The usual though not invariable reply of the anthropologist7 might be given in the words of Mr. Im Thurn, author of a most interesting work on the Indians of British Guiana:
‘From the notion of ghosts,’ says Mr. Im Thurn, ‘a belief has arisen, but very gradually, in higher spirits, and eventually in a Highest Spirit, and, keeping pace with the growth of these beliefs, a habit of reverence8 for, and worship of spirits. . . . The Indians of Guiana know no God.’1
As another example of Mr. Im Thurn’s hypothesis that God is a late development from the idea of spirit may be cited Mr. Payne’s learned ‘History of the New World,’ a work of much research:2
‘The lowest savages10 not only have no gods, but do not even recognise those lower beings usually called spirits, the conception of which has invariably preceded that of gods in the human mind.’
Mr. Payne here differs, toto caelo, from Mr. Tylor, who finds no sufficient proof for wholly non-religious savages, and from Roskoff, who has disposed of the arguments of Sir John Lubbock. Mr. Payne, then, for ethnological purposes, defines a god as ‘a benevolent11 spirit, permanently12 embodied13 in some tangible14 object, usually an image, and to whom food, drink,’ and so on, ‘are regularly offered for the purpose of securing assistance in the affairs of life.’
On this theory ‘the lowest savages’ are devoid15 of the idea of god or of spirit. Later they develop the idea of spirit, and when they have secured the spirit, as it were, in a tangible object, and kept it on board wages, then the spirit has attained16 to the dignity and the savage9 to the conception of a god. But while a god of this kind is, in Mr. Payne’s opinion, relatively17 a late flower of culture, for the hunting races generally (with some exceptions) have no gods, yet ‘the conception of a creator or maker18 of all things . . . obviously a great spirit’ is ‘one of the earliest efforts of primitive19 logic2.’3
Mr. Payne’s own logic is not very clear. The ‘primitive logic’ of the savage leads him to seek for a cause or maker of things, which he finds in a great creative spirit. Yet the lowest savages have no idea even of spirit, and the hunting races, as a rule, have no god. Does Mr. Payne mean that a great creative spirit is not a god, while a spirit kept on board wages in a tangible object is a god? We are unable, by reason of evidence later to be given, to agree with Mr. Payne’s view of the facts, while his reasoning appears somewhat inconsistent, the lowest savages having, in his opinion, no idea of spirit, though the idea of a creative spirit is, for all that, one of the earliest efforts of primitive logic.
On any such theories as these the belief in a moral Supreme20 Being is a very late (or a very early?) result of evolution, due to the action of advancing thought upon the original conception of ghosts. This opinion of Mr. Im Thurn’s is, roughly stated, the usual theory of anthropologists. We wish, on the other hand, to show that the idea of God, as he is conceived of by our inquiring plain man, is shadowed forth21 (among contradictory22 fables23) in the lowest-known grades of savagery24, and therefore cannot arise from the later speculation25 of men, comparatively civilised and advanced, on the original datum26 of ghosts. We shall demonstrate, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Spencer, Mr. Huxley, and even Mr. Tylor, that the Supreme Being, and, in one case at least, the casual sprites of savage faith, are active moral influences. What is even more important, we shall make it undeniable that Anthropology27 has simplified her problem by neglecting or ignoring her facts. While the real problem is to account for the evolution out of ghosts of the eternal, creative moral god of the ‘plain man,’ the germ of such a god or being in the creeds28 of the lowest savages is by anthropologists denied, or left out of sight, or accounted for by theories contradicted by facts, or, at best, is explained away as a result of European or Islamite influences. Now, as the problem is to account for the evolution of the highest conception of God, as far as that conception exists among the most backward races, the problem can never be solved while that highest conception of God is practically ignored.
