The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own exertions2, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who produced it. The foundation of the whole is, the right of producers to what they themselves have produced. It may be objected, therefore, to the institution as it now exists, that it recognises rights of property in individuals over things which they have not produced. For example (it may be said) the operatives in a manufactory create, by their labour and skill, the whole produce; yet, instead of its belonging to them, the law gives them only their stipulated4 hire, and transfers the produce to some one who has merely supplied the funds, without perhaps contributing anything to the work itself, even in the form of superintendence. The answer to this is, that the labour of manufacture is only one of the conditions which must combine for the production of the commodity. The labour cannot be carried on without materials and machinery6, nor without a stock of necessaries provided in advance, to maintain the labourers during the production. All these things are the fruits of previous labour. If the labourers were possessed7 of them, they would not need to divide the produce with any one; but while they have them not, an equivalent must be given to those who have, both for the antecedent labour, and for the abstinence by which the produce of that labour, instead of being expended8 on indulgences, has been reserved for this use. The capital may not have been, and in most cases was not, created by the labour and abstinence of the present possessor; but it was created by the labour and abstinence of some former person, who may indeed have been wrongfully dispossessed of it, but who, in the present age of the world, much more probably transferred his claims to the present capitalist by gift or voluntary contract: and the abstinence at least must have been continued by each successive owner, down to the present. If it he said, as it may with truth, that those who have inherited the savings10 of others have an advantage which they may have in no way deserved, over the industrious11 whose predecessors12 have not left them anything; I not only admit, but strenuously13 contend, that this unearned advantage should be curtailed14, as much as is consistent with justice to those who thought fit to dispose of their savings by giving them to their descendants. But while it is true that the labourers are at a disadvantage compared with those whose predecessors have saved, it is also true that the labourers are far better off than if those predecessors had not saved. They share in the advantage, though not to an equal extent with the inheritors. The terms of co-operation between present labour and the fruits of past labour and saving, are a subject for adjustment between the two parties. Each is necessary to the other. The capitalists can do nothing without labourers, nor the labourers without capital. If the labourers compete for employment, the capitalists on their part compete for labour, to the full extent of the circulating capital of the country. Competition is often spoken of as if it were necessarily a cause of misery16 and degradation17 to the labouring class; as if high wages were not precisely18 as much a product of competition as low wages. The remuneration of labour is as much the result of the law of competition in the United States, as it is in Ireland, and much more completely so than in England.
The right of property includes then, the freedom of acquiring by contract. The right of each to what he has produced, implies a right to what has been produced by others, if obtained by their free consent; since the producers must either have given it from good will, or exchanged it for what they esteemed19 an equivalent, and to prevent them from doing so would be to infringe20 their right of property in the product of their own industry.
§2. Before proceeding21 to consider the things which the principle of individual property does not include, we must specify22 one more thing which it does include: and this is that a title, after a certain period, should be given by prescription23. According to the fundamental idea of property, indeed, nothing ought to be treated as such, which has been acquired by force or fraud, or appropriated in ignorance of a prior title vested in some other person; but it is necessary to the security of rightful possessors, that they should not be molested24 by charges of wrongful acquisition, when by the lapse25 of time witnesses must have perished or been lost sight of, and the real character of the transaction can no longer be cleared up. Possession which has not been legally questioned within a moderate number of years, ought to be, as by the laws of all nations it is, a complete title. Even when the acquisition was wrongful, the dispossession, after a generation has elapsed, of the probably bona fide possessors, by the revival26 of a claim which had been long dormant27, would generally be a greater injustice28, and almost always a greater private and public mischief29, than leaving the original wrong without atonement. It may seem hard that a claim, originally just, should be defeated by mere5 lapse of time; but there is a time after which (even looking at the individual case, and without regard to the general effect on the security of possessors), the balance of hardship turns the other way. With the injustices30 of men, as with the convulsions and disasters of nature, the longer they remain unrepaired, the greater become the obstacles to repairing them, arising from the aftergrowths which would have to be torn up or broken through. In no human transactions, not even in the simplest and clearest, does it follow that a thing is fit to be done now, because it was fit to be done sixty years ago. It is scarcely needful to remark, that these reasons for not disturbing acts of injustice of old date, cannot apply to unjust systems or institutions; since a bad law or usage is not one bad act, in the remote past, but a perpetual repetition of bad acts, as long as the law or usage lasts.
Such, then, being the essentials of private property, it is now to be considered, to what extent the forms in which the institution has existed in different states of society, or still exists, are necessary consequences of its principle, or are recommended by the reasons on which it is grounded.
§3. Nothing is implied in property but the right of each to his (or her) own faculties31, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever he can get for them in a fair market; together with his right to give this to any other person if he chooses, and the right of that other to receive and enjoy it.
