The term taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate; the thing which we understand by it is far from a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is therefore liable to uncertainty21 and confusion. I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated22 remedy for the cure of this disorder23. For, when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing24 nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us; instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner of combining. We are limited in our inquiry by the strict laws to which we have submitted at our setting out.
Circa vilem patulumque morabimur orbem,
Unde pudor proferre pedem vetat aut operis lex.
A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined; but let the virtue25 of a definition be what it will, in the order of things, it seems rather to follow than to precede our inquiry, of which it ought to be considered as the result. It must be acknowledged that the methods of disquisition and teaching may be sometimes different, and on very good reason undoubtedly26; but, for my part, I am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches most nearly to the method of investigation27 is incomparably the best; since, not content with serving up a few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stock on which they grew; it tends to set the reader himself in the track of invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own discoveries, if he should be so happy as to have made any that are valuable.
But to cut off all pretence28 for cavilling29, I mean by the word taste, no more than that faculty or those faculties30 of the mind, which are affected with, or which form a judgment of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts. This is, I think, the most general idea of that word, and what is the least connected with any particular theory. And my point in this inquiry is, to find whether there are any principles, on which the imagination is affected, so common to all, so grounded and certain, as to supply the means of reasoning satisfactorily about them. And such principles of taste I fancy there are; however paradoxical it may seem to those, who on a superficial view imagine that there is so great a diversity of tastes, both in kind and degree, that nothing can be more indeterminate.
All the natural powers in man, which I know, that are conversant31 about external objects, are the senses; the imagination; and the judgment. And first with regard to the senses. We do and we must suppose, that as the conformation of their organs are nearly or altogether the same in all men, so the manner of perceiving external objects is in all men the same, or with little difference. We are satisfied that what appears to be light to one eye, appears light to another; that what seems sweet to one palate, is sweet to another; that what is dark and bitter to this man, is likewise dark and bitter to that; and we conclude in the same manner of great and little, hard and soft, hot and cold, rough and smooth; and indeed of all the natural qualities and affections of bodies. If we suffer ourselves to imagine, that their senses present to different men different images of things, this sceptical proceeding32 will make every sort of reasoning on every subject vain and frivolous33, even that sceptical reasoning itself which had persuaded us to entertain a doubt concerning the agreement of our perceptions. But as there will be little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, it must necessarily be allowed, that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, whilst it operates naturally, simply, and by its proper powers only: for if we deny this, we must imagine that the same cause, operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind, will produce different effects; which would be highly absurd. Let us first consider this point in the sense of taste, and the rather as the faculty in question has taken its name from that sense. All men are agreed to call vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as they are all agreed in finding those qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning their effects with regard to pleasure and pain. They all concur3 in calling sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness unpleasant. Here there is no diversity in their sentiments; and that there is not, appears fully34 from the consent of all men in the metaphors35 which are taken, from the souse of taste. A sour temper, bitter expressions, bitter curses, a bitter fate, are terms well and strongly understood by all. And we are altogether as well understood when we say, a sweet disposition36, a sweet person, a sweet condition and the like. It is confessed, that custom and some other causes have made many deviations37 from the natural pleasures or pains which belong to these several tastes; but then the power of distinguishing between the natural and the acquired relish38 remains39 to the very last. A man frequently comes to prefer the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavor of vinegar to that of milk; but this makes no confusion in tastes, whilst he is sensible that the tobacco and vinegar are not sweet, and whilst he knows that habit alone has reconciled his palate to these alien pleasures. Even with such a person we may speak, and with sufficient precision, concerning tastes. But should any man be found who declares, that to him tobacco has a taste like sugar, and that he cannot distinguish between milk and vinegar; or that tobacco and vinegar are sweet, milk bitter, and sugar sour; we immediately conclude that the organs of this man are out of order, and that his palate is utterly40 vitiated. We are as far from conferring with such a person upon tastes, as from reasoning concerning the relations of quantity with one who should deny that all the parts together were equal to the whole. We do not call a man of this kind wrong in his notions, but absolutely mad. Exceptions of this sort, in either way, do not at all impeach41 our general rule, nor make us conclude that men have various principles concerning the relations of quantity or the taste of things. So that when it is said, taste cannot be disputed, it can only mean, that no one can strictly42 answer what pleasure or pain some particular man may find from the taste of some particular thing. This indeed cannot be disputed; but we may dispute, and with sufficient clearness too, concerning the things which are naturally pleasing or disagreeable to the sense. But when we talk of any peculiar43 or acquired relish, then we must know the habits, the prejudices, or the distempers of this particular man, and we must draw our conclusion from those.