Thus, anthropologists, as a rule, in place of facing and solving their problem, have merely evaded29 it — doubtless unwittingly. This, of course, is not the practice of Mr. Tylor, though even his great work is professedly much more concerned with the development of the idea of spirit and with the lower forms of animism than with the real crux30 — the evolution of the idea (always obscured by mythology) of a moral, uncreated, undying God among the lowest savages. This negligence31 of anthropologists has arisen from a single circumstance. They take it for granted that God is always (except where the word for God is applied32 to a living human being) regarded as Spirit. Thus, having accounted for the development of the idea of spirit, they regard God as that idea carried to its highest power, and as the final step in its evolution. But, if we can show that the early idea of an undying, moral, creative being does not necessarily or logically imply the doctrine33 of spirit (or ghost), then this idea of an eternal, moral, creative being may have existed even before the doctrine of spirit was evolved.
We may admit that Mr. Tylor’s account of the process by which Gods were evolved out of ghosts is a little touffu — rather buried in facts. We ‘can scarcely see the wood for the trees.’ We want to know how Gods, makers34 of things (or of most things), fathers in heaven, and friends, guardians35 of morality, seeing what is good or bad in the hearts of men, were evolved, as is supposed, out of ghosts or surviving souls of the dead. That such moral, practically omniscient Gods are known to the very lowest savages — Bushmen, Fuegians, Australians — we shall demonstrate.
Here the inquirer must be careful not to adopt the common opinion that Gods improve, morally and otherwise, in direct ratio to the rising grades in the evolution of culture and civilisation36. That is not necessarily the case; usually the reverse occurs. Still less must we take it for granted, following Mr. Tylor and Mr. Huxley, that the ‘alliance [of religion and morality] belongs almost, or wholly, to religions above the savage level — not to the earlier and lower creeds;’ or that ‘among the Australian savages,’ and ‘in its simplest condition,’ ‘theology is wholly independent of ethics37.’4 These statements can be proved (by such evidence as anthropology is obliged to rely upon) to be erroneous. And, just because these statements are put forward, Anthropology has an easier task in explaining the origin of religion; while, just because these statements are incorrect, her conclusion, being deduced from premises38 so far false, is invalidated.
Given souls, acquired by thinking on the lines already described, Mr. Tylor develops Gods out of them. But he is not one of the writers who is certain about every detail. He ‘scarcely attempts to clear away the haze39 that covers great parts of the subject.’5
The human soul, he says, has been the model on which man ‘framed his ideas of spiritual beings in general, from the tiniest elf that sports in the grass up to the heavenly creator and ruler of the world, the Great Spirit.’ Here it is taken for granted that the Heavenly Ruler was from the first envisaged41 as a ‘spiritual being’ — which is just the difficulty. Was He?6
The process of framing these ideas is rather obscure. The savage ‘lives in terror of the souls of the dead as harmful spirits.’ This might yield a Devil; it would not yield a God who ‘makes for righteousness.’ Happily, ‘deified ancestors are regarded, on the whole, as kindly42 spirits.’ The dead ancestor is ‘now passed into a deity43.’7 Examples of ancestor-worship follow. But we are no nearer home. For among the Zulus many Amatongo (ancestral spirits) are sacred. ‘Yet their father [i.e. the father of each actual family] is far before all others when they worship the Amatongo. . . . They do not know the ancients who are dead, nor their laud-giving names, nor their names.’8 Thus, each new generation of Zulus must have a new first worshipful object — its own father’s Itongo. This father, and his very name, are, in a generation or two, forgotten. The name of such a man, therefore, cannot survive as that of the God or Supreme Being from age to age; and, obviously, such a real dead man, while known at all, is much too well known to be taken for the creator and ruler of the world, despite some African flattering titles and superstitions44 about kings who control the weather. The Zulus, about as ‘godless’ a people as possible, have a mythical45 first ancestor, Unkulunkulu, but he is ‘beyond the reach of rites,’ and is a centre of myths rather than of worship or of moral ideas.9
After other examples of ancestor-worship, Mr. Tylor branches off into a long discussion of the theory of ‘possession’ or inspiration,10 which does not assist the argument at the present point. Thence he passes to fetishism (already discussed by us), and the transitions from the fetish — (1) to the idol46; (2) to the guardian angel (‘subliminal self’); (3) to tree and river spirits, and local spirits which cause volcanoes; and (4) to polytheism. A fetish may inhabit a tree; trees being generalised, the fetish of one oak becomes the god of the forest. Or, again, fetishes rise into ‘species gods;’ the gods of all bees, owls47, or rabbits are thus evolved.