It follows, therefore, that although the right of bequest32, or gift after death, forms part of the idea of private property, the right of inheritance, as distinguished33 from bequest, does not. That the property of persons who have made no disposition34 of it during their lifetime, should pass first to their children, and failing them, to the nearest relations, may be a proper arrangement or not, but is no consequence of the principle of private property. Although there belong to the decision of such questions many considerations besides those of political economy, it is not foreign to the plan of this work to suggest, for the judgment35 of thinkers, the view of them which most recommends itself to the writer’s mind.
No presumption36 in favour of existing ideas on this subject is to be derived37 from their antiquity38. In early ages, the property of a deceased person passed to his children and nearest relatives by so natural and obvious an arrangement, that no other was likely to be even thought of in competition with it. In the first place, they were usually present on the spot: they were in possession, and if they had no other title, had that, so important in an early state of society, of first occupancy. Secondly39, they were already, in a manner, joint40 owners of his property during his life. If the property was in land, it had generally been conferred by the State on a family rather than on an individual: if it consisted of cattle or moveable goods, it had probably been acquired, and was certainly protected and defended, by the united efforts of all members of the family who were of an age to work or fight. Exclusive individual property in the modern sense, scarcely entered into the ideas of the time; and when the first magistrate41 of the association died, he really left nothing vacant but his own share in the division, which devolved on the member of the family who succeeded to his authority. To have disposed of the property otherwise, would have been to break up a little commonwealth42, united by ideas, interest, and habits, and to cast them adrift on the world. These considerations, though rather felt than reasoned about, had so great an influence on the minds of mankind, as to create the idea of an inherent right in the children to the possessions of their ancestor; a right which it was not competent to himself to defeat. Bequest, in a primitive43 state of society, was seldom recognised; a clear proof, were there no other, that property was conceived in a manner totally different from the conception of it in the present time.1
But the feudal44 family, the last historical form of patriarchal life, has long perished, and the unit of society is not now the family or clan45, composed of all the reputed descendants of a common ancestor, but the individual; or at most a pair of individuals, with their unemancipated children. Property is now inherent in individuals, not in families:the children when grown up do not follow the occupations or fortunes of the parent: if they participate in the parent’s pecuniary46 means it is at his or her pleasure, and not by a voice in the ownership and government of the whole, but generally by the exclusive enjoyment47 of a part; and in this country at least (except as far as entails48 or settlements are an obstacle) it is in the power of parents to disinherit even their children, and leave their fortune to strangers. More distant relatives are in general almost as completely detached from the family and its interests as if they were in no way connected with it. The only claim they are supposed to have on their richer relations, is to a preference, caeteris paribus, in good offices, and some aid in case of actual necessity.
So great a change in the constitution of society must make a considerable difference in the grounds on which the disposal of property by inheritance should rest. The reasons usually assigned by modern writers for giving the property of a person who dies intestate, to the children, or nearest relatives, are, first, the supposition that in so disposing of it, the law is more likely than in any other mode to do what the proprietor50 would have done, if he had done anything; and secondly, the hardship, to those who lived with their parents and partook in their opulence51, of being cast down from the enjoyments52 of wealth into poverty and privation.
There is some force in both these arguments. The law ought, no doubt, to do for the children or dependents of an intestate, whatever it was the duty of the parent or protector to have done, so far as this can be known by any one besides himself. Since, however, the law cannot decide on individual claims, but must proceed by general rules, it is next to be considered what these rules should be.
We may first remark, that in regard to collateral53 relatives, it is not, unless on grounds personal to the particular individual, the duty of any one to make a pecuniary provision for them. No one now expects it, unless there happen to be no direct heirs; nor would it be expected even then, if the expectation were not created by the provisions of the law in case of intestacy. I see, therefore, no reason why collateral inheritance should exist at all. Mr Bentham long ago proposed, and other high authorities have agreed in the opinion, that if there are no heirs either in the descending54 or in the ascending55 line, the property, in case of intestacy, should escheat to the State. With respect to the more remote degrees of collateral relationship, the point is not very likely to be disputed. Few will maintain that there is any good reason why the accumulations of some childless miser15 should on his death (as every now and then happens) go to enrich a distant relative who never saw him, who perhaps never knew himself to be related to him until there was something to be gained by it, and who had no moral claim upon him of any kind, more than the most entire stranger. But the reason of the case applies alike to all collaterals56, even in the nearest degree. Collaterals have no real claims, but such as may be equally strong in the case of non-relatives; and in the one case as in the other, where valid57 claims exist, the proper mode of paying regard to them is by bequest.