This agreement of mankind is not confined to the taste solely44. The principle of pleasure derived46 from sight is the same in all. Light is more pleasing than darkness. Summer, when the earth is clad in green, when the heavens are serene47 and bright, is more agreeable than winter, when everything makes a different appearance. I never remember that anything beautiful, whether a man, a beast, a bird, or a plant, was ever shown, though it were to a hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beautiful, though some might have thought that it fell short of their expectation, or that other things were still finer. I believe no man thinks a goose to be more beautiful than a swan, or imagines that what they call a Friesland hen excels a peacock. It must be observed too, that the pleasures of the sight are not near so complicated, and confused, and altered by unnatural48 habits and associations, as the pleasures of the taste are; because the pleasures of the sight more commonly acquiesce49 in themselves; and are not so often altered by considerations which are independent of the sight itself. But things do not spontaneously present themselves to the palate as they do to the sight; they are generally applied50 to it, either as food or as medicine; and from the qualities which they possess for nutritive or medicinal purposes they often form the palate by degrees, and by force of these associations. Thus opium51 is pleasing to Turks, on account of the agreeable delirium52 it produces. Tobacco is the delight of Dutchmen, as it diffuses53 a torpor54 and pleasing stupefaction. Fermented55 spirits please our common people, because they banish56 care, and all consideration of future or present evils. All of these would lie absolutely neglected if their properties had originally gone no further than the taste; but all these, together with tea and coffee, and some other things, have passed from the apothecary’s shop to our tables, and were taken for health long before they were thought of for pleasure. The effect of the drug has made us use it frequently; and frequent use, combined with the agreeable effect, has made the taste itself at last agreeable. But this does not in the least perplex our reasoning; because we distinguish to the last the acquired from the natural relish. In describing the taste of an unknown fruit, you would scarcely say that it had a sweet and pleasant flavor like tobacco, opium, or garlic, although you spoke57 to those who were in the constant use of those drugs, and had great pleasure in them. There is in all men a sufficient remembrance of the original natural causes of pleasure, to enable them to bring all things offered to their senses to that standard, and to regulate their feelings and opinions by it. Suppose one who had so vitiated his palate as to take more pleasure in the taste of opium than in that of butter or honey, to be presented with a bolus of squills; there is hardly any doubt but that he would prefer the butter or honey to this nauseous morsel58, or to any other bitter drug to which he had not been accustomed; which proves that his palate was naturally like that of other men in all things, that it is still like the palate of other men in many things, and only vitiated in some particular points. For in judging of any new thing, even of a taste similar to that which he has been formed by habit to like, he finds his palate affected in the natural manner, and on the common principles. Thus the pleasure of all the senses, of the sight, and even of the taste, that most ambiguous of the senses, is the same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned.
Besides the ideas, with their annexed59 pains and pleasures, which are presented by the sense; the mind of man possesses a sort of creative power of its own; either in representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and manner in which they were received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and according to a different order. This power is called imagination; and to this belongs whatever is called wit, fancy, invention, and the like. But it must be observed, that this power of the imagination is incapable60 of producing anything absolutely new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses. Now the imagination is the most extensive province of pleasure and pain, as it is the region of our fears and our hopes, and of all our passions that are connected with them; and whatever is calculated to affect the imagination with these commanding ideas, by force of any original natural impression, must have the same power pretty equally over all men. For since the imagination is only the representation of the senses, it can only be pleased or displeased61 with the images, from the same principle on which the sense is pleased or displeased with the realities; and consequently there must be just as close an agreement in the imaginations as in the senses of men. A little attention will convince us that this must of necessity be the case.
