It may seem almost wanton to suggest the desirableness of revising a system at once so simple, so logical, and apparently11 so well bottomed on facts. But there can never be any real harm in studying masses of evidence from fresh points of view. At worst, the failure of adverse12 criticism must help to establish the doctrines13 assailed14. Now, as we shall show, there are two points of view from which the evidence as to religion in its early stages has not been steadily15 contemplated16. Therefore we intend to ask, first, what, if anything, can be ascertained17 as to the nature of the ‘visions’ and hallucinations which, according to Mr. Tylor in his celebrated18 work ‘Primitive Culture,’ lent their aid to the formation of the idea of ‘spirit.’ Secondly19, we shall collect and compare the accounts which we possess of the High Gods and creative beings worshipped or believed in, by the most backward races. We shall then ask whether these relatively20 Supreme Beings, so conceived of by men in very rudimentary social conditions, can be, as anthropology21 declares, mere22 developments from the belief in ghosts of the dead.
We shall end by venturing to suggest that the savage23 theory of the soul may be based, at least in part, on experiences which cannot, at present, be made to fit into any purely24 materialistic25 system of the universe. We shall also bring evidence tending to prove that the idea of God, in its earliest known shape, need not logically be derived from the idea of spirit, however that idea itself may have been attained or evolved. The conception of God, then, need not be evolved out of reflections on dreams and ‘ghosts.’
If these two positions can be defended with any success, it is obvious that the whole theory of the Science of Religion will need to be reconsidered. But it is no less evident that our two positions do not depend on each other. The first may be regarded as fantastic, or improbable, or may be ‘masked’ and left on one side. But the strength of the second position, derived from evidence of a different character, will not, therefore, be in any way impaired26. Our first position can only be argued for by dint27 of evidence highly unpopular in character, and, as a general rule, condemned28 by modern science. The evidence is obtained by what is, at all events, a legitimate29 anthropological30 proceeding31. We may follow Mr. Tylor’s example, and collect savage beliefs about visions, hallucinations, ‘clairvoyance,’ and the acquisition of knowledge apparently not attainable32 through the normal channels of sense. We may then compare these savage beliefs with attested33 records of similar experiences among living and educated civilised men. Even if we attain1 to no conclusion, or a negative conclusion, as to the actuality and supernormal character of the alleged34 experiences, still to compare data of savage and civilised psychology35, or even of savage and civilised illusions and fables37, is decidedly part, though a neglected part, of the function of anthropological science. The results, whether they do or do not strengthen our first position, must be curious and instructive, if only as a chapter in the history of human error. That chapter, too, is concerned with no mean topic, but with what we may call the X region of our nature. Out of that region, out of miracle, prophecy, vision, have certainly come forth38 the great religions, Christianity and Islam; and the great religious innovators and leaders, our Lord Himself, St. Francis, John Knox, Jeanne d’Arc, down to the founder39 of the new faith of the Sioux and Arapahoe. It cannot, then, be unscientific to compare the barbaric with the civilised beliefs and experiences about a region so dimly understood, and so fertile in potent40 influences. Here the topic will be examined rather by the method of anthropology than of psychology. We may conceivably have something to learn (as has been the case before) from the rough observations and hasty inferences of the most backward races.
We may illustrate41 this by an anecdote42:
‘The Northern Indians call the Aurora43 Borealis “Edthin,” that is “Deer.” Their ideas in this respect are founded on a principle one would not imagine. Experience has shown them that when a hairy deer-skin is briskly stroked with the hand on a dark night, it will emit many sparks of electrical fire.’
So says Hearne in his ‘Journey,’ published in 1795 (p. 346).
This observation of the Red Men is a kind of parable44 representing a part of the purport45 of the following treatise46. The Indians, making a hasty inference from a trivial phenomenon, arrived unawares at a probably correct conclusion, long unknown to civilised science. They connected the Aurora Borealis with electricity, supposing that multitudes of deer in the sky rubbed the sparks out of each other! Meanwhile, even in the last century, a puzzled populace spoke47 of the phenomenon as ‘Lord Derwentwater’s Lights.’ The cosmic pomp and splendour shone to welcome the loyal Derwentwater into heaven, when he had given his life for his exiled king.