Next,11
‘As chiefs and kings are among men, so are the great gods among the lesser48 spirits. . . . With little exception, wherever a savage or barbaric system of religion is thoroughly49 described, great gods make their appearance in the spiritual world as distinctly as chiefs in the human tribe.’
Very good; but whence comes the great God among tribes which have neither chief nor king and probably never had, as among the Fuegians, Bushmen, and Australians? The maker and ruler of the world known to these races cannot be the shadow of king or chief, reflected and magnified on the mist of thought; for chief or king these peoples have none. This theory (Hume’s) will not work where people have a great God but no king or chief; nor where they have a king but no Zeus or other supreme King-god, as (I conceive) among the Aztecs.
We now reach, in Mr. Tylor’s theory, great fetish deities50, such as Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, and ‘departmental deities,’ gods of Agriculture, War, and so forth, unknown to low savages.
Next Mr. Tylor introduces an important personage. ‘The theory of family Manes, carried back to tribal51 Gods, leads to the recognition of superior deities of the nature of Divine Ancestor, or First Man,’ who sometimes ranks as Lord of the Dead. As an instance, Mr. Tylor gives the Maori Maui, who, like the Indian Yama, trod first of men the path of death. But whether Maui and Yama are the Sun, or not, both Maori and Sanskrit religion regard these heroes as much later than the Original Gods. In Kamschatka the First Man is the ‘son’ of the Creator, and it is about the origin of the idea of the Creator, not of the First Man, that we are inquiring. Adam is called ‘the son of God’ in a Biblical genealogy52, but, of course, Adam was made, not begotten53. The case of the Zulu belief will be analysed later. On the whole, we cannot explain away the conception of the Creator as a form of the conception of an idealised divine First Ancestor, because the conception of a Creator occurs where ancestor-worship does not occur; and again, because, supposing that the idea of a Creator came first, and that ancestor-worship later grew more popular, the popular idea of Ancestor might be transferred to the waning54 idea of Creator. The Creator might be recognised as the First Ancestor, après coup55.
Mr. Tylor next approaches Dualism, the idea of hostile Good and Bad Beings. We must, as he says, be careful to discount European teaching, still, he admits, the savage has this dualistic belief in a ‘primitive’ form. But the savage conception is not merely that of ‘good = friendly to me,’ ‘bad = hostile to me.’ Ethics, as we shall show, already come into play in his theology.
Mr. Tylor arrives, at last, at the Supreme Being of savage creeds. His words, well weighed, must be cited textually —
‘To mark off the doctrines56 of monotheism, closer definition is required [than the bare idea of a Supreme Creator], assigning the distinctive57 attributes of Deity to none save the Almighty58 Creator. It may be declared that, in this strict sense, no savage tribe of monotheists has been ever known.12 Nor are any fair representatives of the lower culture in a strict sense pantheists. The doctrine which they do widely hold, and which opens to them a course tending in one or other of these directions, is polytheism culminating in the rule of one supreme divinity. High above the doctrine of souls, of divine Manes, of local nature gods, of the great gods of class and element, there are to be discerned in barbaric theology, shadowings, quaint59 or majestic60, of the conception of a Supreme Deity, henceforth to be traced onward61 in expanding power and brightening glory along the history of Religion. It is no unimportant task, partial as it is, to select and group the typical data which show the nature and position of the doctrine of supremacy62, as it comes into view within the lower culture.13
We shall show that certain low savages are as monotheistic as some Christians63. They have a Supreme Being, and the ‘distinctive attributes of Deity’ are not by them assigned to other beings, further than as Christianity assigns them to Angels, Saints, the Devil, and, strange as it appears, among savages, to mediating65 ‘Sons.’