The claims of children are of a different nature: they are real, and indefeasible. But even of these, I venture to think that the measure usually taken is an erroneous one: what is due to children is in some respects underrated, in others, as it appears to me, exaggerated. One of the most binding58 of all obligations, that of not bringing children into the world unless they can be maintained in comfort during childhood, and brought up with a likelihood of supporting themselves when of full age, is both disregarded in practice and made light of in theory in a manner disgraceful to human intelligence. On the other hand, when the parent possesses property, the claims of the children upon it seem to me to be the subject of an opposite error. Whatever fortune a parent may have inherited, or still more, may have acquired, I cannot admit that he owes to his children, merely because they are his children, to leave them rich, without the necessity of any exertion3. I could not admit it, even if to be so left were always, and certainly, for the good of the children themselves. But this is in the highest degree uncertain. It depends on individual character. Without supposing extreme cases, it may be affirmed that in a majority of instances the good not only of society but of the individuals would be better consulted by bequeathing to them a moderate, than a large provision. This, which is a commonplace of moralists ancient and modern, is felt to be true by many intelligent parents, and would be acted upon much more frequently, if they did not allow themselves to consider less what really is, than what will be thought by others to be, advantageous59 to the children.
The duties of parents to their children are those which are indissolubly to the fact of causing the existence of a human being. The parent owes to society to endeavour to make the child a good and valuable member of it, and owes to the children to provide, so far as depends on him, such education, and such appliances and means, as will enable them to start with a fair chance of achieving by their own exertions a successful life. To this every child has a claim; and I cannot admit, that as a child he has a claim to more. There is a case in which these obligations present themselves in their true light, without any extrinsic60 circumstances to disguise or confuse them: it is that of an illegitimate child. To such a child it is generally felt that there is due from the parent, the amount of provision for his welfare which will enable him to make his life on the whole a desirable one.I hold that to no child, merely as such, anything more is due, than what is admitted to be due to an illegitimate child: and that no child for whom thus much has been done, has, unless on the score of previously62 raised expectations, any grievance63, if the remainder of the parent’s fortune is devoted64 to public uses, or to the benefit of individuals on whom in the parent’s opinion it is better bestowed65.
In order to give the children that fair chance of a desirable existence, to which they are entitled, it is generally necessary that they should not be brought up from childhood in habits of luxury which they will not have the means of indulging in after-life. This, again, is a duty often flagrantly violated by possessors of terminable incomes, who have little property to leave. When the children of rich parents have lived, as it is natural they should do, in habits, corresponding to the scale of expenditure66 in which the parents indulge, it is generally the duty of the parents to make a greater provision for them than would suffice for children otherwise brought up. I say generally, because even here there is another side to the question. It is a proposition quite capable of being maintained, that to a strong nature which has to make its way against narrow circumstances, to have known early some of the feelings and experiences of wealth, is an advantage both in the formation of character and in the happiness of life. But allowing that children have a just ground of complaint, who have been brought up to require luxuries which they are not afterwards likely to obtain, and that their claim, therefore, is good to a provision baring some relation to the mode of their bringing up; this, too, is a claim which is particularly liable to be stretched further than its reasons warrant. The case is exactly that of the younger children of the nobility and landed gentry67, the bulk of whose fortune passes to the eldest68 son. The other sons, who are usually numerous, are brought up in the same habits of luxury as the future heir, and they receive as a younger brother’s portion, generally what the reason of the case dictates69, namely, enough to support, in the habits of life to which they are accustomed, themselves, but not a wife or children. It really is no grievance to any man, that for the means of marrying and of supporting a family, he has to depend on his own exertions.
A provision, then, such as is admitted to be reasonable in the case of illegitimate children, for younger children, wherever in short the justice of the case, and the real interests of the individuals and of society, are the only things considered, is, I conceive, all that parents owe to their children, and all, therefore, which the State owes to the children of those who die intestate. The surplus, if any, I hold that it may rightfully appropriate to the general purposes of the community. I would not, however, be supposed to recommend that parents should never do more for their children than what, merely as children, they have a moral right to. In some cases it is imperative70, in many laudable, and in all allowable, to do much more. For this, however, the means are afforded by the liberty of bequest. It is due, not to the children but to the parents, that they should have the power of showing marks of affection, of requiting71 services and sacrifices, and of bestowing72 their wealth according to their own preferences, or their own judgment of fitness.