But in the imagination, besides the pain or pleasure arising from the properties of the natural object, a pleasure is perceived from the resemblance which the imitation has to the original: the imagination, I conceive, can have no pleasure but what results from one or other of these causes. And these causes operate pretty uniformly upon all men, because they operate by principles in nature, and which are not derived from any particular habits or advantages. Mr. Locke very justly and finely observes of wit, that it is chiefly conversant in tracing resemblances; he remarks, at the same time, that the business of judgment is rather in finding differences. It may perhaps appear, on this supposition, that there is no material distinction between the wit and the judgment, as they both seem to result from different operations of the same faculty of comparing. But in reality, whether they are or are not dependent on the same power of the mind, they differ so very materially in many respects, that a perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the rarest things in the world. When two distinct objects are unlike to each other, it is only what we expect; things are in their common way; and therefore they make no impression on the imagination: but when two distinct objects have a resemblance, we are struck, we attend to them, and we are pleased. The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacrity62 and satisfaction in tracing resemblances than in searching for differences; because by making resemblances we produce new images; we unite, we create, we enlarge our stock; but in making distinctions we offer no food at all to the imagination; the task itself is more severe and irksome, and what pleasure we derive45 from it is something of a negative and indirect nature. A piece of news is told me in the morning; this, merely as a piece of news, as a fact added to my stock, gives me some pleasure. In the evening I find there was nothing in it. What do I gain by this, but the dissatisfaction to find that I had been imposed upon? Hence it is that men are much more naturally inclined to belief than to incredulity. And it is upon this principle, that the most ignorant and barbarous nations have frequently excelled in similitudes, comparisons, metaphors, and allegories, who have been weak and backward in distinguishing and sorting their ideas. And it is for a reason of this kind, that Homer and the oriental writers, though very fond of similitudes, and though they often strike out such as are truly admirable, seldom take care to have them exact; that is, they are taken with the general resemblance, they paint it strongly, and they take no notice of the difference which may be found between the things compared.
Now as the pleasure of resemblance is that which principally flatters the imagination, all men are nearly equal in this point, as far as their knowledge of the things represented or compared extends. The principle of this knowledge is very much accidental, as it depends upon experience and observation, and not on the strength or weakness of any natural faculty; and it is from this difference in knowledge, that what we commonly, though with no great exactness, call a difference in taste proceeds. A man to whom sculpture is new, sees a barber’s block, or some ordinary piece of statuary; he is immediately struck and pleased, because he sees something like a human figure; and, entirely64 taken up with this likeness65, he does not at all attend to its defects. No person, I believe, at the first time of seeing a piece of imitation ever did. Some time after, we suppose that this novice66 lights upon a more artificial work of the same nature; he now begins to look with contempt on what he admired at first; not that he admired it even then for its unlikeness to a man, but for that general though inaccurate67 resemblance which it bore to the human figure. What he admired at different times in these so different figures, is strictly the same; and though his knowledge is improved, his taste is not altered. Hitherto his mistake was from a want of knowledge in art, and this arose from his inexperience; but he may be still deficient68 from a want of knowledge in nature. For it is possible that the man in question may stop here, and that the masterpiece of a great hand may please him no more than the middling performance of a vulgar artist; and this not for want of better or higher relish, but because all men do not observe with sufficient accuracy on the human figure to enable them to judge properly of an imitation of it. And that the critical taste does not depend upon a superior principle in men, but upon superior knowledge, may appear from several instances. The story of the ancient painter and the shoemaker is very well known. The shoemaker set the painter right with regard to some mistakes he had made in the shoe of one of his figures, which the painter, who had not made such accurate observations on shoes, and was content with a general resemblance, had never observed. But this was no impeachment69 to the taste of the painter; it only showed some want of knowledge in the art of making shoes. Let us imagine, that an anatomist had come into the painter’s working-room. His piece is in general well done, the figure in question in a good attitude, and the parts well adjusted to their various movements; yet the anatomist, critical in his art, may observe the swell70 of some muscle not quite just in the peculiar action of the figure. Here the anatomist observes what the painter had not observed; and he passes by what the shoemaker had remarked. But a want of the last critical knowledge in anatomy71 no more reflected on the natural good taste of the painter, or of any common observer of his piece, than the want of an exact knowledge in the formation of a shoe. A fine piece of a decollated head of St. John the Baptist was shown to a Turkish emperor: he praised many things, but he observed one defect: he observed that the skin did not shrink from the wounded part of the neck. The sultan on this occasion, though his observation was very just, discovered no more natural taste than the painter who executed this piece, or than a thousand European connoisseurs72, who probably never would have made the same observation. His Turkish majesty73 had indeed been well acquainted with that terrible spectacle, which the others could only have represented in their imagination. On the subject of their dislike there is a difference between all these people, arising from the different kinds and degrees of their knowledge; but there is something in common to the painter, the shoemaker, the anatomist, and the Turkish emperor, the pleasure arising from a natural object, so far as each perceives it justly imitated; the satisfaction in seeing an agreeable figure; the sympathy proceeding from a striking and affecting incident. So far as taste is natural, it is nearly common to all.