It is not known that, among the Andamanese and other tribes, this last notion is due to missionary66 influence. But, in regard to the whole chapter of savage Supreme Beings, we must, as Mr. Tylor advises, keep watching for Christian64 and Islamite contamination. The savage notions, as Mr. Tylor says, even when thus contaminated, may have ‘to some extent, a native substratum.’ We shall select such savage examples of the idea of a Supreme Being as are attested67 by ancient native hymns68, or are inculcated in the most sacred and secret savage institutions, the religious Mysteries (manifestly the last things to be touched by missionary influence), or are found among low insular69 races defended from European contact by the jealous ferocity and poisonous jungles of people and soil. We also note cases in which missionaries70 found such native names as ‘Father,’ ‘Ancient of Heaven,’ ‘Maker of All,’ ready-made to their hands.
It is to be remarked that, while this branch of the inquiry71 is practically omitted by Mr. Spencer, Mr. Tylor can spare for it but some twenty pages out of his large work. He arranges the probable germs of the savage idea of a Supreme Being thus: A god of the polytheistic crowd is simply raised to the primacy, which, of course, cannot occur where there is no polytheism. Or the principle of Manes worship may make a Supreme Deity out of ‘a primeval ancestor’ say Unkulunkulu, who is so far from being supreme, that he is abject72. Or, again, a great phenomenon or force in Nature-worship, say Sun, or Heaven, is raised to supremacy. Or speculative73 philosophy ascends74 from the Many to the One by trying to discern through and beyond the universe a First Cause. Animistic conceptions thus reach their utmost limit in the notion of the Anima Mundi. He may accumulate all powers of all polytheistic gods, or he may ‘loom vast, shadowy, and calm . . . too benevolent to need human worship . . . too merely existent to concern himself with the petty race of men.’14 But he is always animistic.
Now, in addition to the objections already noted75 in passing, how can we tell that the Supreme Being of low savages was, in original conception, animistic at all? How can we know that he was envisaged, originally, as Spirit? We shall show that he probably was not, that the question ‘spirit or not spirit’ was not raised at all, that the Maker and Father in Heaven, prior to Death, was merely regarded as a deathless Being, no question of ‘spirit’ being raised. If so, Animism was not needed for the earliest idea of a moral Eternal. This hypothesis will be found to lead to some very singular conclusions.
It will be more fully76 stated and illustrated77, presently, but I find that it had already occurred to Dr. Brinton.15 He is talking specially78 of a heaven-god; he says ‘it came to pass that the idea of God was linked to the heavens long ere man asked himself, Are the heavens material and God spiritual?’ Dr. Brinton, however, does not develop his idea, nor am I aware that it has been developed previously79.
The notion of a God about whose spirituality nobody has inquired is new to us. To ourselves, and doubtless or probably to barbarians80 on a certain level of culture, such a Divine Being must be animistic, must be a ‘spirit.’ To take only one case, to which we shall return, the Banks Islanders (Melanesia) believe in ghosts, ‘and in the existence of Beings who were not, and never had been, human. All alike might be called spirits,’ says Dr. Codrington, but, ex hypothesi, the Beings ‘who never were human’ are only called ‘spirits,’ by us, because our habits of thought do not enable us to envisage40 them except as ‘spirits.’ They never were men, ‘the natives will always maintain that he (the Vui) was something different, and deny to him the fleshly body of a man,’ while resolute81 that he was not a ghost.16
This point will be amply illustrated later, as we study that strangely neglected chapter, that essential chapter, the Higher beliefs of the Lowest savages. Of the existence of a belief in a Supreme Being, not as merely ‘alleged,’ there is as good evidence as we possess for any fact in the ethnographic region.
It is certain that savages, when first approached by curious travellers, and missionaries, have again and again recognised our God in theirs.
The mythical details and fables about the savage God are, indeed, different; the ethical82, benevolent, admonishing83, rewarding, and creative aspects of the Gods are apt to be the same.17
‘There is no necessity for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of the existence of God, or of a future state, ‘the facts being universally admitted.’18
‘Intelligent men among the Bakwains have scouted84 the idea of any of them ever having been without a tolerably clear conception of good and evil, God and the future state; Nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them as otherwise,’ except polygamy, says Livingstone.