§4. Whether the power of bequest should itself be subject to limitation, is an ulterior question of great importance. Unlike inheritance ab intestato,bequest is one of the attributes of property: the ownership of a thing cannot be looked upon as complete without the power of bestowing it, at death or during life, at the owner’s pleasure: and all the reasons, which recommend that private property should exist, recommend pro1 tanto this extension of it. But property is only a means to an end, not itself the end. Like all other proprietary73 rights, and even in a greater degree than most, the power of bequest may be so exercised as to conflict with the permanent interests of the human race. It does so, when, not content with bequeathing an estate to A, the testator prescribes that on A’s death it shall pass to his eldest son, and to that son’s son, and so on for ever. No doubt, persons have occasionally exerted themselves more strenuously to acquire a fortune from the hope of founding a family in perpetuity; hut the mischiefs74 to society of such perpetuities outweigh75 the value of this incentive76 to exertion, and the incentives77 in the case of those who have the opportunity of making large fortunes are strong enough without it. A similar abuse of the power of bequest is committed when a person who does the meritorious78 act of leaving property for public uses, attempts to prescribe the details of its application in perpetuity; when in founding a place of education (for instance) he dictates, for ever, what doctrines79 shall be taught. It being impossible that any one should know what doctrines will be fit to be taught after he has been dead for centuries, the law ought not to give effect to such dispositions80 of property, unless subject to the perpetual revision (after a certain interval81 has elapsed) of a fitting authority.
These are obvious limitations. But even the simplest exercise of the right of bequest, that of determining the person to whom property shall pass immediately on the death of the testator, has always been reckoned among the privileges which might be limited or varied83, according to views of expediency84. The limitations, hitherto, have been almost solely85 in favour of children. In England the right is in principle unlimited86, almost the only impediment being that arising from a settlement by a former proprietor, in which case the holder87 for the time being cannot indeed bequeath his possessions, but only because there is nothing to bequeath, he having merely a life interest. By the Roman law, on which the civil legislation of the Continent of Europe is principally founded, bequest originally was not permitted at all, and even after it was introduced, a legitima portio was compulsorily88 reserved for each child; and such is still the law in some of the Continental89 nations. By the French law since the Revolution, the parent can only dispose by will, of a portion equal to the share of one child, each of the children taking an equal portion. This entail49, as it may be called, of the bulk of every one’s property upon the children collectively, seems to me as little defensible in principle as an entail in favour of one child, though it does not shock so directly the idea of justice. I cannot admit that parents should be compelled to leave to their children even that provision which, as children, I have contended that they have a moral claim to. Children may forfeit90 that claim by general unworthiness, or particular ill-conduct to the parents: they may have other resources or prospects91: what has been previously done for them, in the way of education and advancement92 in life, may fully9 satisfy their moral claim; or others may have claims superior to theirs.
The extreme restriction93 of the power of bequest in French law, was adopted as a democratic expedient94, to break down the custom of primogeniture, and counteract95 the tendency of inherited property to collect in large masses. I agree in thinking these objects eminently96 desirable; but the means used are not, I think, the most judicious97. Were I framing a code of laws according to what seems to me best in itself, without regard to existing opinions and sentiments, I should prefer to restrict, not what any one might bequeath, but what any one should be permitted to acquire, by bequest or inheritance. Each person should have power to dispose by will of his or her whole property; but not to lavish98 it in enriching some one individual, beyond a certain maximum, which should be fixed99 sufficiently100 high to afford the means of comfortable independence. The inequalities of property which arise from unequal industry, frugality101, perseverance102, talents, and to a certain extent even opportunities, are inseparable from the principle of private property, and if we accept the principle, we must bear with these consequences of it: but I see nothing objectionable in fixing a limit to what any one may acquire by the mere favour of others, without any exercise of his faculties, and in requiring that if he desires any further accession of fortune, he shall work for it.2 I do not conceive that the degree of limitation which this would impose on the right of bequest, would be felt as a burthensome restraint by any testator who estimated a large fortune at its true value, that of the pleasures and advantages that can be purchased with it: on even the most extravagant103 estimate of which, it must be apparent to every one, that the difference to the happiness of the possessor between a moderate independence and five times as much, is insignificant104 when weighed against the enjoyment that might be given, and the permanent benefits diffused105, by some other disposal of the four-fifths. So long indeed as the opinion practically prevails, that the best thing which can be done for objects of affection is to heap on them to satiety106 those intrinsically worthless things on which large fortunes are mostly expended, there might be little use in enacting107 such a law, even if it were possible to get it passed, there would generally be the power of evading108 it. The law would be unavailing unless the popular sentiment went energetically long with it; which (judging from the tenacious109 adherence110 of public opinion in France to the law of compulsory111 division) it would in some states of society and government be very likely to do, however much the contrary may be the fact in England and at the present time. If the restriction could be made practically effectual, the benefit would be great. Wealth which could no longer be employed in over-enriching a few, would either be devoted to objects of public usefulness, or if bestowed on individuals, would be distributed among a larger number. While those enormous fortunes which no one needs for any personal purpose but ostentation112 or improper113 power, would become much less numerous, there would be a great multiplication114 of persons in easy circumstances, with the advantages of leisure, and all the real enjoyments which wealth can those of vanity; a class by whom the services which a nation having leisured classes is entitled to expect from them, either by their direct exertions or by the tone they give to the feelings and tastes of the public, would be rendered in a much more beneficial manner than at present. A large portion also of the accumulations of successful industry would probably be devoted to public uses, either by direct bequests115 to the State, or by the endowment of institutions; as is already done very largely in the United States, where the ideas and practice in the matter of inheritance seem to be unusually rational and beneficial.3
§5. The next point to be considered is, whether the reasons on institution of property rests, are applicable to all things in which a right of exclusive ownership is at present recognised; and if not, on what other grounds the recognition is defensible.