Now, my purpose in the earlier portion of this essay is to suggest that certain phenomena of human nature, apparently as trivial as the sparks rubbed out of a deer’s hide in a dark night, may indicate, and may be allied48 to a force or forces, which, like the Aurora Borealis, may shine from one end of the heavens to the other, strangely illumining the darkness of our destiny. Such phenomena science has ignored, as it so long ignored the sparks from the stroked deer-skin, and the attractive power of rubbed amber49. These trivial things were not known to be allied to the lightning, or to indicate a force which man could tame and use. But just as the Indians, by a rapid careless inference, attributed the Aurora Borealis to electric influences, so (as anthropology assures us) savages50 everywhere have inferred the existence of soul or spirit, intelligence that
‘Does not know the bond of Time,
Nor wear the manacles of Space,’
in part from certain apparently trivial phenomena of human faculty51. These phenomena, as Mr. Tylor says, ‘the great intellectual movement of the last two centuries has simply thrown aside as worthless.’1 I refer to alleged experiences, merely odd, sporadic52, and, for commercial purposes, useless, such as the transference of thought from one mind to another by no known channel of sense, the occurrence of hallucinations which, prima facie, correspond coincidentally with unknown events at a distance, all that is called ‘second sight,’ or ‘clairvoyance,’ and other things even more obscure. Reasoning on these real or alleged phenomena, and on other quite normal and accepted facts of dream, shadow, sleep, trance, and death, savages have inferred the existence of spirit or soul, exactly as the Indians arrived at the notion of electricity (not so called by them, of course) as the cause of the Aurora Borealis. But, just as the Indians thought that the cosmic lights were caused by the rubbing together of crowded deer in the heavens (a theory quite childishly absurd), so the savage has expressed, in rude fantastic ways, his conclusion as to the existence of spirit. He believes in wandering separable souls of men, surviving death, and he has peopled with his dreams the whole inanimate universe.
My suggestion is that, in spite of his fantasies, the savage had possibly drawn53 from his premises54 an inference not wholly, or not demonstrably erroneous. As the sparks of the deer-skin indicated electricity, so the strange lights in the night of human nature may indicate faculties55 which science, till of late and in a few instances, has laughed at, ignored, ‘thrown aside as worthless.’
It should be observed that I am not speaking of ‘spiritualism,’ a word of the worst associations, inextricably entangled56 with fraud, bad logic10, and the blindest credulity. Some of the phenomena alluded57 to have, however, been claimed as their own province by ‘spiritists,’ and need to be rescued from them. Mr. Tylor writes:
‘The issue raised by the comparison of savage, barbaric, and civilised spiritualism is this: Do the Red Indian medicine-man, the Tatar necromancer58, the Highland59 ghost-seer, and the Boston medium, share the possession of belief and knowledge of the highest truth and import, which, nevertheless, the great intellectual movement of the last two centuries has simply thrown aside as worthless?’
Distinguo! That does not seem to me to be the issue. In my opinion the issue is: ‘Have the Red Indian, the Tatar, the Highland seer, and the Boston medium (the least reputable of the menagerie) observed, and reasoned wildly from, and counterfeited60, and darkened with imposture61, certain genuine by-products of human faculty, which do not prima facie deserve to be thrown aside?’
That, I venture to think, is the real issue. That science may toss aside as worthless some valuable observations of savages is now universally admitted by people who know the facts. Among these observations is the whole topic of Hypnotism, with the use of suggestion for healing purposes, and the phenomena, no longer denied, of ‘alternating personalities62.’ For the truth of this statement we may appeal to one of the greatest of Continental63 anthropologists, Adolf Bastian.2 The missionaries65, like Livingstone, usually supposed that the savage seer’s declared ignorance — after his so-called fit of inspiration — of what occurred in that state, was an imposture. But nobody now doubts the similar oblivion of what has passed that sometimes follows the analogous66 hypnotic sleep. Of a remarkable67 cure, which the school of the Salpêtrière or Nancy would ascribe, with probable justice, to ‘suggestion,’ a savage example will be given later.