In poetry, and other pieces of imagination, the same parity74 may be observed. It is true, that one man is charmed with Don Bellianis, and reads Virgil coldly; whilst another is transported with the ?neid, and leaves Don Bellianis to children. These two men seem to have a taste very different from each other; but in fact they differ very little. In both these pieces, which inspire such opposite sentiments, a tale exciting admiration75 is told; both are full of action, both are passionate76; in both are voyages, battles, triumphs, and continual changes of fortune. The admirer of Don Bellianis perhaps does not understand the refined language of the ?neid, who, if it was degraded into the style of the “Pilgrim’s Progress,” might feel it in all its energy, on the same principle which made him an admirer of Don Bellianis.
In his favorite author he is not shocked with the continual breaches77 of probability, the confusion of times, the offences against manners, the trampling78 upon geography; for he knows nothing of geography and chronology, and he has never examined the grounds of probability. He perhaps reads of a shipwreck79 on the coast of Bohemia: wholly taken up with so interesting an event, and only solicitous80 for the fate of his hero, he is not in the least troubled at this extravagant81 blunder. For why should he be shocked at a shipwreck on the coast of Bohemia, who does not know but that Bohemia may be an island in the Atlantic ocean? and after all, what reflection is this on the natural good taste of the person here supposed?
So far then as taste belongs to the imagination, its principle is the same in all men; there is no difference in the manner of their being affected, nor in the causes of the affection; but in the degree there is a difference, which arises from two causes principally; either from a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object. To illustrate82 this by the procedure of the senses, in which the same difference is found, let us suppose a very smooth marble table to be set before two men; they both perceive it to be smooth, and they are both pleased with it because of this quality. So far they agree. But suppose another, and after that another table, the latter still smoother than the former, to be set before them. It is now very probable that these men, who are so agreed upon what is smooth, and in the pleasure from thence, will disagree when they come to settle which table has the advantage in point of polish. Here is indeed the great difference between tastes, when men come to compare the excess or diminution83 of things which are judged by degree and not by measure. Nor is it easy, when such a difference arises, to settle the point, if the excess or diminution be not glaring. If we differ in opinion about two quantities, we can have recourse to a common measure, which may decide the question with the utmost exactness; and this, I take it, is what gives mathematical knowledge a greater certainty than any other. But in things whose excess is not judged by greater or smaller, as smoothness and roughness, hardness and softness, darkness and light, the shades of colors, all these are very easily distinguished84 when the difference is any way considerable, but not when it is minute, for want of some common measures, which perhaps may never come to be discovered. In these nice cases, supposing the acuteness of the sense equal, the greater attention and habit in such things will have the advantage. In the question about the tables, the marble-polisher will unquestionably determine the most accurately85. But notwithstanding this want of a common measure for settling many disputes relative to the senses, and their representative the imagination, we find that the principles are the same in all, and that there is no disagreement until we come to examine into the pre-eminence or difference of things, which brings us within the province of the judgment.