The essential principle of property being to assure to all persons what they have produced by their labour and accumulated by their abstinence, this principle cannot apply to what is not the produce of labour, the raw material of the earth. If the land derived its productive power wholly from nature, and not at all from industry, or if there were any means of discriminating116 what is derived from each source, it not only would not be necessary, but it would be the height of injustice, to let the gift of nature be engrossed117 by individuals. The use of the land in agriculture must indeed, for the time being, he necessity exclusive; the same person who has ploughed and sown must be permitted to reap: but the land might be occupied for one season only, as among the ancient Germans; or might be periodically redivided as population increased: or the State might he the universal landlord, and the cultivators tenants118 under it, either on lease or at will.
But though land is not the produce of industry, most of its valuable qualities are so. Labour is not only requisite119 for using, but almost equally so for fashioning, the instrument. Considerable labour is often required at the commencement, to clear the land for cultivation120. In many cases, even when cleared, its productiveness is wholly the effect of labour and art. The Bedford Level produced little or nothing until artificially drained. The bogs121 of Ireland, until the same thing is done to them, can produce little besides fuel. One of the barrenest soils in the world, composed of the material of the Goodwin Sands, the Pays de Waes in Flanders, has been so fertilized122 by industry, as to have become one of the most productive in Europe. Cultivation also requires buildings and fences, which are wholly the produce of labour. The fruits of this industry cannot be reaped in a short period. The labour and outlay123 are immediate82, the benefit is spread over many years, perhaps over all future time. A holder will not incur124 this labour and outlay when strangers and not himself will he benefited by it. If he undertakes such improvements, he must have a sufficient period before him in which to profit by them: and he is in no way so sure of having always a sufficient period as when his tenure125 is perpetual.4
§6. These are the reasons which form the justification126 in an economical point of view, of property in land. It is seen, that they are only valid, in so far as the proprietor of land is its improver. Whenever, in any country, the proprietor, generally speaking, ceases to be the improver, political economy has nothing to say in defence of landed property, as there established. In no sound theory of private property was it ever contemplated127 that the proprietor of land should be merely a sinecurist128 quartered on it.
In Great Britain, the landed proprietor is not unfrequently an improver. But it cannot be said that he is generally so. And in the majority of cases he grants the liberty of cultivation on such terms, as to prevent improvements from being made by any one else. In the southern parts of the island, as there are usually no leases, permanent improvements can scarcely he made except by the landlord’s capital; accordingly the South, compiled with the North of England, and with the Lowlands of Scotland, is still extremely backward in agricultural improvement. The truth is, that any very general improvement of land by the landlords, is hardly compatible with a law or custom of primogeniture. When the land goes wholly to the heir, it generally goes to him severed129 from the pecuniary resources which would enable him to improve it, the personal property being absorbed by the provision for younger children, and the land itself often heavily burthened for the same purpose. There is therefore but a small proportion of landlords who have the means of making expensive improvements, unless they do it with borrowed money, and by adding to the mortgages with which in most cases the land was already burthened when they received it. But the position of the owner of a deeply mortgaged estate is so precarious130; economy is so unwelcome to one whose apparent fortune greatly exceeds his real means, and the vicissitudes131 of rent and price which only trench132 upon the margin133 of his income, are so formidable to one who can call little more than the margin his own, that it is no wonder if few landlords find themselves in a condition to make immediate sacrifices for the sake of future profit. Were they ever so much inclined, those alone can prudently134 do it, who have seriously studied the principles of scientific agriculture: and great landlords have seldom seriously studied anything. They might at least hold out inducements to the farmers to do what they will not or cannot do themselves; but even in granting leases, it is in England a general complaint that they tie up their tenants by covenants135 grounded on the practices of an obsolete136 and exploded agriculture; while most of them, by withholding137 leases altogether, and giving the farmer no guarantee of possession beyond a single harvest, keep the land on a footing little more favourable138 to improvement than in the time of our barbarous ancestors,
— immetata quibus jugera liberas
Fruges et Cererem ferunt,
Nec cultura placet longior annua.