Savage hypnotism and ‘suggestion,’ among the Sioux and Arapahoe, has been thought worthy68 of a whole volume in the Reports of the Ethnological Bureau of the Smithsonian Institute (Washington, U.S., 1892–98). Republican Governments publish scientific matter ‘regardless of expense,’ and the essential points might have been put more shortly. They illustrate the fact that only certain persons can hypnotise others, and throw light on some peculiarities69 of rapport70.3 In brief, savages anticipated us in the modern science of experimental psychology, as is frankly71 acknowledged by the Society for Experimental Psychology of Berlin. ‘That many mystical phenomena are much more common and prominent among savages than among ourselves is familiar to everyone acquainted with the subject. The ethnological side of our inquiry72 demands penetrative study.’4
That study I am about to try to sketch73. My object is to examine some ‘superstitious74 practices’ and beliefs of savages by aid of the comparative method. I shall compare, as I have already said, the ethnological evidence for savage usages and beliefs analogous to thought-transference, coincidental hallucinations, alternating personality, and so forth, with the best attested modern examples, experimental or spontaneous. This raises the question of our evidence, which is all-important. We proceed to defend it. The savage accounts are on the level of much anthropological evidence; they may, that is, be dismissed by adversaries75 as ‘travellers’ tales.’ But the best testimony76 for the truth of the reports as to actual belief in the facts is the undesigned coincidence of evidence from all ages and quarters.5 When the stories brought by travellers, ancient and modern, learned and unlearned, pious77 or sceptical, agree in the main, we have all the certainty that anthropology can offer. Again, when we find practically the same strange neglected sparks, not only rumoured78 of in European popular superstition80, but attested in many hundreds of depositions81 made at first hand by respectable modern witnesses, educated and responsible, we cannot honestly or safely dismiss the coincidence of report as indicating a mere ‘survival’ of savage superstitious belief, and nothing more.
We can no longer do so, it is agreed, in the case of hypnotic phenomena. I hope to make it seem possible that we should not do so in the matter of the hallucinations provoked by gazing in a smooth deep, usually styled ‘crystal-gazing.’ Ethnologically, this practice is at least as old as classical times, and is of practically world-wide distribution. I shall prove its existence in Australia, New Zealand, North America, South America, Asia, Africa, Polynesia, and among the Incas, not to speak of the middle and recent European ages. The universal idea is that such visions may be ‘clairvoyant.’ To take a Polynesian case, ‘resembling the Hawaiian wai harru.’ When anyone has been robbed, the priest, after praying, has a hole dug in the floor of the house, and filled with water. Then he gazes into the water, ‘over which the god is supposed to place the spirit of the thief. . . . The image of the thief was, according to their account, reflected in the water, and being perceived by the priest, he named the individual, or the parties.’6 Here the statement about the ‘spirit’ is a mere savage philosophical82 explanation. But the fact that hallucinatory pictures can really be seen by a fair percentage of educated Europeans, in water, glass balls, and so forth, is now confirmed by frequent experiment, and accepted by opponents, ‘non-mystical writers,’ like Dr. Parish of Munich.7 I shall bring evidence to suggest that the visions may correctly reflect, as it were, persons and places absolutely unknown to the gazer, and that they may even reveal details unknown to every one present. Such results among savages, or among the superstitious, would be, and are, explained by the theory of ‘spirits.’ Modern science has still to find an explanation consistent with recognised laws of nature, but ‘spirits’ we shall not invoke83.