So long as we are conversant with the sensible qualities of things, hardly any more than the imagination seems concerned; little more also than the imagination seems concerned when the passions are represented, because by the force of natural sympathy they are felt in all men without any recourse to reasoning, and their justness recognized in every breast. Love, grief, fear, anger, joy, all these passions have, in their turns, affected every mind; and they do not affect it in an arbitrary or casual manner, but upon certain, natural, and uniform principles. But as many of the works of imagination are not confined to the representation of sensible objects, nor to efforts upon the passions, but extend themselves to the manners, the characters, the actions, and designs of men, their relations, their virtues86 and vices87, they come within the province of the judgment, which is improved by attention, and by the habit of reasoning. All these make a very considerable part of what are considered as the objects of taste; and Horace sends us to the schools of philosophy and the world for our instruction in them. Whatever certainty is to be acquired in morality and the science of life; just the same degree of certainty have we in what relates to them in works of imitation. Indeed it is for the most part in our skill in manners, and in the observances of time and place, and of decency88 in general, which is only to be learned in those schools to which Horace recommends us, that what is called taste, by way of distinction, consists: and which is in reality no other than a more refined judgment. On the whole, it appears to me, that what is called taste, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners, and actions. All this is requisite89 to form taste, and the groundwork of all these is the same in the human mind; for as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole groundwork of taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive90 reasoning on these matters.
Whilst we consider taste merely according to its nature and species, we shall find its principles entirely uniform; but the degree in which these principles prevail, in the several individuals of mankind, is altogether as different as the principles themselves are similar. For sensibility and judgment, which are the qualities that compose what we commonly call a taste, vary exceedingly in various people. From a defect in the former of these qualities arises a want of taste; a weakness in the latter constitutes a wrong or a bad one. There are some men formed with feelings so blunt, with tempers so cold and phlegmatic91, that they can hardly be said to be awake during the whole course of their lives. Upon such persons the most striking objects make but a faint and obscure impression. There are others so continually in the agitation92 of gross and merely sensual pleasures, or so occupied in the low drudgery93 of avarice94, or so heated in the chase of honors and distinction, that their minds, which had been used continually to the storms of these violent and tempestuous95 passions, can hardly be put in motion by the delicate and refined play of the imagination. These men, though from a different cause, become as stupid and insensible as the former; but whenever either of these happen to be struck with any natural elegance96 or greatness, or with these qualities in any work of art, they are moved upon the same principle.
The cause of a wrong taste is a defect of judgment. And this may arise from a natural weakness of understanding (in whatever the strength of that faculty may consist), or, which is much more commonly the case, it may arise from a want of a proper and well-directed exercise, which alone can make it strong and ready. Besides, that ignorance, inattention, prejudice, rashness, levity97, obstinacy98, in short, all those passions, and all those vices, which pervert99 the judgment in other matters, prejudice it no less in this its more refined and elegant province. These causes produce different opinions upon everything which is an object of the understanding, without inducing us to suppose that there are no settled principles of reason. And indeed, on the whole, one may observe, that there is rather less difference upon matters of taste among mankind, than upon most of those which depend upon the naked reason; and that men are far better agreed on the excellence100 of a description in Virgil, than on the truth or falsehood of a theory of Aristotle.
A rectitude of judgment in the arts, which may be called a good taste, does in a great measure depend upon sensibility; because if the mind has no bent101 to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply itself sufficiently102 to works of that species to acquire a competent knowledge in them. But though a degree of sensibility is requisite to form a good judgment, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise from a quick sensibility of pleasure; it frequently happens that a very poor judge, merely by force of a greater complexional sensibility, is more affected by a very poor piece, than the best judge by the most perfect; for as everything now, extraordinary, grand, or passionate, is well calculated to affect such a person, and that the faults do not affect him, his pleasure is more pure and unmixed; and as it is merely a pleasure of the imagination, it is much higher than any which is derived from a rectitude of the judgment; the judgment is for the greater part employed in throwing stumbling-blocks in the way of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its enchantment104, and in tying us down to the disagreeable yoke105 of our reason: for almost the only pleasure that men have in judging better than others, consists in a sort of conscious pride and superiority, which arises from thinking rightly; but then this is an indirect pleasure, a pleasure which does not immediately result from the object which is under contemplation. In the morning of our days, when the senses are unworn and tender, when the whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss106 of novelty fresh upon all the objects that surround us, how lively at that time are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate the judgments107 we form of things! I despair of ever receiving the same degree of pleasure from the most excellent performances of genius, which I felt at that age from pieces which my present judgment regards as trifling108 and contemptible109. Every trivial cause of pleasure is apt to affect the man of too sanguine110 a complexion103: his appetite is too keen to suffer his taste to be delicate; and he is in all respects what Ovid says of himself in love,
Molle meum levibus cor est violabile telis,
Et semper causa est, cur ego63 semper amem.