Landed property in England is thus very far from completely fulfilling the conditions which render its existence economically justifiable139. But if insufficiently140 realized even in England, in Ireland those conditions are not complied with at all. With individual exceptions (some of them very honourable141 ones), the owners of Irish estates do nothing for the land but drain it of its produce. What has been epigrammatically said in the discussions on “peculiar142 burthens” is literally143 true when applied144 to them; that the greatest “burthen on land” is the landlords. Returning nothing to the soil, they consume its whole produce, minus the potatoes strictly145 necessary to keep the inhabitants from dying of famine; and when they have any purpose of improvement, the preparatory step usually consists in not leaving even this pittance146, but turning out the people to beggary if not to starvation.5 When landed property has placed itself upon this footing it ceases to be defensible, and the time has come for making some new arrangement of the matter.
When the “sacredness of property” is talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. its appropriation147 is wholly a question of general expediency. When private property in land is not expedient, it is unjust. It is no hardship to any one, to be excluded from what others have produced: they were not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at all. But it is some hardship to be born into the world and to find all nature’s gifts previously engrossed, and no place left for the new-comer. To reconcile people to this, after they have once admitted into their minds the idea that any moral rights belong to them as human beings, it will always be necessary to convince them that the exclusive appropriation is good for mankind on the whole, themselves included. But this is what no sane148 human being could be persuaded of, if the relation between the landowner and the cultivator were the same everywhere as it has been in Ireland.
Landed property is felt, even by those most tenacious of its rights, to be a different thing from other property; and where the bulk of the community have been disinherited of their share of it, and it has become the exclusive attribute of a small minority, men have generally tried to reconcile it, at least in theory, to their sense of justice, by endeavouring to attach duties to it, and erecting149 it into a sort of magistracy, either moral or legal. But if the state is at liberty to treat the possessors of land as public functionaries150, it is only going one step further to say, that it is at liberty to discard them. The claim of the landowners to the land is altogether subordinate to the general policy of the state. The principle of property gives them no right to the land, but only a right to compensation for whatever portion of their interest in the land it may be the policy of the state to deprive them of. To that, their claim is indefeasible. it is due to landowners, and to owners of any property whatever, recognised as such by the state, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they derived from it. This is due on the general principles on which property rests. If the land was bought with the compensation is due to them on even if otherwise, it is still due on that ground; even if otherwise, it is still due on the ground of prescription. Nor can it ever be necessary for accomplished151 an object by which community should be immolated152. When the property is of a kind to which peculiar affections attach themselves, the compensation ought to exceed a bare pecuniary equivalent. But, subject to the proviso, the state is at liberty to deal with landed property as the general interests of the community may require, even to the extent, if it so happen, of doing with the whole, what is done with a part whenever a bill is passed for a railroad or a new street. The community has too much at stake in the proper cultivation of the land, and in the conditions annexed153 to the occupancy of it, to leave these things to the discretion154 of a class of persons called landlords, when they have shown themselves unfit for the trust. The legislature, which if it pleased might convert the whole body of landlords into fundholders or pensioners155, might, à fortiori, commute156 the average receipts of Irish landowners into a fixed rent charge, and raise the tenants into proprietors157; supposing always that the full market value of the land was tendered to the landlords, in case they preferred that to accepting the conditions proposed.
There will be another place for discussing the various modes of landed property and tenure, and the advantages and inconveniences of each; in this chapter our concern is with the right itself, the grounds which justify158 it, and (as a corollary from these) the conditions by which it should be limited. To me it seems almost an axiom that property in land should be interpreted strictly, and that the balance in all cases of doubt should incline against the proprietor. The reverse is the case with property in moveables, and in all things the product of labour: over these, the owner’s power both of use and of exclusion159 should be absolute, except where positive evil to others would result from it: but in the case of land, no exclusive right should be permitted in any individual, which cannot be shown to be productive of positive good. To be allowed any exclusive right at all, over a portion of the common inheritance, while there are others who have no portion, is already a privilege. No quantity of moveable goods which a person can acquire by his labour, prevents others from acquiring the like by the same means; but from the very nature of the case, whoever owns land, keeps mothers out of the enjoyment of it. The privilege, or monopoly, is only defensible as a necessary evil; it becomes an injustice when carried to any point to which the compensating160 good does not follow it.