In the same way I mean to examine all or most of the ‘so-called mystical phenomena of savage life.’ I then compare them with the better vouched84 for modern examples. To return to the question of evidence, I confess that I do not see how the adverse anthropologist64, psychologist, or popular agnostic is to evade85 the following dilemma86: To the anthropologist we say, ‘The evidence we adduce is your own evidence, that of books of travel in all lands and countries. If you may argue from it, so may we. Some of it is evidence to unusual facts, more of it is evidence to singular beliefs, which we think not necessarily without foundation. As raising a presumption87 in favour of that opinion, we cite examples in which savage observations of abnormal and once rejected facts, are now admitted by science to have a large residuum of truth, we argue that what is admitted in some cases may come to be admitted in more. No a priori line can here be drawn.’
To the psychologist who objects that our modern instances are mere anecdotes88, we reply by asking, ‘Dear sir, what are your modern instances? What do you know of “Mrs. A.,” whom you still persistently89 cite as an example of morbid91 recurrent hallucinations? Name the German servant girl who, in a fever, talked several learned languages, which she had heard her former master, a scholar, declaim! Where did she live? Who vouches92 for her, who heard her, who understood her? There is, you know, no evidence at all; the anecdote is told by Coleridge: the phenomena are said by him to have been observed “in a Roman Catholic town in Germany, a year or two before my arrival at G?ttingen. . . . Many eminent93 physiologists94 and psychologists visited the town.” Why do you not name a few out of the distinguished95 crowd?’8 This anecdote, a rumour79 of a rumour of a Protestant explanation of a Catholic marvel96, was told by Coleridge at least twenty years after the possible date. The psychologists copy it,9 one after the other, as a flock of sheep jump where their leader has jumped. An example by way of anecdote may be permitted.
According to the current anthropological theory, the idea of soul or spirit was suggested to early men by their experiences in dreams. They seemed, in sleep, to visit remote places; therefore, they argued, something within them was capable of leaving the body and wandering about.
This something was the soul or spirit. Now it is obvious that this opinion of early men would be confirmed if they ever chanced to acquire, in dreams, knowledge of places which they had never visited, and of facts as to which, in their waking state, they could have no information. This experience, indeed, would suggest problems even To Mr. Herbert Spencer, if it occurred to him.
Conversing97 on this topic with a friend of acknowledged philosophical eminence98, I illustrated99 my meaning by a story of a dream. It was reported to me by the dreamer, with whom I am well acquainted, was of very recent occurrence, and was corroborated100 by the evidence of another person, to whom the dream was narrated101, before its fulfilment was discovered. I am not at liberty to publish the details, for good reasons, but the essence of the matter was this: A. and B. (the dreamer) had common interests. A. had taken certain steps about which B. had only a surmise102, and a vague one, that steps had probably been taken. A. then died, and B. in an extremely vivid dream (a thing unfamiliar103 to him) seemed to read a mass of unknown facts, culminating in two definite results, capable of being stated in figures. These results, by the very nature of the case, could not be known to A., so that, before he was placed out of B.‘s reach by death, he could not have stated them to him, and, afterwards, had assuredly no means of doing so.
The dream, two days after its occurrence, and after it had been told to C., proved to be literally104 correct. Now I am not asking the reader’s belief for this anecdote (for that could only be yielded in virtue105 of knowledge of the veracity106 of B. and C.), but I invite his attention to the psychological explanation. My friend suggested that A. had told B. all about the affair, that B. had not listened (though his interests were vitally concerned), and that the crowd of curious details, naturally unfamiliar to B., had reposed107 in his subconscious108 memory, and had been revived in the dream.
Now B.‘s dream was a dream of reading a mass of minute details, including names of places entirely109 unknown to him. It may be admitted, in accordance with the psychological theory, that B. might have received all this information from A., but, by dint of inattention — ‘the malady110 of not marking’ — might never have been consciously aware of what he heard. Then B.‘s subconscious memory of what he did not consciously know might break upon him in his dream. Instances of similar mental phenomena are not uncommon111. But the general result of the combined details was one which could not possibly be known to A. before his death; nor to B. could it be known at all. Yet B.‘s dream represented this general result with perfect accuracy, which cannot be accounted for by the revival112 of subconscious memory in sleep. Neither asleep nor awake can a man remember what it is impossible for him to have known. The dream contained no prediction for the results were now fixed113; but (granting the good faith of the narrator) the dream did contain information not normally accessible.