One of this character can never be a refined judge; never what the comic poet calls elegans formarum spectator. The excellence and force of a composition must always he imperfectly estimated from its effect on the minds of any, except we know the temper and character of those minds. The most powerful effects of poetry and music have been displayed, and perhaps are still displayed, where these arts are but in a very low and imperfect state. The rude hearer is affected by the principles which operate in these arts even in their rudest condition; and he is not skilful111 enough to perceive the defects. But as the arts advance towards their perfection, the science of criticism advances with equal pace, and the pleasure of judges is frequently interrupted by the faults which we discovered in the most finished compositions.
Before I leave this subject, I cannot help taking notice of an opinion which many persons entertain, as if the taste were a separate faculty of the mind, and distinct from the judgment and imagination; a species of instinct, by which we are struck naturally, and at the first glance, without any previous reasoning, with the excellences112 or the defects of a composition. So far as the imagination, and the passions are concerned, I believe it true, that the reason is little consulted; but where disposition, where decorum, where congruity113 are concerned, in short, wherever the best taste differs from the worst, I am convinced that the understanding operates, and nothing else; and its operation is in reality far from being always sudden, or, when it is sudden, it is often far from being right. Men of the best taste by consideration come frequently to change these early and precipitate114 judgments, which the mind, from its aversion to neutrality and doubt, loves to form on the spot. It is known that the taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly as we improve our judgment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by frequent exercise. They who have not taken these methods, if their taste decides quickly, it is always uncertainly; and their quickness is owing to their presumption115 and rashness, and not to any sudden irradiation, that in a moment dispels116 all darkness from their minds. But they who have cultivated that species of knowledge which makes the object of taste, by degrees and habitually117 attain118 not only a soundness but a readiness of judgment, as men do by the same methods on all other occasions. At first they are obliged to spell, but at last they read with ease and with celerity; but this celerity of its operation is no proof that the taste is a distinct faculty. Nobody, I believe, has attended the course of a discussion which turned upon matters within the sphere of mere naked reason, but must have observed the extreme readiness with which the whole process of the argument is carried on, the grounds discovered, the objections raised and answered, and the conclusions drawn119 from premises120, with a quickness altogether as great as the taste can be supposed to work with; and yet where nothing but plain reason either is or can be suspected to operate. To multiply principles for every different appearance is useless, and unphilosophical too in a high degree.
This matter might be pursued much farther; but it is not the extent of the subject which must prescribe our bounds, for what subject does not branch out to infinity121? It is the nature of our particular scheme, and the single point of view in which we consider it, which ought to put a stop to our researches.