For instance, the exclusive right to the land for purposes of cultivation does not imply an exclusive right to it for purposes of access; and no such right ought to be recognised, except to the extent necessary to protect the produce against damage, and the owner’s privacy against invasion. The pretension161 of two Dukes to shut up a part of the Highlands, and exclude the rest of mankind from many square miles of mountain scenery to prevent disturbance162 to wild animals, is an abuse; it exceeds the legitimate61 bounds of the right of landed property. When land is not intended to be cultivated, no good reason can in general be given for its being private property at all; and if any one is permitted to call it his, he ought to know that he holds it by sufferance of the community, and on an implied condition that his ownership, since it cannot possibly do them any good, at least shall not deprive them of any, which could have derived from the land if it had been unappropriated. Even in the case of cultivated land, a man whom, though only one among millions, the law permits to hold thousands of acres as his single share, is not entitled to think that all this is given to him to use and abuse, and deal with as if it concerned nobody but himself. The rents or profits which he can obtain from it are at his sole disposal; but with regard to the land, in everything which he does with it, and in everything which he abstains163 from doing, he is morally bound, and should whenever the case admits be legally compelled, to make his interest and pleasure consistent with the public good. The species at large still retains, of its original claim to the soil of the planet which it inhabits, as much as is compatible with the purposes for which it has parted with the remainder.
§7. Besides property in the produce of labour, and property in land, there are other things which are or have been subjects of property, in which no proprietary rights ought to exist at all. But as the civilized164 world has in general made up its mind on most of these, there is no necessity for dwelling165 on them in this place. At the head of them, is property in human beings. It is almost superfluous166 to observe, that this institution can have no place in any society even pretending to be founded on justice, or on fellowship between human creatures. But, iniquitous167 as it is, yet when the state has expressly legalized it, and human beings, for generations, have been bought, sold, and inherited under sanction of law, it is another wrong, in abolishing the property, not to make full compensation. This wrong was avoided by the great measure of justice in 1833, one of the most virtuous168 acts, as well as the most practically beneficent, ever done collectively by a nation. Other examples of property which ought not to have been created, are properties in public trusts; such as judicial169 offices under the old French regime, and the heritable jurisdictions170 which, in countries not wholly emerged from feudality, pass with the land. Our own country affords, as cases in point, that of a commission in the army, and of an advowson, or right of nomination171 to an ecclesiastical benefice. A property is also sometimes created in a right of taxing the public; in a monopoly, for instance, or other exclusive privilege. These abuses prevail most in semibarbarous countries but are not without example in the most civilized. In France there are several important trades and professions, including notaries172, attorneys, brokers173, appraisers, printers, and (until lately) bakers174 and butchers, of which the numbers are limited by law. The brevet or privilege of one of the permitted number consequently brings a high price in the market. When such is the case, compensation probably could not with justice be refused, on the abolition175 of the privilege. There are other cases in which this would be more doubtful. The question would turn upon what, in the peculiar circumstances, was sufficient to constitute prescription; and whether the legal recognition which the abuse had obtained, was sufficient to constitute it an institution, or amounted only to an occasional licence. It would be absurd to claim compensation for losses caused by changes in a tariff176, a thing confessedly variable from year to year; or for monopolies like those granted to individuals by the Tudors, favours of a despotic authority, which the power that gave was competent at any time to recal.
So much on the institution of property, a subject of which, for the purposes of political economy, it was indispensable to treat, but on which we could not usefully confine ourselves to economical considerations. We have now to inquire on what principles and with what results the distribution of the produce of land and labour is effected, under the relations which this institution creates among the different members of the community.
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pro
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| n.赞成，赞成的意见，赞成者 | |
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exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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expended
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| v.花费( expend的过去式和过去分词 )；使用（钱等）做某事；用光；耗尽 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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savings
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| n.存款，储蓄 | |
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industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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predecessors
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| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
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strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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curtailed
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| v.截断，缩短( curtail的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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miser
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| n.守财奴，吝啬鬼 (adj.miserly) | |
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misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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degradation
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| n.降级；低落；退化；陵削；降解；衰变 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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esteemed
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| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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infringe
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| v.违反，触犯，侵害 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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specify
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| vt.指定，详细说明 | |
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prescription
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| n.处方，开药；指示，规定 | |
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molested
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| v.骚扰( molest的过去式和过去分词 )；干扰；调戏；猥亵 | |
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lapse
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| n.过失，流逝，失效，抛弃信仰，间隔；vi.堕落，停止，失效，流逝；vt.使失效 | |
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revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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dormant
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| adj.暂停活动的；休眠的；潜伏的 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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injustices
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| 不公平( injustice的名词复数 )； 非正义； 待…不公正； 冤枉 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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bequest
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| n.遗赠；遗产，遗物 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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magistrate
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| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
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commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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clan
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| n.氏族，部落，宗族，家族，宗派 | |
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pecuniary
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| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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entails
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| 使…成为必要( entail的第三人称单数 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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proprietor
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| n.所有人；业主；经营者 | |
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opulence
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| n.财富，富裕 | |
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enjoyments
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| 愉快( enjoyment的名词复数 )； 令人愉快的事物； 享有； 享受 | |
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collateral
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| adj.平行的；旁系的；n.担保品 | |
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descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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collaterals
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| n.附属担保品( collateral的名词复数 ) | |
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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extrinsic
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| adj.外部的；不紧要的 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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grievance
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| n.怨愤，气恼，委屈 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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bestowed
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| 赠给，授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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expenditure
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| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
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gentry
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| n.绅士阶级，上层阶级 | |
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eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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requiting
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| v.报答( requite的现在分词 )；酬谢；回报；报复 | |
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bestowing
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| 砖窑中砖堆上层已烧透的砖 | |
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proprietary
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| n.所有权，所有的；独占的；业主 | |
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mischiefs
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| 损害( mischief的名词复数 )； 危害； 胡闹； 调皮捣蛋的人 | |
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outweigh
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| vt.比...更重，...更重要 | |
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incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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incentives