However, by way of psychological explanation of the dream, my friend cited Coleridge’s legend, as to the German girl and her unconscious knowledge of certain learned languages. ‘And what is the evidence for the truth of Coleridge’s legend?’ Of course, there is none, or none known to all the psychologists who quote it from Coleridge. Neither, if true, was the legend to the point. However, psychology will accept such unauthenticated narratives114, and yet will scoff115 at first baud, duly corroborated testimony from living and honourable116 people, about recent events.
Only a great force of prejudice can explain this acceptance, by psychologists, of one kind of marvellous tale on no evidence, and this rejection117 of another class of marvellous tale, when supported by first hand, signed and corroborated evidence, of living witnesses. I see only one escape for psychologists from this dilemma. Their marvellous tales are possible, though unvouched for, because they have always heard them and repeated them in lectures, and read and repeated them in books. Our marvellous tales are impossible, because the psychologists know that they are impossible, which means that they have not been familiar with them, from youth upwards118, in lectures and manuals. But man has no right to have ‘clear ideas of the possible and impossible,’ like Faraday, a priori, except in the exact sciences. There are other instances of weak evidence which satisfies psychologists.
Hamilton has an anecdote, borrowed from Monboddo, who got it from Mr. Hans Stanley, who, ‘about twenty-six years ago,’ heard it from the subject of the story, Madame de Laval. ‘I have the memorandum119 somewhere in my papers,’ says Mr. Stanley, vaguely120. Then we have two American anecdotes by Dr. Flint and Mr. Rush; and such is Sir William Hamilton’s equipment of odd facts for discussing the unconscious or subconscious. The least credible121 and worst attested of these narratives still appears in popular works on psychology. Moreover, all psychology, except experimental psychology, is based on anecdotes which people tell about their own subjective122 experiences. Mr. Galton, whose original researches are well known, even offered rewards in money for such narratives about visualised rows of coloured figures, and so on.
Clearly the psychologist, then, has no prima facie right to object to our anecdotes of experiences, which he regards as purely subjective. As evidence, we only accept them at first hand, and, when possible, the witnesses have been cross-examined personally. Our evidence then, where it consists of travellers’ tales, is on a level with that which satisfies the anthropologist. Where it consists of modern statements of personal experience, our evidence is often infinitely123 better than much which is accepted by the nonexperimental psychologist. As for the agnostic writer on the Non–Religion of the Future, M. Guyau actually illustrates124 the Resurrection of our Lord by an American myth about a criminal, of whom a hallucinatory phantasm appeared to each of his gaol125 companions, separately and successively, on a day after his execution! For this prodigious126 fable36 no hint of reference to authority is given.10 Yet the evidence appears to satisfy M. Guyau, and is used by him to reinforce his argument.
The anthropologist and psychologist, then, must either admit that their evidence is no better than ours, if as good, or must say that they only believe evidence as to ‘possible’ facts. They thus constitute themselves judges of what is possible, and practically regard themselves as omniscient127. Science has had to accept so many things once scoffed128 at as ‘impossible,’ that this attitude of hers, as we shall show in chapter ii., ceases to command respect.
My suggestion is that the trivial, rejected, or unheeded phenomena vouched for by the evidence here defended may, not inconceivably, be of considerable importance. But, stating the case at the lowest, if we are only concerned with illusions and fables, it cannot but be curious to note their persistent90 uniformity in savage and civilised life.
To make the first of our two main positions clear, and in part to justify129 ourselves in asking any attention for such matters, we now offer an historical sketch of the relations between Science and the so-called ‘Miraculous’ in the past.