Now we may agree with Mr. Tylor that modern theologians, familiar with savage creeds, will scarcely argue that ‘they are direct or nearly direct products of revelation’ (vol. ii. p. 356). But we may argue that, considering their nascent85 ethics (denied or minimised by many anthropologists) and the distance which separates the high gods of savagery from the ghosts out of which they are said to have sprung; considering too, that the relatively pure and lofty element which, ex hypothesi, is most recent in evolution, is also, not the most honoured, but often just the reverse; remembering, above all, that we know nothing historically of the mental condition of the founders86 of religion, we may hesitate to accept the anthropological hypothesis en masse. At best it is conjectural87, and the facts are such that opponents have more justification88 than is commonly admitted for regarding the bulk of savage religion as degenerate89, or corrupted90, from its own highest elements. I am by no means, as yet, arguing positively91 in favour of that hypothesis, but I see what its advocates mean, or ought to mean, and the strength of their position. Mr. Tylor, with his unique fairness, says ‘the degeneration theory, no doubt in some instances with justice, may claim such beliefs as mutilated and perverted92 remains93 of higher religion’ (vol. ii. p. 336).
I do not pretend to know how the lowest savages evolved the theory of a God who reads the heart and ‘makes for righteousness,’ It is as easy, almost, for me to believe that they ‘were not left without a witness,’ as to believe that this God of theirs was evolved out of the maleficent ghost of a dirty mischievous94 medicine-man.
Here one may repeat that while the ‘quaint or majestic foreshadowings’ of a Supreme Being, among very low savages, are only sketched95 lightly by Mr. Tylor; in Mr. Herbert Spencer’s system they seem to be almost omitted. In his ‘Principles of Sociology’ and ‘Ecclesiastical Institutions’ one looks in vain for an adequate notice; in vain for almost any notice, of this part of his topic. The watcher of conduct, the friendly, creative being of low savage faith, whence was he evolved? The circumstance of his existence, as far as I can see; the chastity, the unselfishness, the pitifulness, the loyalty96 to plighted97 word, the prohibition98 of even extra-tribal homicide, enjoined99 in various places on his worshippers, are problems that appear somehow to have escaped Mr. Spencer’s notice. We are puzzled by endless difficulties in his system: for example as to how savages can forget their great-grandfathers’ very names, and yet remember ‘traditional persons from generation to generation,’ so that ‘in time any amount of expansion and idealisation can be reached,’19
Again, Mr. Spencer will argue that it is a strange thing if ‘primitive men had, as some think, the consciousness of a Universal Power whence they and all other things proceeded,’ and yet ‘spontaneously performed to that Power an act like that performed by them to the dead body of a fellow savage’ — by offerings of food.20
Now, first, there would be nothing strange in the matter if the crude idea of ‘Universal Power’ came earliest, and was superseded100, in part, by a later propitiation of the dead and ghosts. The new religious idea would soon refract back on, and influence by its ritual, the older conception. And, secondly101, it is precisely102 this ‘Universal Power’ that is not propitiated103 by offerings of food, in Tonga, (despite Mr. Huxley) Australia, and Africa, for example. We cannot escape the difficulty by saying that there the old ghost of Universal Power is regarded as dead, decrepit104, or as a roi-fainéant not worth propitiating105, for that is not true of the punisher of sin, the teacher of generosity106, and the solitary107 sanction of faith between men and peoples.
It would appear then, on the whole, that the question of the plain man to the anthropologist, ‘Having got your idea of spirit into the savage’s mind, how does he develop out of it what I call God?’ has not been answered. God cannot be a reflection from human kings where there have been no kings; nor a president elected out of a polytheistic society of gods where there is as yet no polytheism; nor an ideal first ancestor where men do not worship their ancestors; while, again, the spirit of a man who died, real or ideal, does not answer to a common savage conception of the Creator. All this will become much more obvious as we study in detail the highest gods of the lowest races.