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| 激励某人做某事的事物( incentive的名词复数 )； 刺激； 诱因； 动机 | |
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meritorious
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| adj.值得赞赏的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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holder
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| n.持有者，占有者；(台，架等)支持物 | |
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compulsorily
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| 强迫地，强制地 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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forfeit
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| vt.丧失；n.罚金，罚款，没收物 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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eminently
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| adv.突出地；显著地；不寻常地 | |
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judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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98
lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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99
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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100
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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101
frugality
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| n.节约，节俭 | |
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102
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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103
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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104
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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105
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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106
satiety
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| n.饱和；(市场的)充分供应 | |
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107
enacting
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| 制定（法律），通过（法案）( enact的现在分词 ) | |
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108
evading
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| 逃避( evade的现在分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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109
tenacious
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| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
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110
adherence
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| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
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111
compulsory
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| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
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112
ostentation
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| n.夸耀，卖弄 | |
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113
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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114
multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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115
bequests
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| n.遗赠( bequest的名词复数 )；遗产，遗赠物 | |
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116
discriminating
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| a.有辨别能力的 | |
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117
engrossed
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| adj.全神贯注的 | |
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118
tenants
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| n.房客( tenant的名词复数 )；佃户；占用者；占有者 | |
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119
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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120
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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121
bogs
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| n.沼泽，泥塘( bog的名词复数 )；厕所v.（使）陷入泥沼， （使）陷入困境( bog的第三人称单数 )；妨碍，阻碍 | |
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122
Fertilized
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| v.施肥( fertilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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123
outlay
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| n.费用，经费，支出；v.花费 | |
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124
incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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125
tenure
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| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
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126
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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127
contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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128
sinecurist
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| n.担任闲职的人员 | |
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129
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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130
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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131
vicissitudes
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| n.变迁，世事变化；变迁兴衰( vicissitude的名词复数 )；盛衰兴废 | |
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132
trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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133
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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134
prudently
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| adv. 谨慎地，慎重地 | |
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135
covenants
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| n.（有法律约束的）协议( covenant的名词复数 )；盟约；公约；（向慈善事业、信托基金会等定期捐款的）契约书 | |
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136
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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137
withholding
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| 扣缴税款 | |
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138
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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139
justifiable
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| adj.有理由的，无可非议的 | |
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140
insufficiently
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| adv.不够地，不能胜任地 | |
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141
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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142
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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143
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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144
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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145
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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146
pittance
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| n.微薄的薪水，少量 | |
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147
appropriation
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| n.拨款，批准支出 | |
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148
sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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149
erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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150
functionaries
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| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
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151
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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152
immolated
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| v.宰杀…作祭品( immolate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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153
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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154
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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155
pensioners
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| n.领取退休、养老金或抚恤金的人( pensioner的名词复数 ) | |
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156
commute
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| vi.乘车上下班；vt.减(刑)；折合；n.上下班交通 | |
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157
proprietors
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| n.所有人，业主( proprietor的名词复数 ) | |
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158
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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159
exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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160
compensating
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| 补偿，补助，修正 | |
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161
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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162
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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163
abstains
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| 戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的第三人称单数 )； 弃权（不投票） | |
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164
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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165
dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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166
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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167
iniquitous
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| adj.不公正的；邪恶的；高得出奇的 | |
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168
virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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169
judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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170
jurisdictions
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| 司法权( jurisdiction的名词复数 )； 裁判权； 管辖区域； 管辖范围 | |
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171
nomination
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| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
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172
notaries
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| n.公证人，公证员( notary的名词复数 ) | |
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173
brokers
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| n.（股票、外币等）经纪人( broker的名词复数 )；中间人；代理商；（订合同的）中人v.做掮客（或中人等）( broker的第三人称单数 )；作为权力经纪人进行谈判；以中间人等身份安排… | |
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174
bakers
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| n.面包师( baker的名词复数 )；面包店；面包店店主；十三 | |
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175
abolition
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| n.废除，取消 | |
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176
tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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