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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concurrence
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| n.同意；并发 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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volatile
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| adj.反复无常的，挥发性的，稍纵即逝的，脾气火爆的；n.挥发性物质 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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labor
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| n.劳动，努力，工作，劳工；分娩；vi.劳动，努力，苦干；vt.详细分析；麻烦 | |
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laborers
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| n.体力劳动者，工人( laborer的名词复数 )；（熟练工人的）辅助工 | |
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negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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impel
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| v.推动；激励，迫使 | |
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ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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19
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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20
WHIMS
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| 虚妄，禅病 | |
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21
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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22
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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23
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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24
circumscribing
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| v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的现在分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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25
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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26
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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27
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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28
pretence
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| n.假装，作假；借口，口实；虚伪；虚饰 | |
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29
cavilling
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| n.（矿工的）工作地点抽签法v.挑剔，吹毛求疵( cavil的现在分词 ) | |
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30
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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31
conversant
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| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
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32
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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33
frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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34
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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35
metaphors
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| 隐喻( metaphor的名词复数 ) | |
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36
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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37
deviations
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| 背离，偏离( deviation的名词复数 )； 离经叛道的行为 | |
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38
relish
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| n.滋味，享受，爱好，调味品；vt.加调味料，享受，品味；vi.有滋味 | |
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39
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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40
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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41
impeach
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| v.弹劾；检举 | |
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42
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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43
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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44
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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45
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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46
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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47
serene
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| adj. 安详的，宁静的，平静的 | |
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48
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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49
acquiesce
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| vi.默许，顺从，同意 | |
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50
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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51
opium
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| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
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52
delirium
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| n. 神智昏迷,说胡话;极度兴奋 | |
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53
diffuses
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| （使光）模糊，漫射，漫散( diffuse的第三人称单数 )； （使）扩散； （使）弥漫； （使）传播 | |
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54
torpor
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| n.迟钝；麻木；（动物的）冬眠 | |
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55
fermented
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| v.（使）发酵( ferment的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）激动；骚动；骚扰 | |
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56
banish
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| vt.放逐，驱逐；消除，排除 | |
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57
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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58
morsel
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| n.一口，一点点 | |
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59
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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60
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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61
displeased
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| a.不快的 | |
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62
alacrity
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| n.敏捷，轻快，乐意 | |
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63
ego
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| n.自我，自己，自尊 | |
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64
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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65
likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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66
novice
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| adj.新手的，生手的 | |
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67
inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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68
deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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69
impeachment
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| n.弹劾；控告；怀疑 | |
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70
swell
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| vi.膨胀，肿胀；增长，增强 | |
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71
anatomy
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| n.解剖学，解剖；功能，结构，组织 | |
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72
connoisseurs
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| n.鉴赏家，鉴定家，行家( connoisseur的名词复数 ) | |
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73
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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74
parity
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| n.平价，等价，比价，对等 | |
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75
admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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76
passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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77
breaches
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| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
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78
trampling
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| 踩( trample的现在分词 )； 践踏； 无视； 侵犯 | |
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79
shipwreck
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| n.船舶失事，海难 | |
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80
solicitous
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| adj.热切的，挂念的 | |
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81
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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82
illustrate
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| v.举例说明，阐明；图解，加插图 | |
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83
diminution
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| n.减少；变小 | |
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84
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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85
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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86
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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87
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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88
decency
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| n.体面，得体，合宜，正派，庄重 | |
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89
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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90
conclusive
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| adj.最后的，结论的；确凿的，消除怀疑的 | |
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91
phlegmatic
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| adj.冷静的，冷淡的，冷漠的，无活力的 | |
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92
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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93
drudgery
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| n.苦工，重活，单调乏味的工作 | |
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94
avarice
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| n.贪婪；贪心 | |
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95
tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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96
elegance
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| n.优雅；优美，雅致；精致，巧妙 | |
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97
levity
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| n.轻率，轻浮，不稳定，多变 | |
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98
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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99
pervert
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| n.堕落者，反常者；vt.误用，滥用；使人堕落，使入邪路 | |
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100
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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101
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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102
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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103
complexion
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| n.肤色；情况，局面；气质，性格 | |
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104
enchantment
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| n.迷惑，妖术，魅力 | |
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105
yoke
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| n.轭；支配；v.给...上轭，连接，使成配偶 | |
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106
gloss
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| n.光泽，光滑；虚饰；注释；vt.加光泽于；掩饰 | |
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107
judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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108
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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109
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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110
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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111
skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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112
excellences
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| n.卓越( excellence的名词复数 )；（只用于所修饰的名词后）杰出的；卓越的；出类拔萃的 | |
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113
congruity
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| n.全等，一致 | |
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114
precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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115
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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116
dispels
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| v.驱散，赶跑( dispel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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117
habitually
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| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
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118
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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119
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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120
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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121
infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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