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62 personalities | |
n. 诽谤,(对某人容貌、性格等所进行的)人身攻击; 人身攻击;人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
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63 continental | |
adj.大陆的,大陆性的,欧洲大陆的 | |
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64 anthropologist | |
n.人类学家,人类学者 | |
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65 missionaries | |
n.传教士( missionary的名词复数 ) | |
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66 analogous | |
adj.相似的;类似的 | |
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67 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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68 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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69 peculiarities | |
n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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70 rapport | |
n.和睦,意见一致 | |
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71 frankly | |
adv.坦白地,直率地;坦率地说 | |
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72 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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73 sketch | |
n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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74 superstitious | |
adj.迷信的 | |
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75 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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76 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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77 pious | |
adj.虔诚的;道貌岸然的 | |
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78 rumoured | |
adj.谣传的;传说的;风 | |
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79 rumour | |
n.谣言,谣传,传闻 | |
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80 superstition | |
n.迷信,迷信行为 | |
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81 depositions | |
沉积(物)( deposition的名词复数 ); (在法庭上的)宣誓作证; 处置; 罢免 | |
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82 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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83 invoke | |
v.求助于(神、法律);恳求,乞求 | |
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84 vouched | |
v.保证( vouch的过去式和过去分词 );担保;确定;确定地说 | |
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85 evade | |
vt.逃避,回避;避开,躲避 | |
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86 dilemma | |
n.困境,进退两难的局面 | |
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87 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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88 anecdotes | |
n.掌故,趣闻,轶事( anecdote的名词复数 ) | |
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89 persistently | |
ad.坚持地;固执地 | |
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90 persistent | |
adj.坚持不懈的,执意的;持续的 | |
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91 morbid | |
adj.病的;致病的;病态的;可怕的 | |
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92 vouches | |
v.保证( vouch的第三人称单数 );担保;确定;确定地说 | |
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93 eminent | |
adj.显赫的,杰出的,有名的,优良的 | |
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94 physiologists | |
n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 );生理学( physiology的名词复数 );生理机能 | |
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95 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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96 marvel | |
vi.(at)惊叹vt.感到惊异;n.令人惊异的事 | |
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97 conversing | |
v.交谈,谈话( converse的现在分词 ) | |
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98 eminence | |
n.卓越,显赫;高地,高处;名家 | |
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99 illustrated | |
adj. 有插图的,列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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100 corroborated | |
v.证实,支持(某种说法、信仰、理论等)( corroborate的过去式 ) | |
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101 narrated | |
v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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102 surmise | |
v./n.猜想,推测 | |
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103 unfamiliar | |
adj.陌生的,不熟悉的 | |
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104 literally | |
adv.照字面意义,逐字地;确实 | |
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105 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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106 veracity | |
n.诚实 | |
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107 reposed | |
v.将(手臂等)靠在某人(某物)上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108 subconscious | |
n./adj.潜意识(的),下意识(的) | |
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109 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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110 malady | |
n.病,疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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111 uncommon | |
adj.罕见的,非凡的,不平常的 | |
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112 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
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113 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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114 narratives | |
记叙文( narrative的名词复数 ); 故事; 叙述; 叙述部分 | |
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115 scoff | |
n.嘲笑,笑柄,愚弄;v.嘲笑,嘲弄,愚弄,狼吞虎咽 | |
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116 honourable | |
adj.可敬的;荣誉的,光荣的 | |
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117 rejection | |
n.拒绝,被拒,抛弃,被弃 | |
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118 upwards | |
adv.向上,在更高处...以上 | |
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119 memorandum | |
n.备忘录,便笺 | |
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120 vaguely | |
adv.含糊地,暖昧地 | |
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121 credible | |
adj.可信任的,可靠的 | |
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122 subjective | |
a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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123 infinitely | |
adv.无限地,无穷地 | |
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124 illustrates | |
给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 ); 说明; 表明; (用示例、图画等)说明 | |
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125 gaol | |
n.(jail)监狱;(不加冠词)监禁;vt.使…坐牢 | |
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126 prodigious | |
adj.惊人的,奇妙的;异常的;巨大的;庞大的 | |
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127 omniscient | |
adj.无所不知的;博识的 | |
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128 scoffed | |
嘲笑,嘲弄( scoff的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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129 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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