely acts directly himself, and still more frequently commands. The general does nothing but command the army, and hardly ever makes use of a weapon. The commander-in-chief never takes direct part in the action itself, and simply makes general arrangements as to the movements of the masses. A similar relation exists in every combination of persons for common action—in agriculture, commerce, and in every department of activity.

And so without artificially analysing all the converging planes of the cone and ranks of the army or classes or ranks of any department whatever, or public undertaking, from lower to higher, a law comes into existence, by which men always combine together for the performance of common action in such relation that the more directly they take part in the action, the less they command, and the greater their numbers; and the less direct the part they take in the common action, the more they command, and the fewer they are in number; passing in that way from the lower strata up to a single man at the top, who takes least direct share in the action, and devotes his energy more than all the rest to giving commands.

This is the relation of persons in command to those whom they command, and it constitutes the essence of the conception of what is called power.

Restoring the conditions of time under which all events take place, we found that a command is carried out only when it relates to a corresponding course of events. Restoring the essential condition of connection between the persons commanding and fulfilling the commands, we have found that by their very nature the persons commanding take the smallest part in the action itself, and their energy is exclusively directed to commanding.

只有不以时间为转移的神的意志的表现，才可以和若干年或若干世纪的一整串事件有关，只有不受任何事物影响的神，才可以由他自己的意志来确定人类行动的方向；但是人是按一定时间行动，而且亲自参与事件的。

只要重新确定第一个被忽略的条件——时间条件，我们就可以看出，没有使后一道命令可以执行的前一道命令，则任何命令都是不可能执行的。

从来没有一道命令是自发地出现的，也没有一道命令是适用于一连串事件的；而每道命令都是来自另一道命令，从来不是针对一连串事件，只是针对事件的某一时刻。

例如，当我们说拿破仑命令军队去作战的时候，我们是把一系列连续的、互相关联的命令结合在一道同时下达的命令中的。拿破仑不能下命令出征俄国，也从来未曾下过那样的命令。他今天命令向维也纳、柏林、彼得堡发出这样那样的公文；明天又向陆军、舰队、兵站部发出这样那样的指示和命令，等等，等等——成百万条命令，这许多命令形成一系列导致法国军队进入俄国一连串事件相应的命令。

拿破仑在位时，曾发出远征英国的命令，并且为此用了比用在任何别的计划上更多的力量和时间，可是在他统治的全部时间内，从来不曾有一次企图执行这个计划，却侵入了他屡次认为宜于结成同盟的俄国，其所以会发生这样的情形，是因为前面那些命令对一连串事件不适宜，而后面一些命令却是适宜的。

若要命令确实能够执行，就必须发出能够执行的命令。但是，要知道什么能执行、什么不能执行，是不可能的，不但在有成百万人参加的拿破仑进攻俄国的情形下不可能知道，即使在最简单的事件上也不可能知道，因为在这两种情形下都会遇到成百万种阻碍。每种被执行了的命令，同时总有大量未执行的命令。一切不能执行的命令，都与事件不相联系，所以未被执行。那些能执行的命令，只有与一贯的命令相关联，与一系列事件相符合，才得以执行。

我们以为一个事件的发生是由于它的前一道命令所引起的，这个错误的观念之所以产生，是由于我们只看见事件发生了，在成千上万条的命令中，只有几条与事件有联系的命令得到了执行，却忘记了由于不能执行而未被执行的那一些。此外，我们在这方面的迷误的主要原因是：在历史记载中，一系列不同的难以数计的、细小的事件，例如引导法国军队到俄国去的那些事件，按照这一系列事件所产生的结果被归纳成一桩事件，与这一归纳相应，又把那一系列命令归纳成一个单独的意志表现。

我们说拿破仑想进攻俄国，就进攻了。事实上，我们从拿破仑的一切行动中从未发现任何类似这种意志的表现，只发现许许多多的最繁杂的最不明确的命令，或者说他的意志表现。在拿破仑的无数未被执行的命令中，关于一八一二年战役的那些命令被执行了，这并非因为那些命令与别的未被执行的命令有什么不同，只因为那一系列命令与导致法国军队进入俄国的一系列事件相符合；正如用镂花模板绘制这样或那样的图形，并非在哪一面或照什么样涂上颜色，而是在模板上雕刻的图形的各个面都涂上颜色。

因此，考查命令与事件在时间上的关系时，我们就发现，命令无论如何不是事件的原因，而两者之间不过存在着一定的关系罢了。

要了解这种关系是什么，这就需要把一切不来自神而来自人的命令所具备的、被疏忽的条件恢复过来，那个条件就是，发出命令的人亲自参与了事件。

颁发命令者和接受命令者之间的关系，就是叫作权力的东西。这种关系包括以下各点：

人们为共同行动而结成一定的团体，在这些团体中，尽管为共同行动所确立的目的不同，但参与行动的人们之间的关系总是相同的。

人们结合成这些团体，彼此之间总有这样的关系：在他们结合起来采取集体行动时，大多数的人是直接参与的，少数人是间接参与的。

在人们为集体行动而结成的团体中，军队是最明确、最清楚的例子之一。

每支军队都包括低级军事人员——列兵，他们总占绝大多数；比较高的军事人员——班长和军士；他们的总数比列兵少；更高级的军官的总数目更少，由此类推，直到权力集于一人之身的最高军事首脑。

军事组织酷似圆锥体，直径最大的底部是由列兵组成的；比底部较高的截面，是由较高级军事人员组成的；由此类推，直到圆锥体的顶端就是总司令了。

人数最多的士兵组成圆锥体的底部和它的基础。士兵直接去刺、杀、烧、抢，也总从高级人员接受从事这些行动的命令；他们自己从来不发布一道命令。那些军士们（为数较少）行动比士兵为少；但是他们发布命令。军官更少地直接行动，但是命令发得更多了。将军只是指挥部队，指示目标，几乎从来不使用武器。总司令从来不直接参加战斗，只是发布有关群众行动的总的命令。在人们从事共同行动的所有团体中——在农业、商业和一切行政机关中，人与人之间的关系都是这样。

因此，不用特意分解连成一体的圆锥体的各个部分——一支军队的所有官职，或任何行政机关或公共事业中由最低级到最高级的职称和职位，我们就可以看出一种法则，根据这种法则，采取联合行动的人们结成下面的关系：愈多地直接参与行动的人，他们的指挥权就愈小，他们的人数就愈多；而愈少地直接参与行动的人，他们的指挥权就愈大，他们的人数也就愈少；照这样从底层上升到最后那个人，那个人最少地直接参与行动，最多地发号施令。

指挥者和被指挥者的这种关系，就是所谓权力这个概念的实质。

恢复了时间条件（一切事件都是在时间条件下发生的），我们发现，命令只有在它与一系列相应的事件相关联的时候才得以执行。恢复了发命令者和执行命令者之间的关系的必要条件，我们发现，由于这种条件的性质，命令者最少地参与事件本身，他们的活动仅仅是发号施令。