Our study, of course, does not pretend to embrace the religion of all the savages in the world. We are content with typical, and, as a rule, well-observed examples. We range from the creeds of the most backward and worst-equipped nomad108 races, to those of peoples with an aristocracy, hereditary109 kings, houses and agriculture, ending with the Supreme Being of the highly civilised Incas, and with the Jehovah of the Hebrews.
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anthropological
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| adj.人类学的 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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primal
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| adj.原始的；最重要的 | |
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omniscient
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| adj.无所不知的；博识的 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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anthropologist
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| n.人类学家，人类学者 | |
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reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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savage
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| adj.野蛮的；凶恶的，残暴的；n.未开化的人 | |
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savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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tangible
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| adj.有形的，可触摸的，确凿的，实际的 | |
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devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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maker
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| n.制造者，制造商 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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forth
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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fables
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| n.寓言( fable的名词复数 )；神话，传说 | |
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savagery
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speculation
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datum
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| n.资料；数据；已知数 | |
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anthropology
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| n.人类学 | |
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creeds
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| （尤指宗教）信条，教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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crux
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| adj.十字形；难事，关键，最重要点 | |
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negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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makers
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| n.制造者，制造商（maker的复数形式） | |
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guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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premises
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haze
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| n.霾，烟雾；懵懂，迷糊；vi.(over)变模糊 | |
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envisage
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| v.想象，设想，展望，正视 | |
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envisaged
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| 想像，设想( envisage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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superstitions
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| 迷信，迷信行为( superstition的名词复数 ) | |
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mythical
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| adj.神话的；虚构的；想像的 | |
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46
idol
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| n.偶像，红人，宠儿 | |
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47
owls
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| n.猫头鹰( owl的名词复数 ) | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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50
deities
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| n.神，女神( deity的名词复数 )；神祗；神灵；神明 | |
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tribal
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| adj.部族的，种族的 | |
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genealogy
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| n.家系，宗谱 | |
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begotten
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| v.为…之生父( beget的过去分词 )；产生，引起 | |
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waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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55
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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56
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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almighty
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| adj.全能的，万能的；很大的，很强的 | |
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quaint
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| adj.古雅的，离奇有趣的，奇怪的 | |
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majestic
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| adj.雄伟的，壮丽的，庄严的，威严的，崇高的 | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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Christians
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| n.基督教徒( Christian的名词复数 ) | |
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Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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mediating
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| 调停，调解，斡旋( mediate的现在分词 )； 居间促成； 影响…的发生； 使…可能发生 | |
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missionary
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| adj.教会的，传教(士)的；n.传教士 | |
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attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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hymns
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| n.赞美诗，圣歌，颂歌( hymn的名词复数 ) | |
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insular
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| adj.岛屿的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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missionaries
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| n.传教士( missionary的名词复数 ) | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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ascends
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的第三人称单数 ) | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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illustrated
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| adj. 有插图的，列举的 动词illustrate的过去式和过去分词 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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barbarians
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| n.野蛮人( barbarian的名词复数 )；外国人；粗野的人；无教养的人 | |
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resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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admonishing
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| v.劝告( admonish的现在分词 )；训诫；（温和地）责备；轻责 | |
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scouted
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| 寻找，侦察( scout的过去式和过去分词 )； 物色（优秀运动员、演员、音乐家等） | |
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nascent
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| adj.初生的，发生中的 | |
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founders
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| n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
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conjectural
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| adj.推测的 | |
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justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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corrupted
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| （使）败坏( corrupt的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）腐化； 引起（计算机文件等的）错误； 破坏 | |
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positively
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| adv.明确地，断然，坚决地；实在，确实 | |
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perverted
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| adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 )；腐蚀；败坏；使堕落 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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plighted
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| vt.保证，约定（plight的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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prohibition
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| n.禁止；禁令，禁律 | |
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99
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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101
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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102
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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103
propitiated
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| v.劝解，抚慰，使息怒( propitiate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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104
decrepit
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| adj.衰老的，破旧的 | |
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105
propitiating
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| v.劝解，抚慰，使息怒( propitiate的现在分词 ) | |
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106
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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107
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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108
nomad
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| n.游牧部落的人，流浪者，游牧民 | |
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109
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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